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Beginning in the 1970s, states adopted sentencing reforms as a response to a
growing number of concerns in the criminal justice system. These reforms included
sentencing guidelines, statutory presumptive sentencing, determinate sentencing, truth in
sentencing, and three strikes laws. Each reform has become an important part of the
judicial system. These "fixed" reforms shifted sentencing from the indeterminate-
rehabilitation sentencing model to a more predetermined-deterrence model. The reforms'
main purpose is to limit judicial discretion by insuring convicted felons receive a
reasonably standard sentence depending on the crime they committed.
Few studies have attempted to systematically answer the question of whether these
reforms produced the outcomes stated by their supporters. This analysis utilizes a social
chain theory, which suggests the socio-political context of the law and order movement
interacted with structural-procedural changes in the justice system that led to
vunintended consequences. The study assesses the effects of sentencing reforms on
shifts in year-to-year changes in general incarceration rates, changes in the racial/ethnic
composition of imprisonment, and changes in the gender composition of imprisonment. It
also assesses the social, political, and demographic characteristics of states that change the
rate of adoption of sentencing reforms across all 50 states from the years 1965 to 2008 on
the aggregate state level.
This study finds, counter to most previous findings, that sentencing reforms are
associated with higher rates of imprisonment. The results further suggest mechanisms are
at work that unintentionally "target" historically disadvantaged groups, perpetuating
inequalities within the criminal justice system instead of easing them. This result is counter
to some of the policies' stated goals. Conversely, the results suggest that drug arrest rates
and not sentencing reforms are associated with the narrowing gender gap in imprisonment.
Finally, the results indicate that state-level characteristics are important in predicting which
states will adopt sentencing reforms. From a policy perspective, rapid changes in the
composition of imprisonment can be a logistical and financial burden, and these results
shed light onto the specific mechanisms causing a portion of the change.
This dissertation includes previously unpublished co-authored material.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 1972 imprisonment rates in the United States began what would
become the largest growth in inmate population per-capita in the history of the nation. In
the four decades that followed, the U.S. would witness an unprecedented steady and rapid
growth in imprisonment. At the start of the rise, the imprisonment rate was about 100
inmates per 100,000 U.S. residents and by 2007 there were 506 inmates per 100,000 (see
Graph 1.1). This 500% increase drastically changed the way the prison system and the
justice system operated (DeFina and Arvanites 2002; Greenberg and West 2001).
At the same time imprisonment rates were rising, the U.S. embarked on a new and
vigorous "war on crime" that was characterized by a general "get tough" mentality. The
"get tough on crime" mentality was part of a larger movement some researchers have
come to call the law and order movement. The movement was born out of a counter
culture movement against the 1960s where civil unrest resulting in riots, radical black
power and youth movements, assassinations of top political figures, increased crime, and
increased drug use drove public pressure to "do something about it" (Roberts 1996). This
public perception interacted with partisan politics and media coverage to create a "perfect
storm" for the law and order movement to flourish (Abramsky 2007; Beckett 1997;
Scheingold 1991).
2Graph 1.1. Average State Imprisonment Rate Over Time from 1965 to 2008
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Note: The dotted reference line indicates 1972, which was the last year imprisonment remained relatively
low before the rapid and steady increase of the "imprisonment binge" began.
Sentencing reforms were a part of the law and order movement and have
drastically shifted the function and goals of sentencing to a system that is relatively more
predetermined and calculable. The main purpose of sentencing reforms is to remove
judicial discretion by insuring that convicted felons receive relatively similar sentence
depending on the crime committed. Prior to sentencing reforms, the U.S. was dominated
by an indeterminate sentencing system. This system allowed considerable latitude to the
judge in rendering the type and degree of sentence. Parole boards acting independently
of other parts of the judicial system and largely independent of legislators then
3determined if the prisoner had been properly rehabilitated and was ready for
release. This model represented the rehabilitation goal of sentencing. It was believed
that offenders could be reformed within prisons (Blumstein, Cohen, Martin, and Tonry
1983; Frase 2005). Sentencing was meant to meet the offender's needs and patterned to
allow the process of reform to play out. Thus, offenders were sentenced using rather
loose sentencing ranges (Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006; Tonry 1995).
The sentencing discretion was granted to the judge (and in a few jurisdictions, the
jury) largely by legislators at both the state and federal levels who established rather
loose sentencing ranges, often allowing combinations of confinement and probation.
This allowed the judge latitude to select a sentence within the relatively wide prescribed
range when establishing minimum and maximum amounts of time-served (Roberts
1996). Relatively few set laws or procedures defined how the judge was to determine the
sentence. Upon release, the convict would be reintroduced as a rehabilitated individual
who was socially functional and law abiding (Albonetti 1997; Kempf-Leonard and
Sample 2001; Marvell 1995).
The dominance of the indeterminate sentencing model came to an end during the
law and order movement. The criticisms began during the 1970's, reached new heights
during the 1980's, and continue today on multiple fronts (Hebert 1997; Reitz 1995).
Critics advanced a number of purported problems, including complaints about the
arbitrariness of the sentencing procedure, ineffectiveness of treatment and reform
programs, lack of tough time, and claims of rampant repeat offenders. Critics focusing
on sentencing charged that it allowed far too much disparity in types of sentencing and
4time served. As a result, a push to limit the variability in sentencing occurred
(Griset 1995; Hebert 1997; Miethe and Moore 1985).
Whereas the indeterminate-rehabilitation model of sentencing is offender-
centered, the sentencing reform policies of the law and order movement are crime
centered. Their goal is not to reform offenders, but to punish than. The model serves to
create uniformity among similarly situated crimes. Judges no longer set sentences based
on a loose range, but instead pass along a pre-determined fixed sentence to the offender
based almost solely on their prior record and crime committed (Spohn 2000; Tonry
1995). Often, parole boards were then significantly limited or removed as the decision
making body in determining if the offender was ready to return to society. The model
pushes towards strict deterrence theory where the punishment is ideally, swift, certain,
and severe. While the due-process revolution has made the swift component difficult to
achieve!, sentencing reforms were successful in implementing the certain and severe
components (Blumstein, Cohen, Martin, and Tonry 1983; Von Hirsch 1985).
In this analysis we examine the effects of the six main sentencing reforms passed
after 1972, which include sentencing guidelines (divided into two different types),
statutory presumptive sentencing, determinate sentencing, truth in sentencing, and three
strikes laws (see Appendix A for detailed discussion of the structure of each reform).
Each has become an important part of the criminal justice system (see Table 1.1).
Appendix A describes in detail the differences between the various reforms, but the key
1 This is not necessarily a bad thing and many researchers have shown the benefits of such limits (Albonetti
1997; Saltzburg 2001).
5is that they all generally make a shift away from the rehabilitation model and
towards a deterrence model with more predictability.
Three of the reforms operate on the front-end, focusing on judicial discretion.
They can be ranked in accordance of their level of severity and by the power they possess
to limit discretion. The first is presumptive sentencing guidelines. It consists of a table of
possible sentences with a very narrow range within a sentencing category that is defined
by an offender's criminal history (prior offenses) running across the top of the table and
the severity of the current offense running down the side of the table. These two main
determinants are cross-referenced to determine the sentencing range. The reform is strict
in its application. Allowing only very limited deviations (e.g., judge decides to hand
down a longer than prescribed sentence).
The second most severe reform is voluntary sentencing guidelines. They treat
guidelines as a formal recommendation, but do not legally mandate they be followed.
The difference is in their legal mechanisms. States with presumptive sentencing
guidelines have "legally-binding" sentencing matrixes enforceable by appellate review,
allowing both the prosecution and defense to appeal sentences that do not follow the
guidelines. Conversely, in states with the voluntary guidelines, there is no appellate
review. First passed in the mid 1980s, sentencing guidelines are the most rational and
predictable of the front-end reforms.
The third and final front-end reform considered is statutory presumptive
sentencing. Like sentencing guidelines, it represents an attempt to create uniformity
within similarly situated crimes, but acts less like a sentencing rubric. It specifies an
6appropriate or "normal" sentence for each offense, creating more uniformity within
similarly situated crimes, but ultimately leaves a large degree of discretion to judges
(Spelman 2009; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006; Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn 2009).
Presumptive sentencing guidelines, voluntary sentencing guidelines, and statutory
presumptive sentencing are considered independent and mutually exclusive "front-end"
"fixed" sentencing reforms and may not, at any given time, coexist with each other or
indeterminate sentencing. Their main focus is in the actions of the judge. Conversely,
the "back-end" limiting (truth in sentencing) or elimination (determinate sentencing) of
discretionary release is considered separate because their focus on release allows
operation alongside the "front-end" reforms. These two reforms act to limit the ability of
prison officials to shorten the original sentence (Blumstein, Cohen, Martin, and Tonry
1983; Tonry 1995).
Truth in sentencing legislation was first instituted in Illinois in 1978 and twenty-
four states now have such laws. These laws require that those convicted serve a
statutorily defined minimum amount of time, limiting the power of parole boards or other
release mechanisms.2 The other major back-end reform is often called determinate
sentencing and, in general, is used to refer to a system without discretionary parole
boards.
Finally we consider three strikes laws. This reform is unique and independent
from the other reforms because it focuses on a specific offender; the habitual repeat
offender. Three strikes can be considered alongside both the front-end and back-end
2 In our coding of this variable we included only states meeting the 1994 federal omnibus crime bill
minimum 85% time served of the original sentence.
7reforms. They work to sentence three-time felony offenders to long sentences,
often 25 years to life. Washington was the first state to pass a three strikes law in 1993
and due to a couple of high profile cases that created a media frenzy, 23 more states
adopted the reform in a short three-year period. Because of the unique nature of the
reform and the way the law was passed, the effect of this reform is likely to be less than
the previous reforms, but any analysis of sentencing reforms would be remiss if it did not
consider them (Boerner 2001; Dickey and Hollenhorst 1999; Kovandzic, Sloan, and
Vieraitis 2004).
Table 1.1. Distribution of Sentencing Types Across the United States as of 2008
Presum.
Guide
Vol
Guide
Stat.
Presum
Deter.
Sent
Truth in
Sent
Three
Strikes
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
- - - - - -
- - 1980 - - -
- - 1978 1994 1994 -
- 1994 - - - 1995
- - 1976 - 1994 1994
- - 1979 - - 1994
- - - - 1995 1994
1987 - - 1990 1990 -
1983 - - 1983 1995 1995
- - - - 1995 1995
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - 1978 - -
- - 1977 - - 1994
- - - - 1996 -
1983 - - - 1993 1994
- - - - - -
- 1992 - - - 1994
- - - 1976 1995 -
- 1983 - - - 1994
- - - - - -
- - - - 1994 -
8Table 1.1. (continue)
Presum.
Guide
Vol
Guide
Stat.
Presum
Deter.
Sent
Truth in
Sent
Three
Strikes
1980 - - 1982 1993 -
- - - 1995 1995 -
- 1997 - - 1994 -
- - - - - 1995
- - - - - -
- - - - - 1995
- - - - - -
- - 1977 - - 1995
- - 1977 - - 1994
- - - - 1995 -
1994 - - 1994 1994 1994
- - - - 1995 1995
1996 - - 1996 1996 -
- - - - - -
1989 - - 1989 1995 -
1982 - - - 1991 1995
- - 1980 - - -
- - - - - 1995
- - - - 1996 -
1989 - - - 1995 1995
- - - - - -
- 1993 - - 1985 1995
- - - - - 1995
- - - 1995 1995 1994
1983 - - 1984 1984 1993
- - - - - -
- 1985 - - - 1994
- - - - - -
10 7 8 12 24 24
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Nolih Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Is.
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Total
Note: Table 1.1 represents the current sentencmg type used by each state as of2008. Presum. Guide. refer
stands for presumptive sentencing guidelines. Vol. guide. Stands for voluntary sentencing guidelines. Stat.
Presum. Sent. Stands for statutory presumptive sentencing. Deter. Sent. stands for determinate sentencing.
Truth in sent. stands for truth in sentencing. Three strikes refers to three strikes laws. All other states
utilize indeterminate sentencing.
While states adopting reforms often adopted numerous types (e.g.) Oregon which
adopted presumptive sentencing guidelines in 1989, abolished parole in 1989, and
adopted truth in sentencing in 1995), their coexistence is not absolute and they were often
instituted in different years (see Table 1.1 for complete list of reforms) (Frase 2005;
Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006). There are three key points about the reforms that
9should be noted. First, all six reforms represent a shift from the indeterminate-
rehabilitation model to a more punitive model with a discretion-limiting sentencing
structure. Second, because the dependent variables in the analyses presented in chapters
2-5 do not include county or local jail populations, only individuals sentenced to more
than one year are considered. Because it takes time from the passage of these reforms
until their implementation, we use a one-year lag (impact one year after inception) in our
analyses. Third, while in the year following the reform there was likely an instantaneous
effect on some portion of the imprisonment rate, not all individuals imprisoned during
that year were "caught up" by the reform. Some of the individuals contributing to the
imprisonment rate (the dependent variables) were individuals who were already
imprisoned and sentenced under the old sentencing procedure. Over time, a greater
proportion of prisoners were likely to be "caught up" by the reform. At some point a
plateau at nearly full effect would have occurred with only a small portion of the rate
attributable to those sentenced to long terms under indeterminate sentencing. To address
both the lagged effect and capture the expected "logged growth curve" like effect, a new
measure of reforms was implemented. Using a logarithmic measure to model the effect
of sentencing reforms represents an important divergence of this study from previous
studies, which relied heavily on dummy variables to code the reforms effects on
imprisonment rates in an "instantaneous" manner. 3
3 Coding the reforms as dummy variables for adopted reforms suggests that imprisonment rates would be
affected 100% by the new policy in the first year it was adopted. A logarithmic measure represents a more
appropriate theoretically expected effect and should lead to more robust results.
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Few studies have attempted to systematically answer the question of
whether these new sentencing procedures or parole board's limitations produced the
outcomes stated by their supporters. The current study assessed the effects on shifts in
incarceration rates within states (all 50 states) from the years 1965 to 2008.4 The study
has implications for both theory and policy. Substantively, the results may indicate that
reforms significantly increased imprisonment. Functionally, rapid prison growth can be a
logistical and financial burden on a state and these results could help to shed light onto
the specific mechanisms associated with this growth. Furthermore, the results may
indicate that socio-political mechanisms are at work that "target" historically
disadvantaged groups, which may aid in the continuation of inequalities within the
criminal justice system. This is of particular concern given that many states have
suggested that racial and ethnic disparities should decrease with the limiting of judicial
discretion. If results indicate no change or even an increase in disparities despite
intentions to reduce, then states may want to reevaluate their sentencing procedures.
Primarily the research aims to assess "changes over time" within state
imprisonment rates due to sentencing reforms. The full project assessed the effects of
sentencing reforms on (1) the total state imprisonment rate; (2) imprisonment rates of
people of color; (3) the female to male composition of state imprisonment rates; and (4)
sociopolitical climates within states that led to adoption of sentencing reforms. The goal
of the full project (all 4 sections) is to shed light on the effects of "fixed" sentencing
reforms on these key areas of imprisonment rates by building theoretical understandings
4 Some of the individual analyses incorporate fewer years or include only 49 states.
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of the adoption of refonns and the policy implications resulting from unforeseen
consequences. States have committed large amounts of time and money in the process of
adopting and implementing these refonns and research is needed to assess their impact.
Given the context of the time (e.g., the law and order movement) and the
increased bureaucratization of the system (e.g., Weberian fonnal rationalizations) it was
expected that states passing refonns would have shifted their imprisonment rates and
composition of those imprisoned as a direct result of the structure of the refonn compared
to non-refonn states. The project suggests that fonnal rationality theory gives us the
needed structure to understand how the refonns affected sentencing, while a
sociopolitical interaction theory allows us to understand why it happened. Why it
happened is found in the law and order movement. The sociopolitical interaction theory
suggests the policy shifts represent the highly connected push-pull between the media,
politicians, and a public demand for punishment that characterized the law and order
movement. Politicians championed the refonn movement where "getting tough on
crime" became a political hot button issue and policy makers, both liberal and
conservative, risked political suicide if they appeared even remotely soft on crime and
justice (Gottschalk 2006; Jacobs and Cannichae1200 1; Smith 2004). The theory
suggests U.S. states began adopting neoclassical or what we have come to call "fixed"
sentencing6 procedures (see appendix A for descriptions) when both political rhetoric and
5 This concept is presented in more detail in subsequent chapters
6 The name "fixed" sentencing is designed to illustrate the more determined nature of the reforms in
comparison to indeterminate sentencing. This is not to suggest reforms are "fixed" with no discretion or
departures. The name is only intended to highlight the more structured and more assured nature of the new
sentencing procedure. "Fixed" reforms refers to sentencing reforms in the form of sentencing guidelines,
12
public outcry combined to lead to a demand for highly punitive sanctions, the
result being a focus on few things other than punishment (Frase 2005; Stemen, Rengifo,
and Wilson 2006). We further suggest that the sociopolitical movement to get tough on
crime produced a shift from a substantive rational system to a formal rational system.
This structural shift gives the reforms the needed mechanisms to have a causal impact on
imprisonment. In the end, this paper suggests the "fixing" of sentencing represents both
the goal of creating more punitive sanctions (ensuring the move towards the deterrence
model) and the shift in structure to ensure it.
As Scheingo1d (1991) and Beckett (1997) suggest, the shift from indeterminate
sentencing to "fixed" sentencing represented the concerted effort by policy makers to
advance what has been called the "justice model" of crime and punishment that focuses
on making criminals pay and deterring those who might commit crimes in the future.
The model creates a system that is often referred to as "just deserts" in which the
punishment is designed to fit the crime not the offender (Doob 2000; Frase 2005; Simon
2007). "Fixed" sentencing may serve as a concrete policy that represents a cultural
climate in which both political rhetoric and public outcry resulted in highly punitive
sanctions that focus little attention on any goal other than punishment.
While considerable criminology research focused on the structural causes (e.g.,
poverty, racial segregation, and class conflict) of crime and imprisonment and the social
disparities embedded in them (Engen and Gainey 2000; Engen and Steen 2000; Irwin and
statutory presumptive sentencing, determinate sentencing, truth in sentencing, and three strikes laws which
shifts the system from a indeterminate rehabilitation model of sentencing to a more predetermined punitive
structure.
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Austin 1997; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000; Tayler 2000), research also
suggests policy makers largely operate and make decisions outside the structural
approach. Therefore a focus on the structures will not inform our understanding of why
the policy was adopted (Beckett 1997; Doob 2000; Simon 2007). Scheingold (1991)
suggests, instead, we need to focus on the public perceptions of crime. He argues that the
public largely constructs its view on the interpersonal level, focusing on the offender-
victim paradigm. That is, crime is an issue of underlying offender pathology and the
personal-societal effect it has on the victim: focusing on personal harm and the social
stigma attached to it. To the average citizen, the state's purpose is in limiting the actions
of those who are likely to "perform" deviant acts and punishing those who have wronged
others. Understanding the crime and justice schemas of the average citizen suggests why
there is such an intense focus on sentencing. To the average citizen, the sentence is both
the loci ofpunishment and the loci ofprotection (Beckett 1997; Jacobs and Carmichael
2001; Scheingold 1991).
But as Scheingold (1991) further suggests, the mechanisms by which policy are
adopted is complex and interactive taking into consideration policy; policy makers at
national, state, and local levels; political elites; public opinions; citizen activism; and
media responses and representations. "[PJolicy changes are mostly likely to occur when
political leaders, in part by taking their cues from the media, choose to play upon public
anxieties that are themselves inflamed by media imagery and vicarious victimization
rather than by crime as such (Scheingold 1991:44)".
14
An examination of the justice model under the law and order movement7
lends support to this argument. Expansion of the justice model was often used to further
political agendas by playing on public fears of crime. Both Republicans and Democrats
championed this agenda and benefited from the movement. "Getting tough on crime"
became a political hot topic, and policy makers, both liberals and conservatives, pushed
an individualistic view of crime as a function of societal deviants that should be
addressed by punitive measures (Abramsky 2007; Hunter 1991; Simon 2007).
Meanwhile, the media added to the movement by continually displaying images
of crime that were largely symbolic of individual deviant actors preying upon random
isolated individuals. Once the three components, the public, the media, and politicians,
became full integrated and the fear of crime became a social issue, politicians then seized
upon the fear to create law and justice platfonns focused on getting tough on crime. This
complex circle of interactions served to promote and sustain the politicization of crime
that reinforces the deterrence model ofjustice (Beckett 1997; Simon 2007).
Savelsberg (1992) argues sentencing refonns are an ideal representation of what
Weber calls fonnal rationality; while indetenninate sentencing, conversely, is more
closely aligned with substantive rationality. Both sentencing procedures are rational as
defined by Weber (1978) as they are based in law, giving the procedures "legalized"
validity, but they differ in the application of the laws. Substantive decision-making is
subject to values, appeals to ethical nonns, and historical precedent with less focus on
unifonnity of the outcomes. Fonnal decisions, on the other hand, focus on limiting
7 See Abramsky (2007), Hart (2005) or Hunter (1991) for a more detailed discussion of the "law and order
movement."
15
subjective decision-making by stressing rationalized structural outcomes that
removed subjective values by emphasizing a technical orientation to procedural process
grounded in well-defined criteria designed to elicit a specific outcome. In the end,
"fixed" sentencing reforms serve to bureaucratize the process with the specific goal of
removing subjective interpretations and outcomes.
Although Weber's idea of a formal rational system advanced a theory
highlighting separations between law and politics, bureaucratizing of sentencing into
"fixed" procedures through political agendas may actually bridge the gap between law
and politics. This suggests the Weberian argument may be informative in understanding
the limiting of discretion: but it is an incomplete theoretical frame (Beckett 1997; Hunter
1991). Sheingold (1991) theorizes that until recently, application oflaw historically
operated somewhat independently from political battles. National political policy and
even state and local political policy specific to crime and punishment served more as a
symbolic gesture that enhanced political rhetoric, but had less operational effect on how
the justice system acted. But under the law and order movement, the separation between
politics and law (or at least operational practices) may have been blurred with
considerably more power placed into the hands of policy makers (Doob 2000; Scheingold
1991). For example, with "fixed" sentencing, the judge no longer "fits" the sentence and
instead is reduced to the "automation" of the paragraphs written by policy makers or their
designee (e.g., sentencing commissions) (Boerner 2001; Tonry 1995).
Reform legislation was largely passed without the support of the courts,
particularly judges, who immediately disapproved feeling they had lost their power to fit
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the offense with appropriate sentences based on the contexts of the crime and
offender (Savelsberg 1992). Now in most cases a judge can only deviate from this
prescription by providing a written explanation of the reasons why she or he would do so
(recent Supreme Court decisions have called this procedure into question). Research
does indicate, on average, judges comply with guidelines 85% of the time, indicating the
separation of law and politics may have been bridged (Marvell 1995; Scheingold 1991).
This suggests a more appropriate theoretical frame may be a blending of the pure
Weberian notion of shifting towards a rationally defined system where the judge now
mindlessly acts out the prescribed structures with Sheingold's "blurring" of legal action
and politics into a system susceptible to social and cultural pressures. The net result is a
system that both limits variability and increases the average sentence. It should be noted
that Weber's notion of formal rationality did not rule out a strong interaction of the
political and legal spheres, but Sheingold's argument offers a more historically relevant
theoretical explanation of the causes of the intersection and suggests a tighter weave.
Given that "fixed" sentencing reforms not only bureaucratized sentencing, but
were also established under the politics of fear associated with the law and order crusade,
it is likely the interaction of the various components discussed above have served to
increase imprisonment beyond indeterminate sentencing. While some policy makers
have argued that "fixed" sentencing reforms would not increase imprisonment rates
(Brewer, Beckett, and Holt 1981; Engen and Gainey 2000), the sociopolitical pressures to
"get tough on crime" are likely to manifest themselves in the policies stressing punitive
punishment (Abramsky 2007; Beckett 1997; Hunter 1991; Simon 2007). Though states
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not adopting "fixed" sentencing are also likely to be influenced by the law and
order movement as well, "fixed" reforms are likely to increase imprisonment more by
"formalizing" the political into law. For example, by limiting the low end of the sentence
range, the judge has no ability to select lenient sentences for at least some felons
(Savelsberg 1992; Weber 1978).
Chapter 2, herein, "Fixed" Sentencing: The Effects on the Total Imprisonment
Rates Over Time, highlights the various sentencing reforms, both front- and back-end. It
sets the context for these reforms in the law and order movement and the relation of these
reforms to formal rationalization theory. It develops rationales for the hypothesized
expected effect of reforms on changes in state imprisonment rates. The chapter is
primarily concerned with the shifts in state imprisonment rates due to the adoption of the
six sentencing reforms included in this analysis. The analysis also includes a number of
new methodological innovations making the analysis significantly more adept at
assessing the true outcomes. Chief among them was the adoption of a conditional change
score panel model and the new "logarithmic growth curve" measure for sentencing.
These innovations are one of the primary differences between this analysis and prior
research on this subjecl.
While Chapter 2 deals with the effects of reforms on total state imprisonment
rates, which is an area of reform research analyzed by other scholars, the effects of
sentencing reforms on the racial/ethnic composition of imprisonment is an area, to date,
that has not been assessed on an aggregate state level. The racial/ethnic composition of
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those incarcerated is the focus of Chapter 3. The analysis in Chapter 3 assesses
changes in the odds of Black to White imprisonment and Hispanic to White
imprisonment.
Chapter 3 borrows arguments from Chapter 2, namely that the social context of
the law and order movement interacted with the structural change that resulted from
sentencing reform adoption, but takes it a step further by adding an additional link to the
chain. Unfortunately, in the context of the racial composition of those incarcerated, the
Weberian formal rationalization process described by Save1sberg (1992) may also serve
to fortify the institutionalization of racist policies (or at a minimum policies that create
racial disparities). The technical-rational apparatus serves to replace discretion (i.e.)
individual) based racism with institutional racism in which the byproduct serves to create
more "legitimized" justification for the higher rates of imprisonment among people of
color (Ulmer and Kramer 1998; Ulmer and Johnson 2004). At first view, the sentencing
process seems to be justified due to its "race neutral apparatus" that focused on crime and
criminal history rather than an individualistic characteristic of the offenders. In actuality,
it worked to conceal and possibly amplify the racial and ethnic disparities (Abramsky
2007; Beckett 1997; Scheingold 1991).
Drawing on work by Gary Fine (2006), Chapter 3's complete theoretical frame is
presented as a series of chained social actions cOlmected through a cascading series of
events that ends with an increase in racial disparities (see Figure 1.1). While each link in
the chain possesses a distinct theoretical frame, the entire chain is needed to understand
why and how the changes in the racial and ethnic composition of imprisonment were
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manifested. The analysis ultimately focused the expected outcome on Merton's
theory of the unanticipated or unintended consequences of social action; the unintended
consequences framework alone is insufficient to explain the policy outcomes (Fine 2006).
Without the context of the structural shifts, the outcome that occurred might well have
been quite different than what was observed and without the specifics of the entire chain
of actions different outcomes might be anticipated.
Figure 1.1. Social Chain Theory Used in Chapter III
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Figure 1.1 outlines the general framework of the social chain. The three ovals
represent an event or tangible social action that is preceded by a square (or a series of
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squares in the case of the law and order movement) representing the distinct
theoretical frame for each link in the chain. While each link is important in its own right,
the entire chain is ultimately more important in explaining the outcome than anyone part.
For example, unintended consequences as a result of the adoption of sentencing reforms
are both a social phenomenon, characterized by the interaction of the media, public, and
politics found in the law and order movement, and a structural phenomenon, found in the
formal rationalization of the sentencing structure. While Merton's theory may suggest a
rise in disparities among people of color is a likely result given the power of unintended
consequences, the origins of the determinism are rooted elsewhere. Without both
previous links of the chain, the final link, the rise in racial disparities in sentencing as an
unintended consequence, is insufficient in understand the expected outcome
(Wooldredge, Griffin, and Rauschenberg 2005).
Steffenmeier and Demuth (2000) argue "fixed" sentencing reforms also led to a
widening ofthe net of those who are sentenced to prison in three possible ways. First,
some convicted criminals of relatively small crimes may not have gone to prison prior to
sentencing reforms. Generally inmates only go to prison if they are sentenced to more
than one year; it is plausible under "fixed" sentencing relatively minor crimes requiring a
sentence of less than a year would, under the reforms, carry a sentenced of more than a
year, leading to a direct impact on new commitments to prison. Second, sentencing
reforms may lead to more criminals being sentenced to prison time rather than probation,
resulting in a widening of the net of those who go to prison as new commitments. Third,
sentencing reforms often mandate that prisoners released from prison be placed under
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supervised parole, rather than unconditional release or other more passive forms of
parole, resulting in a direct increase in parole violators returned to prison.
There is particular concern that "net-widening" is disproportionately affecting
females more than males. This concern is examined in Chapter 4 (includes previously
unpublished co-authored material with Robert M. O'Brien), which tests the effects of
sentencing reforms on the odds of female to male imprisonment. Previous research
indicates the gender gap in imprisonment is narrowing with the female imprisonment
rates growing faster than the male imprisonment rate. Furthermore, research also
indicates the single fastest growing demographic group in prisons is females of color,
suggesting the possibility that this group is being affected significantly more (Western
2005). The resulting growth in the female imprisonment rate may be associated with
changing social expectations and roles of women in society and a resulting "equalizing"
of the punitive treatment of female to male criminality (Doob 2000; Griset 1995).
Research into judicial attitudes suggest judges view females as the primary
caregivers and often refrained from long sentences for mothers, but with more "fixed"
sentencing judges may now see themselves as having few options except sentencing
women to longer sentences than desired (Ulmer and Kramer 1998). Steffensmeier et al.
(1998) research indicates that race is a stronger main effect on female imprisonment than
male imprisonment. With "fixed" sentencing focused on drug and violent crimes, which
have become associated with people of color, particularly blacks; race, gender, and crime
may interact to increase female rates higher in states adopting reforms. This asserticm is
bolstered by research indicating violent and drug crime arrests are rising faster among
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women than men and these increase may play into the politics of fear, further
pushing for more consistent sentencing targeted at females specifically (Abramsky 2007;
Ulmer and Johnson 2004).
Chapters 2-4 deal with the effects of sentencing on three key components of
imprisonment. Chapter 5, on the other hand, shifts the analysis from an outcome model,
concerned with changes in imprisonment, to an analysis of the social, political, and
demographic environments in which reforms are more likely to be adopted. This Chapter
utilizes event-history analysis to assess the relative likelihood a reform is adopted
depending the level of state variation (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002; Carroll 1982; Wu
2008). For example, in this analysis, I tested whether reforms were more likely to be
adopted if states had high unemployment, high percent under the poverty line,
Republican control of the legislator or governorship, or high percent black. These
models have the ability to suggest important state demographics that can increase the
likelihood a reform is adopted. In the end, the analysis indicates that reform adoption
does not happen in a vacuum and which state characteristics are driving reform adoption
(Xie 1994).
While the previous three substantive analyses worked within a broad theory of the
law and order movement, which created an environment where reforms are likely to be
adopted, and their specific structural impact, the event-history analysis focuses on
identifying the relative impact of the components of the state environment. Therefore the
analysis does not draw from the same broad theoretical approach of the previous
analyses. Instead, it focused on smaller arguments used in previous research to suggest
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state-level variables associated with sentencing refonn adoption. The analysis
helps identify the state structural components that influence criminal justice policy
decisions (Wu 2008).
The general aim of the entire research project is to bring attention to the affects
"fixed" sentencing refonns have on state-level imprisonment rates, how it changed the
composition of imprisonment, and what state-level characteristics increase the likelihood
that a state adopts a specific refonn. The analysis begins with a discussion of the effects
of sentencing refonns on the overall imprisonment rate. It is then followed by a
discussion of the effects on people of color, specifically Blacks and Hispanics; did
refonns increase the raciaVethnic disparities in imprisonment? Third, the analysis
examines the role refonns played in the growing female imprisonment rate as compared
to males. Finally the analysis shifts slightly and looks at how state social, political, and
demographic characteristics affected refonn adoption.
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CHAPTER II
"FIXED" SENTENCING: THE EFFECT
ON IMPRISONNIENT RATES OVER TINIE
Introduction
Prior to the mid 1970s indetenninate sentencing dominated the United States
criminal justice system. This model ofjustice focused on rehabilitating offenders within
prison through work and education programs (Roberts 1996). Sentencing by judges (and
in a few jurisdictions, the jury) reflected the rehabilitation goal. In most cases judges
were given wide discretion to facilitate the reform process through sentencing offenders
to loose ranges (e.g., 5 to 25 years). Parole boards acting independently of other parts of
the judicial system and largely independent of legislators then detennined if the prisoner
had been properly rehabilitated and was ready for release (Albonetti 1997; Kempf-
Leonard and Sample 2001; Marvell 1995). The sentencing model reflected a criminal-
centered approached designed to pattern punishment to the offender's rehabilitation need.
But in the late 1960s and early 1970s, critics advanced a number of purported problems,
including complaints about the arbitrariness of the sentencing procedure, ineffectiveness
of treatment and refonn programs, cozy correctional facilities, and rampant repeat
offenders (Hebert 1997; Reitz 1995). Critics focusing on sentencing charged that it
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allowed far too much disparity in sentencing types and time served. In response,
legislators (or voters) passed discretion limiting sentencing reforms with more pre-
determined structures that limited the range and the ability of officials to deviate from
them (Clarkson and Morgan 1995; Griset 1995; Hebert 1997).
The current study analyzes shifts in imprisonment rates due to the adoption of
sentencing reforms on the state level over time. I focus on six main sentencing reforms
passed after 1972, which include sentencing guidelines (divided into presumptive and
voluntary), statutory presumptive sentencing, truth in sentencing, determinate sentencing
(abolishment of discretionary parole boards), and three strikes laws. Given the context of
the time (e.g., the law and order movement) and the increased bureaucratization of the
system (e.g., Weberian formal rationalization) it was hypothesized states passing reforms
would increase imprisonment rates more than non-reform states. While formal rationality
gives us the needed structure to understand how the reforms affect sentencing, it does not
by itself explain why it happened.
Why it happened is found in the law and order movement characterized by a
politics of fear. The sociopolitical interaction theory suggests the policy shifts represent
the highly connected push-pull between the media, politicians, and a public demand for
punishment. Politicians championed the reform movement where "getting tough on
crime" became a political hot button issue and policy makers, both liberal and
conservative, risked political suicide if they appeared remotely soft on crime and justice
(Gottschalk 2006; Jacobs and Carmichae12001; Smith 2004). The theory suggests U.S.
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states began adopting neoclassical or what I have come to call "fixed" sentencing8
procedures (see appendix A for descriptions) when both political rhetoric and public
outcry combined to lead to a demand for highly punitive sanctions, the result being a
focus on few things other than punishment (Frase 2005; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson
2006).
In the end, this paper suggests the "fixing" of sentencing represents both the goal
of creating more punitive sanctions and the shift in structure to ensure it. I suggest the
reforms were driven by a sociopolitical movement to get tough on crime that produced a
shift from a substantive rational system to a formal rational system. The effect of this
shift is tested through a 50 state panel analysis covering the years 1967 to 2007. The
models incorporate a number of controls including fixed-effects for states and a first-
differenced dependent variable, which allows for the measurement of the average change
over-time within states controlling for other state-level time-variant covariates. This
model represents a significant divergence from previous research and should supply more
robust and theoretically appropriate results. In an additional divergence from previous
research, this analysis incorporates a new measure of reforms as logged growth curves
that is more theoretically appropriate and should lead to more meaningful results.
8 The name "fixed" sentencing is designed to illustrate the more determined nature of the reforms in
comparison to indeterminate sentencing. This is not to suggest reforms are "fixed" with no discretion or
departures. The name is only intended to highlight the more structured and more assured nature of the new
sentencing procedure. "Fixed" reforms refers to sentencing reforms in the form of sentencing guidelines,
statutory presumptive sentencing, determinate sentencing, truth in sentencing, and three strikes laws which
shifts the system from a indeterminate rehabilitation model of sentencing to a more predetermined punitive
structure.
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Literature Review
The previous research assessing "fixed" reforms falls largely into two categories,
with notable exceptions. The first focuses on extra-legal effects like the influence ofrace
or gender on judicial departures from baseline sentence recommendations (e.g. Griffin
and Wooldredge 2006; Johnson 2006; Kramer and Steffensmeier 1993; Kramer and
Ulmer 1996; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer 1998; Ulmer and Kramer 1998;
Wooldredge and Griffin 2005; Wooldredge, Griffin, and Rauschenberg 2005;
Wooldredge 2009), while the second focuses on the influence of policy changes on
sentencing outcomes (e.g. Arvanites and Asher 1998; Brewer, Beckett, and Holt 1981;
Dalessio and Stolzenberg 1995; Frase 1995; Frase 2005; Griset 1996; Johnson 2006;
Tonry 1995). In both cases the body ofliterature largely utilized data on individual
states, counties, or cities. While providing important insights, they are limited to the
specific context and sentencing structures of the particular jurisdiction and lack broad
cross-sectional applicability. While a few studies analyzed year-to-year changes over
time, these studies have also largely been limited to a single state,9 calling into question
their generalizability beyond the single case. 10 This paper follows an even smaller subset
of research, which analyzes aggregate state level data over time (e.g., Stemen et al
(2006), Spelman (2009), and Zhang (2009). This prior research suggests the front-end
sentencing reforms (e.g., sentencing guidelines and statutory presumptive sentencing) do
9 A few studies have also assessed the federal system (e.g., Albonetti 1997).
10 Preliminary analysis in this study indicated that considerable state-to-state variation in imprisonment
rates, which further calls into question the generalizability of the single state approach.
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not directly lead to changes in imprisonment, while the elimination of
discretionary parole release (e.g., determinate sentencing) is more likely to do so.
I build on theories advanced by Scheingold (1991) and Beckett (1997) suggesting
that the shift in sentencing policy represents the concerted effort by policy makers to
advance the "justice model" of crime and punishment through the law and order
movement. This framework focuses on making criminals pay and deterring those who
might commit crimes in the future,11 with punishment tailored to fit the crime rather than
the offender (Doob 2000; Simon 2007). To understand why this shift occurs, Scheingold
(1991) suggests we must recognize the complex and interactive mechanisms that
influence policy change. The interaction includes policy makers at national, state, and
local levels, political elites, public opinion, citizen activism, and media responses and
representations. In this interaction, the crucial element is the public's fear of crime.
"[P]olicy changes are mostly likely to occur when political leaders, in part by taking their
cues from the media, choose to play upon public anxieties that are themselves inflamed
by media imagery and vicarious victimization rather than by crime as such" (Scheingold
1991 :44). Gottschalk (2006; 2009) notes that prior to the late 1960s crime rarely
registered as a top public issue and not until the law and order movement did the public
begin to demand substantial change. Used to further political agendas by playing on
public fears of crime (often misrepresenting actual aggregate crime rates), politicians
11 Some authors like Von Hirsch (1985) would argue that reforms do not represent such a cynical approach,
but instead take a more measure "proportional" structure designed to meet the crime and take on no real
deterrence effect (or at least are not explicitly designed to be a deterrent). The authors advocating a Von
Hirsch-type of view of reforms often refer to them as a proportional model (as opposed to the justice
model).
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advanced an individualistic view of crime as a function of societal deviants. A
lack of effective sanctions was seen as part of the problem (Abramsky 2007; Simon
2007). Meanwhile, the media continually displayed images of crime, especially images
of isolated victims of random violent crime, fueling public fears (Glassner 1999). In
completing the interactive cycle, politicians then seized upon the fears to create platforms
focused on getting tough on crime. This complex circle of interactions served to promote
and sustain the politicization of crime characterized by the "politics offear" that stressed
"getting tough on crime," resulting in the model of punishment featuring among other
things, "fixed" sentencing reforms (Beckett 1997; Simon 2007).
Furthermore, while it is true that crime increased in the late 1970s and 1980s, both
the political response and the public perception of increasing crime far outstripped reality
(Abramsky 2007). Thus, Scheingold (1991) suggests that researchers understanding of
the political process ofjustice should begin with an understanding of the public
perceptions of crime (not to be confused with actual crime rates which mayor may not be
related to perceptions). He argues that the public largely constructs its understanding of
crime on the interpersonal level, focusing on the offender-victim paradigm characterized
by a fear of victimization, especially of violent crime. To the general public, crime is seen
as an issue of underlying offender pathology and the personal effect it has on their victim.
Thus to the average citizen, the state's purpose is in limiting the actions of those who are
likely to commit deviant acts and punishing those who have wronged others. To the
average citizen, the sentence is both the loci ofpunishment and the loci ofprotection,
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suggesting why there is such an intense public focus on sentencing (Beckett 1997;
Jacobs and Carmichae12001; Scheingo1d 1991)
These historical underpinnings provide some important contexts when
considering why reforms were passed and what goals they may have had, but unless
reforms are significant in altering the structure, shifts in imprisonment are not likely. For
example, if judicial discretion is maintained, then reforms are unlikely to effect change.
Save1sberg (1992) argues sentencing guidelines (and likely other sentencing reforms as
well) are an ideal representation of Weber's formal rationality. A number of prior studies
have employed the formal rationality theory, which creates a distinctive theoretical lens
for understanding how sentencing policy has been "fixed" or, in other words, how the
structure was altered to become more predetermined and allowing less discretion. The
theory suggests sentencing reforms represent formal rationality, while indeterminate
sentencing is more closely aligned with substantive rationality.
Both sentencing procedures are rational as defined by Weber (1978) because they
are based in law and thus have "legalized" validity, but differ in their application (i.e.
formal vs. substantive) of the laws. Substantive decision-making is subject to values,
appeals to ethical norms, and historical precedent with less focus on uniformity of the
outcomes. Formal decisions, on the other hand, focus on limiting subjective decision-
making by stressing rationalized structural outcomes that remove personal values by
emphasizing a technical orientation to procedural process grounded in well-defined
criteria designed to elicit a specific outcome. "The judge ... is more or less an
automaton of paragraphs: the legal documents, together with the costs and fees, are
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dropped in at the top with the expectation that the judgment will emerge at the
bottom, together with more or less sound arguments - an apparatus, accordingly, whose
functioning is by and large calculable or predictable (Weber 1978: 17)." In the end,
social policies such as "fixed" sentencing reforms serve to bureaucratize the process, with
the specific goal of removing subjective interpretations and outcomes (Engen and Gainey
2000; Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn 2009). Highlighting the need to place the structural
changes within social contexts, formal rationalization is the link that brought the political
rhetoric to fruition by codifying the sociopolitical goals of the law and order movement
into structural-operational changes.
Under the formalization of the system driven by the law and order movement, the
separation between politics and law (or at least operational practices) may have been
blurred with considerably more power placed into the hands of policy makers (Doob
2000; Scheingold 1991). For example, with "fixed" sentencing, the judge no longer fits
the sentence to the offender. Instead, the judge merely applies the laws passed by policy
makers or their designee, e.g., sentencing commissions. 12 The net result is a system more
susceptible to social and cultural pressures that limits variability and possibly increases
12 Several researchers point out that while the reforms removed discretion from the judge's hands, some
discretion may remain in the process (A1bonetti1997; Griset 1996; Kempf-Leonard and Sample 2001;
Ulmer, Kur1ychek and Kramer 2007). Instead, discretion is shifted to the hands of the prosecutor;
inadvertently increasing their power by allowing them to choose a sentence category when charging a
suspect. With this choice, they know if convicted, the type and length of sentence the suspect will serve. A
few studies have found that prosecutors are more likely to consider factors outside the offender's crime and
prior record in determining prosecution of violent and drug crimes, but are less likely for property and other
non-violent felony crime (Engen et al. 2003). In the end this analysis is not concerned with the loci ofthe
effect. Instead it is interested in the general effect of reforms on total change in state imprisonment over
time and thus while researching discretion placement is important in general; it is not the focus of this
analysis.
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imprisonment (Boerner 2001; Tonry 1995). It should be noted that Weber's
notion of fornlal rationality did not rule out an interaction of the political and legal
spheres, but Beckett's and Sheingold's arguments about the influences of the law and
order movement offers a historically relevant theoretical explanation of what caused the
current intersection and suggested a tightening of the weave between the two spheres.
Hypotheses:
Given that "fixed" sentencing reforms represent a structural change born under
the politics of fear associated with the law and order movement, it is possible the
interaction served to increase imprisonment in states with the sentencing reforms at a
greater rate than imprisonment in states with indeterminate sentencing. Though states not
adopting "fixed" sentencing are also likely to be influenced by the sociopolitics of the
time, "fixed" reforms are likely to increase imprisonment more by formalizing the
sociopolitical environment into practice through their technical rational bureaucratic
structure brought on by their formal rationalization. For example, by limiting the low end
of the sentence range, the judge has restricted ability to select lenient sentences for at
least some felons (Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer 2008; Savelsberg 1992). Research of
sentencing guidelines indicate, on average, judges comply 85% of the time, suggesting
the separation of law and politics has been bridged and that the reforms (at least
sentencing guidelines) do influence the way judges act (Marvell 1995; Scheingold 1991).
The Hypotheses are consistent with some previous research suggesting reforms
will increase imprisonment. It should be noted, however, a number of studies argue
against this conclusion (Dalessio and Stolzenberg 1995; Greenberg and West 2001;
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Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Marvell 1995; Smith 2004; Spelman 2009; Tonry
and Hatlestad 1997). Additionally, this hypothesis is drawn from a theory that is likely to
be specific to the U.S. justice system. As Von Hirsch (1985) has pointed out, while many
western industrial societies also experienced significant prison growth, the U.S. maintains
a unique justice system, both structurally and culturally, suggesting the effects are not
generalizable to other countries.
Hypothesis 1 suggests that states with "front-end" sentencing reforms
(distinctions between various reforms may be found in Appendix A) in the form of
presumptive sentencing guidelines, voluntary guidelines, and statutory presumptive
sentencing will increase imprisonment more than states that still utilize indeterminate
sentencing. These three reforms are mutually exclusive with only one of the possible
types of reforms being in operation at once in any given state.
Hypothesis 1: States implementing '.'fixed" sentencing reforms in the form of
presumptive sentencing guidelines, voluntary sentencing guidelines, and statutory
presumptive sentencing had greater increases in rates ofimprisonment than states
not implementing them.
These reforms are distinct from the other three reforms because their focus is on
sentencing, while the other three reforms focus on release. To illustrate the difference, it
is important to recognize that changes can come from one of three different avenues.
First, imprisonment rates increase due to initial longer sentences. Second, rates increase
because the system is sentencing more individuals to prison. Or third, felons serve longer
terms because they are serving a longer portion of their original sentence, which is most
likely due to the elimination or reduction in the use of early parole. In this analysis, point
one, longer initial sentences is most likely the result of changes in sentencing on the
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front-end, while point 3, serving longer portions of their original sentences, is
likely the result of truth in sentencing laws, the abolishment of parole boards, or a
combination ofboth (Abramsky 2007; Frase 2005; Reitz 1995; Tonry 1995). Therefore,
to assess point 3; hypothesis 2 states:
Hypothesis 2: States adopting truth in sentencing laws or abolishing parole
boards (determinate sentencing) had greater positive changes in rates of
imprisonment than states not implementing them.
It should be noted that abolishment of parole boards does not necessarily mean
the abolishment of parole. In fact, states with "fixed" sentencing still utilize parole, but
research indicates that as discretionary parole boards are removed, with early release
limited to good behavior and a few other limited programs, imprisonment rates
increased13 (Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006). Furthermore, the "get tough on crime"
climate along with increased budgetary limitation are likely to lead to other mechanisms
of early release (e.g., job training programs, GED, etc.) being curtailed or eliminated
(Brewer, Beckett, and Holt 1981; Frase 2005; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006).
While the five reforms in the previous two hypotheses deal with either a
wholesale restructuring of the sentencing on the front end (presumptive sentencing
guidelines, voluntary sentencing guidelines, and statutory presumptive sentencing) or in
the back end with the limiting or abolishment of parole (truth in sentencing and
determinate sentencing), three-strikes laws are unique because they focus on a subset of
offenders - the habitual offender - and not the system as a whole. Like the previous
13 Of note, a number of studies have found evidence that truth in sentencing or determinate sentencing had
no significant effect or actually reduced imprisonment (Mauer 2002b; Nicholson-Crotty 2004; Stemen,
Rengifo, and Wilson 2006; Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn 2009).
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reforms, three strikes laws are hypothesized to increase imprisonment (Lotke,
Colburn, and Schiraldi 2004).
Hypothesis 3: States adopting three strikes laws will have greater increases in the
rates ofimprisonment than states that have not adopted them.
While hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 deal with general effects of reforms on changes in
total imprisonment rates within states and assess two (longer initial sentences and longer
portion of their sentence) of the three areas by which reforms can have an effect,
Steffenmeier and Demuth (2000) argue that reforms can also lead to a widening ofthe net
(e.g., the third point previously discussed, reforms are bringing in individuals who would
otherwise not have gone to prison) in three ways. First, some convicted criminals of
relatively minor crimes may not have gone to prison under indeterminate sentencing.
Generally convicts only go to prison if they are sentenced to more than one year; thus, it
is plausible that some offenders would have received a sentence of less than a year under
indetern1inate sentencing, but were sentenced to more than a year under "fixed"
sentencing. This change would directly increase new commitments to prison. Second,
under sentencing reforms more criminals were sentenced to prison time rather than
probation, resulting in a "widening of the net" of those who go to prison as new
commitments. Third, direct increase in parole violators being returned to prison due to
reforms could result from released prisoners being placed under supervised parole, rather
than unconditional released or other more passive forms of parole. To assess the
possibility that reforms both affect time-served and possibly widen the net, hypotheses 4
and 5 state:
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Hypothesis 4: States implementing "fixed" sentencing reforms will have
greater increases in time-served than states that have not adopted "fixed"
sentencing reforms.
Hypothesis 5: States implementing "fixed" sentencing reforms will have greater
increases in commitments than states that have not adopted "fixed" sentencing
reforms.
Data
Before 1972, imprisonment rates remained relatively stable over time, but since
that point, steady and rapid increases have occurred. The analysis begins in 1967 and
covers each year to 200i 4 . The study analyzes state-level imprisonment data for all 5015
states, allowing for assessment of the impacts of sentencing reforms on changes in
imprisonment rates over time across 50 states. With 50 states and 41 years of
observations, we have a total of2050 observations. This "pooling" of the time-series and
cross-sectional data greatly improves the statistical power of the models (Hsiao 2003;
Wooldridge 1997).
In this analysis, presumptive sentencing guidelines, voluntary sentencing
guidelines, and statutory presumptive sentencing are considered independent and
mutually exclusive "front-end" "fixed" sentencing reforms and may not, at any given
time, coexist with each other or indeterminate sentencing. Conversely, the "back-end"
limiting (truth in sentencing) or elimination (determinate sentencing) of discretionary
14 Data actually covers the years 1965 to 2008, but the moving average calculated to alleviate the issues of
spikes in changes in imprisonment truncated the data by one year at the beginning and the end.
Furthermore the lagged variables further reduced the measured effects at the beginning of the data reducing
the actual measured years to 72 to 07.
15 Washington DC is often included in analysis of this type (treated as a "fifty-first state"), but was
excluded because data for the entire time period in question was not complete. In addition to incomplete
data, Washington DC stopped housing its own prisoners in 2001.
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release is considered separate because their focus on release allows operation
alongside the "front-end" reforms. Furthermore, the unique and independent nature of
three strikes laws also allows them to be considered alongside both the front-end and
back-end reforms. While states adopting reforms often adopted numerous types (e.g.,
Oregon which adopted presumptive sentencing guidelines in 1989, abolished parole in
1989, and adopted truth in sentencing in 1995), their coexistence is not absolute and were
often instituted in different years (See Table 1.1 on Page 7 for complete list of reforms)
(Frase 2005; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006).
Table 2.1 outlines the six sentencing reform variables. They were compiled from
numerous sources including the Bureau of Justice Assistance (1996), Frase (2005),
Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn (2009), and a report by the Vera institute (Stemen,
Rengifo, and Wilson 2006). While most research is in agreement on the general goals of
the reforms, considerable variation in the design and application of the reforms exists and
there is little consensus about how to classify them into appropriate groups (Frase 2005;
Marvell 1995; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006; Tonry 1995). Appendix A provides a
detailed discussion of the general function of the various reforms and how they are
delineated in this study.
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Table 2.1. The Six Refonns Included in Analysis
FlOnt-End Refonns Back-End Refonns Sentencmg Enhancement
Refonn Measured Description
Presumptive Sentencing Logged Consist of a matrix of possible sentences with a very
Guidelines] Growth narrow range within a sentencing category that is
Curve defined by an offender's criminal history (prior
offenses) and offense severity. Judges generally must
follow the matrix. They are strict in their application;
only allowing very limited deviations.
Voluntary Sentencing Logged Treats guidelines as fonnal recommendation, but does
Guidelines] Growth not legally mandate they be followed by the judge.
Curve
Statutory Presumptive Logged Represents an attempt to create unifonnity within
Sentencing] Growth similarly situated crimes, but acts less like a sentencing
Curve rubric. It specifies an appropriate or "nonnal" sentence
for each offense as a baseline for a judge.
Determinate Sentencingl Logged Refers to a system without discretionary parole boards.
Growth
Curve
Truth in Sentencing2 Logged Requires offenders serve a statutorily defined minimum
Growth amount of time. Only states meeting the 1994 federal
Curve omnibus crime bill minimum of 85% time-served of
original sentence are considered.
Three Strikes Laws3 Logged A habitual offender law focused on three-time felony
Growth offenders. Generally the law suggests a severe
Curve sentence (25 to life or life) for a third felony offense.
2 .J
There are three key points about the reforms that should be noted. First, all six
refonns represent a shift from the indetenninate-rehabilitation model to a punitive model
with a discretion-limiting sentencing structure. Second, because the dependent variable
does not include county or local jail populations, only individuals sentenced to more than
one year are considered, suggesting a one-year lag (impact one year after inception).
Third, while in the year following the refonn there will be an instantaneous effect on
some portion of the imprisonment rate, not all individuals in any given year will be
"caught up" by the refonn. Some of the rates (the race specific rates used to construct the
odds ratios) will be individuals who were already imprisoned and sentenced under the old
sentencing procedure. Over time, a greater proportion of prisoners will be "caught up"
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by the reform. At some point a plateau at nearly full effect will occur and only a
small portion of the rate will be individuals who were sentenced to long terms under
indeterminate sentencing. To address both the lagged effect and capture the expected
"logged growth curve" like effect, a new measure of the reform's impact on total
imprisonment rates was developed. Using a logarithmic measure to model the effect of
sentencing reforms represents an important divergence of this study from previous
analyses, which relied heavily on dummy variables. 16
To create the new sentencing measures, each state was coded as 1.00 the first year
of implementation and as e (2.71828) for year five through the last year of observation.
The intervening years between one and five were set at an equal distance between 1.00
and 2.71828. Finally, the absolute log of each score was taken. This procedure created a
"logarithmic growth variable" with a one-year lag (the log of 1 is 0) that suggests full
effect at five years. The measure represents an effect that approaches 1 (the full effect) at
an increasingly diminished rate (increases fast at first and then slows). States with
indeterminate sentencing were coded to zero and represent the reference group and, of
course, the log was not taken for those years before adoption of the sentencing reform.
The dependent variable, total prison population per 100,000, is measured on the
state level and was observed over time for each state. Data for the dependent variable
and two of the independent variables, parole violators and new commitments to prison
per 100,000, were obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (U.S. 1965-1983; U.S.
16 Coding the reforms as dummy variables (zero before adoption and 1 after adoption) suggests
imprisonment rates would be affected 100% by the new policy in the first year it was adopted. A
logarithmic measure represents a more appropriate theoretically expected effect and should lead to more
robust results.
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1984-1998; U.S. 1999-2008)17. The FBI's Vnifonn Crime Report (VCR) (1965-
2008b)18 supplied the data on violent crime19 and drug crime arrests per 100,000.20 The
crime variables will be lagged by one year (See Appendix E for descriptive statistics of
variables used in this analysis).
It is important to note that the variables represent a theory that crime rates will
have direct effects on changes in state prison populations. Simply put, states with more
crime will have larger increases in imprisonment over time. This theory necessitates that
the crime variables be lagged, as crime rates are not likely to have an "instantaneous"
effect on imprisonment as those arrested will undoubtedly take time to be processed
through the system. The models could have included un-lagged crime controls, but this
would suggest crime had a more "simultaneous" effect within the same year. While
possible, for example, if one theorized that higher crime creates social pressure to "do
something about it," the fonner theory is tested in this analysis.
17 Data for the years of 1972 to 1983 is available in the yearly publication: Prisoners in State and Federal
Institutions on December 31, 1972 (through 1983). Data for the years of 1984 to 1998 is available in the
yearly publication: Correctional Populations in the United States, 1984 (through 1998). Data for the years
of 1999 to 2008 is available in the yearly publication: Prisoners, 1999 (through 2008). All three
publications are produced and printed by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (see Citations). Rates per
100,000 for each variable was computed by taking the raw number of prisoners for each state by year that
was provided by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and dividing by state population per 100,000 as supplied
by the Bureau of the Census (see citation).
18 Data from the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) is available in print and online from the U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation and is produced and printed yearly (see Citations).
19 Violent crime arrests represent the Uniform Crime Reports indexed crimes and include the offenses of
murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.
20 In this project "violent crime" and "drug crime" rates refers to violent crime and drug crime arrests rates
recorded by the Uniform Crime Reports for each year (see Citations).
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The U.S. Census (U.S. 1965-69,1971-1979,1981-1989,1991-1999,2001-
2008; U.S. 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000i l supplied the data for percent black, percent
Hispanic, percent urban, and population density and also supplied total population for
each state which served as the denominator to construct all rate variables. The U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (1965-2008a) supplied information to construct the data for
unemployment rates, while the U.S. Bureau of the Census (2006) provided the data for
poverty rates.
Dubin (2007) supplied the needed data for political party affiliation of each state
senate and house (or assembly).22 The dummy code for the governor's political party was
obtained from Hershey (2007). The political variables were also lagged in this analysis,
suggesting that it takes two years for political control to manifest in the operations of
these states. Research indicates the controls included in this study represent key areas of
association with prison population, warranting their inclusion in this analysis (Albonetti
1997; Arvanites and Asher 1998; DeFina and Arvanites 2002; Engen and Gainey 2000;
Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000; Western 2001; Western 2005; Zhang, Maxwell, and
Vaughn 2009).
21 Data from the census is available online at census.gov maintained by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and
was compiled from both census data and population estimates (see Citations).
22 State house and senate variables were constructed by centering the percent Republican around 50% so
that Republican control represents positive deviations from 50%, while Democratic control represents
negative deviations. The absolute value of the deviations were then logged, with the negative sign return
for the Democratic control, to create a logarithmic scale with positive and negative deviation from zero to
represent the diminishing returns of political party concentrations.
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To facilitate the testing of a possible "net-widening" effect, a general
"time-served,,23 measure was modeled by including controls for prison entries. The
measure deduces "time served" by isolating the unknown variable (time-served) by
controlling for known contributing variables (new commitments and parole violators
returned). Furthermore, general net-widening can also be deduced by looking for
significant reductions in coefficients for the reforms when commitments to prison are
added as covariates.
While not ideal, the measure does allow for rudimentary proxy testing of both of
the main loci of reforms: time served and "net-widening." This is made possible because
the dependent variables as a change in rates of imprisonment per 100,000 can be broken
down into three components: (1) new individuals entering the system since the last count,
plus (2) those who are still in the system from before the last count, minus (3) those who
have left the system since last count, which when combined produces each year by state
count. Taking this into consideration, new commitments and parole violators returned
should have a significant positive impact on incarceration rates and their inclusion creates
a more stringent test of sentencing reforms as a quasi-measure of "time served.,,24
23 Ideally the study would include time-served as a direct measure, but unfortunately this data is not
available on the aggregate state level across all 50 states for the time period under investigation. The
"quasi-measure" is the best approximation considering the data available.
24 The quasi-measure of time served represents the rate ofthose who stay in prison minus those who have
left. This measure approximates "time-served" across all prisoners while not distinguishing the percentage
of prisoners sentenced under specific sentencing types. The measure serves to assess the general "time-
served" for a specific state by year data point by controlling for those entering the system, deducing change
due to "time-served" by isolating the unknown variable by controlling for a known contributing variable.
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Methods
A Time-Series Cross-Section (TSCS) regression technique employing panel
corrected standard errors (PCSE) was used to analyze changes in state imprisonment rates
due to the adoption of sentencing reforms. This method is a variant of ordinary least
squared (OLS) regression and while OLS is not particularly useful in TSCS (England,
Kilbourne, Farkas, and Dou 1988), it can be correctly implemented when used in
conjunction with PCSE and corrections for autoregression that greatly improves the
reliability of the standard errors produced by the models (Beck and Katz 1995; Ha1aby
2004; Hsiao 2003; Wooldridge 1995; Wooldridge 2000).15 In the end, the models
measure a shift in sentencing from the reference group of states still incorporating
indeterminate sentencing to states with one or more sentencing reforms.
While a PCSE model corrects some problems associated with TSCS models, it
does not solve all issues associated with complicated TSCS models. Omitted state level
variables that are stable over time (omitted variable bias), but correlated with the error
term for the dependent variable can make point estimates biased. Therefore, a unit fixed
effect model (instead of the random effects model), which holds the unexplained time-
invariant variation constant, controlling for the unobserved state level effects, was
incorporated.16 While the unit fixed-effects model is statistically nece.ssary, it also
sacrifices little in substantive interpretation because the primary concern of this analysis
is not with pane1-to-pane1 variation. Instead the interest lies in aggregate change over
25 For a more detailed discussion of the statistical models and their validity see Appendix B.
26 In this analysis, both the Hausman and Mundlak tests of omitted variable bias suggest a bias is present in
the random effects models.
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time within states. In fact the panel-specific fixed-effects approach leaves us
with a model that measures exactly that-the change in the dependent variable within each
panel where the coefficients give us the aggregate within-state change over time for the
average within state change in the independent variable (England, Kilbourne, Farkas, and
Dou 1988; Halaby 2004; Wooldridge 1997; Wooldridge 2005). Substantively, this is
where we would expect to find the effect of reforms that are state (panel) specific.
After implementing panel-specific fixed-effects, the Dickey Fuller and Phillips-
Perron unit-root tests suggested the presence of a unit-root. Furthermore, there are
substantive reasons to believe that a previous year's imprisonment is highly associated
with the current year's level except for a new shock, given that the dependent variable is
the total imprisonment rate. Because of the presence of a unit root we first differenced the
dependent variable. Because theory suggests it is desirable to preserve the measure of
change over time, I decided not to include fixed-effects for years27 (e.g., period or time
effects) and instead use a series of common time-series procedures proven effective at de-
trending data, addressing issues of random walks, and rectifying time specific shocks
(Allison 2009; Finkel 1995; Halaby 2004).28
It is important to note that once fixed-effects for units is implemented the analysis
no longer represents a pooling of the state (panel) by year (time) observations and now
27 Additionally, each state has almost complete autonomy over their imprisonment rates and its changes
will be a reflection of change over time (within panels), thus "explaining" the uncontrolled variation over
time may result in a misspecification of state specific effects (Halaby 2004).
28 While fixed-effects for time is on the list of appropriate tools correcting for most time variant issues
(including serial correlation), unfortunately they change the interpretation of the coefficients from change
over time by controlling for unexplained change over time that is stable over the panels.
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becomes a series of simultaneous time-series analyses that measure the aggregate
(averaged across panels) change over-time within panels (Frees 2004; Hsiao 2003;
Spelman 2009). As noted, between 1967 and 2007 imprisonment trended up almost
550%. This created the common time-series specification problem where reforms would
likely increase total imprisonment simply because they are clustered on the more recent
end of the time-series where the rate of imprisonment is the highest. This is a
specification error that must be corrected for, thus the first-difference transformation was
applied, changing the dependent variable to year-to-year change (sometimes referred to
as the unconditional change score) (Finke11995; Halaby 2004). Even in a change scores
analysis a shock or spike in the series can undermine the model's ability to measure
change over time effectively. To remedy the apparent shocks observed, a three-year
moving average was instituted (Frees 2004). Unlike the unchanged score model (total
imprisonment), the change score model (first differenced) no longer fails the Dickey
Fuller or Phillips-Perron unit-root test.29
Statistically, change scores are not without their limitations. A phenomenon
known as regression to the mean suggests that the unconditional change score model can
lead to biased results because the explanatory variables are related to the initial values of
the dependent variables. To correct for this, a lagged term of imprisonment rate was
included as a control variable. This model is often referred to as the static-score or
conditional change-score model and "frames the analysis in the following fashion: do the
independent X variables [both X or L1X] influence changes in Yfor fixed levels of Yr-], that
29 This is true for both the first differenced and moving averaged variables.
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is, taking into account the negative effect of initial values of Y on subsequent
change?" (Finkel 1995: 9). In effect, this analysis can be viewed as 50 simultaneous first-
differenced time-series regressions analyzed with aggregated estimates that produce
coefficients representing the average effect of reforms on the average state (Finkel 1995;
Frees 2004).
Results
Table 2.2 presents the results for four models testing the five hypotheses in this
analysis. The models measure the increase or decrease in the change in the average
imprisonment rate due to the move from indeterminate sentencing (the reference group)
to one or more of the sentencing reforms. Modell serves as the base model, analyzing
the six sentencing reforms and first-level interaction terms (as noted most states adopt
more than one reform suggesting an interaction effect is likely). Keeping with
convention, insignificant interaction coefficients were left in the models because
significant interactions were expected (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003). The model indicates
just one of the front end reforms, statutory presumptive sentencing and just one of the
back-end reforms, determinate sentencing are significantly associated with imprisonment
rates. Both suggest a conditional main effect that increases the change in imprisonment
rates by 15.29730 and 15.090 per 100,000 respectively. This suggests that when these two
reforms are fully implemented they increase the rate of change by roughly 55% over
indeterminate sentencing (the rate of change for indeterminate sentencing states is, on
30 The average year-to-year changes for sentencing reforms were calculated by setting the control variables
(when applicable) to their means and then a reform to 1 (indicating full effect at 5 years). This provides the
average effect of the reform for the average state. For the interaction of more than one reform, the
conditional main effects and the interaction terms are all set to 1.
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average, 9.650). When statutory presumptive sentencing is paired with
determinate sentencing and treated as interacting with each other, the interaction term,
serving as a mitigating effect, actually reduces the combined conditional main effect
resulting in a 17.702 increase. But it should be noted that this combination of reforms is
only found in Arizona, suggesting Arizona is an outlier from the other states adopting
statutory presumptive sentencing. The base model explains roughly 40% of the variation.
Table 2.2. Conditional Main Effects of Sentencing Refonn and Their
First Level Interactions.
Variables Total Imprisonment "Time-Served"
Modell I Mode12 Mode13 Mode14
Reforms
Pres. Sent. Guidelines 1.636 1.359 1.536 1.374
(1.170) (1.392) (1.177) (1.444)
Voluntary Sent. Guidelines 0.0514 -1.677** -0.141 -1.864**
(0.929) (0.704) (0.921) (0.731)
Statutory Presumptive Sent. 5.647*** 3.642*** 4.814*** 3.033***
(1.113) (1.029) (1.156) (1.132)
Determinate Sentencing 5.440*** 2.675*** 4.980*** 2.330**
(1.303) (0.962) (1.377) (1.048)
Truth in Sentencing -0.745 0.611 -0.717 0.831
(0.894) (0.774) (0.960) (0.861)
Three Strikes 1.119 0.411 1.089 0.512
(1.002) (0.920) (1.043) (0.912)
Interaction Terms
Pres. Guide * DetelID. Sent. -6.281 *** -6.603*** -6.303*** -6.805***
(1.630) (1.686) (1.706) (1.870)
Pres. Guide * Truth in Sent. 2.199** 2.655*** 2.163* 2.693**
(1.096) (1.017) (1.171) (1.173)
Pres. Guide * Three Strikes -3.207** -3.890*** -3.191** -3.775***
(1.281) (1.228) (1.343) (1.353)
V01. Guide * Determ. Sent. -6.819*** -6.791 *** -6.377*** -6.769***
(2.231) (1.907) (2.433) (1.992)
Vol. Guide * Truth in Sent. -0.267 1.566 -0.503 1.391
(1.246) (0.956) (1.332) (1.116)
Vol. Guide * Three Strikes 0.566 1.581 ** 0.459 1.711 **
(0.872) (0.775) (0.882) (0.809)
Stat. Pres. * Determ. Sent. -3.035 -1.554 -0.812 0.784
(2.424) (1.765) (2.942) (2.198)
Stat. Pres. * Truth in Sent. -2.932* -2.589 -4.491 ** -4.321 **
(1.607) (1.581) (1.953) (1.770)
Stat. Pres. * Three Strikes -1.425 -0.761 -1.553 -0.865
(1.013) (1.183) (1.006) (1.268)
Det. Sent. * Truth in Sent. -2.348** -1.827 -2.303* -1.791
(1.166) (1.177) (1.226) (1.332)
Det. Sent. * Three Strikes 2.850* 3.898** 3.288* 4.145**
(1.655) (1.522) (1.733) (1.708)
Truth * Three Strikes -0.644 -1.045 -0.267 -0.72
(1.135) (0.818) (1.223) (0.963)
Observations 2024 2024 1924 1924
R-squared 0.398 0.493 0.418 0.508
Lagged Dependent Variable -0.0077*** -0.020*** -0.014*** -0.025***
(For Reference Onlv) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
Notes: Models present analysis incorporating Prais-Winsten Regression with Panel
Corrected Standard Errors of imprisonment rates per 100,000 state population for the
years 1967 to 2007 with a lagged dependent variable ternl and fixed-effects for states.
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Models 2 adds crime, demographic, and political control variables (See
Table 2.3) to the reform variables in model 1 increasing the explained variation by about
10%. Historical and contemporary research has shown high rates of violent crime
increase state imprisonment (Irwin and Austin 1997; Mauer 2002a; Raphael 2009;
Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000). The effect of violent crime is particularly strong in the
South where the rates of violent crime and imprisonment are generally higher, likely the
result of sociohistorical factors creating a subculture of violence particular to the South
(Clarke 1998; Crow and Gertz 2008; Karnig and Mcclain 1985). Drug crimes on the
other hand are essential to understanding the effect of reforms. The war on drugs was a
key component of the law and order movement and the criminal justice system increased
criminalization of various drug crimes, especially possession. As resulted, one fifth of
the prison population has been convicted of a drug crime, a 20-fold increase from 1980
(Baum 1997; Beckett, Nyrop, Pfingst, and Bowen 2005; McDonald and Carlson 1994;
McShane and Williams 1997; Western 2001). As expected, the lagged crime variables
were significantly related to increases in imprisonment, suggesting increases in crime do
increase the change in imprisonment within states.
Three of the demographic variables, including percent urban, percent
unemployment, and percent Hispanic significantly increased the change in imprisonment,
while percent poor of a state significantly reduced imprisonment. Finally, in Model 2,
two of the political variables, Republican state senate control and Republican governor
significantly increased changes in imprisonment. This suggests that while it is likely that
the social pressure to get tough on crime cuts across political parties at least for these two
institutions, states with Republican control have larger average changes in
imprisonment over time.
Table 2.3. Results from Control Variables Incorporated in Models from Table 2.2.
Variables Total Imprisonment "Time-Served"
Modell I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Crime Controls
Violent Crime (Lagged) - 0.964*** - .855***
- (0.001) - (0.002)
Drug Crime (Lagged) - 5.11*** - 4.24***
- (0.001) - (0.000)
Demo2raphic Controls
Percent Black - 0.0791 - 0.0857
- (0.076) - (0.077)
Percent Hispanic - 0.196*** - 0.220***
- (0.061) - (0.066)
Percent Unemployment - 0.381 *** - 0.426***
- (0.113) - (0.116)
Percent Poor - -0.127* - -0.115*
- (0.066) - (0.069)
Population Density - 0.00393 - 0.00689
- (0.007) - (0.007)
Percent Urban - 0.0467*** - 0.0454***
- (0.007) - (0.007)
Political Controls
Rep. St. House (Lagged) - 0.0771 - 0.0916
(Two Year Lag) - (0.139) - (0.146)
Rep. St. Senate (Lagged) - 0.199* - 0.230*
(Two Year Lag) - (0.120) - (0.119)
Rep. Governor (Lagged) - 1.058*** - 1.206***
- (0.231 ) - (0.239)
"Time-Served" Variables
New Commitments - - 0.0204*** 0.0183***
- - (0.006) (0.006)
Parole Violators Returned - - 0.0174** 0.0123*
- - (0.008) (0.007)
Observations 2024 2024 1924 1924
R-squared 0.398 0.493 0.418 0.508
Lagged Dependent Var. -0.0077*** -0.020*** -0.014*** -0.025***
(For Reference Onlv) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Standard errors III parentheses
*** p<O.OI, ** p<0.05, * p<O.1
Notes: Models present analysis incorporating Prais-Winsten Regression with Panel
Corrected Standard Errors of imprisonment rates per 100,000 state population for the
years 1967 to 2007 with a lagged dependent variable term and fixed-effects for states.
This table presents the control variables incorporated in Table 2.2.
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Model 2 in Table 2.2 outlines the effects of sentencing reforms on changes
in imprisonment rates controlling for state-level influences listed in Model 2 of Table 2.3.
The results are similar to those found in Modell, but with three notable changes. First,
in Model 2, voluntary sentencing guidelines now significantly reduce changes in
imprisonment. This marks the only reform (the conditional main effect) to significantly
reduce imprisonment changes. This suggests that while Hypothesis 1 is supported for
statutory presumptive sentencing, it is not supported for voluntary sentencing guidelines.
Additionally, two changes in the interaction terms are present. First, the interaction
between determinate sentencing and truth in sentencing, which was significant, no longer
significantly reduces changes in imprisonment. Second, an interaction between voluntary
guidelines and three strikes is now significant, suggesting that while voluntary guidelines
on their own reduce imprisonment changes, when taken into combination with three
strikes laws they actually increase changes in imprisonment to 9.965 over the average
change in indeterminate sentencing of9.650 (a 3.26% increase). It is important to note
that no states adopted voluntary sentencing guidelines by themselves and were always
accompanied by an additional reform. For example, in the case of three strikes laws,
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Wyoming all adopted voluntary guidelines and then chose to
add three strikes.
To illustrate the average effect of sentencing reforms on aggregate changes in
imprisonment over-time for states adopting the six reforms singularly or in combination,
Table 2.4 outlines the predicted scores for the combinations of reforms. The predicted
change scores represent the average change in imprisonment rates for the average state
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adopting some combination of the reforms. A combination in which at least one
of the reforms was significant was flagged. In some of the cases the reform (e.g.,
voluntary sentencing guidelines) or some combinations of the reforms (e.g., presumptive
sentencing guidelines in combination with truth in sentencing and determinate
sentencing) reduced the changes in imprisonment, but these cases were rarer. For the
majority of the cases the reforms increased changes in imprisonment, both on the front-
end and on the back-end, lending some support to hypothesis 1 (sentencing guidelines
and statutory presumptive will increase changes in imprisonment on the front-end) and 2
(determinate sentencing and truth in sentencing will increase changes in sentencing on
the back-end). Three strikes on the other hand did not significantly increase
imprisonment changes on their own, but did when taken in combination with other
reforms. The analysis of three strikes laws suggests support, but with caveats, for
hypothesis 3 (three strikes laws will increase changes in imprisonment).
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Table 2.4. Estimated Aggregate Change Over Time of Reforms by Themselves or
in Combination with Other Reforms.
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Presumptive Sent.
Guidelines 11.009 14.275 8.52* 9.751 7.894*
Voluntary Sent.
Guidelines 7.973* 10.15* 9.965* 4.207* 11.097*
Statutory Presumptive
Sent. 13.292* 12.942* 10.608* 9.919*
Truth in Sentencing 10.261 11.1 09* 9.627
Abolishment of Parole 12.325* 11.1 09* 14.373*
Three Strikes 10.061 9.627 14.373*
Indeterminate Sentencin 9.650
Mean St Dev. Max Min
Average Imprisonment
Rate Per 100,000 240.813 163.941 870 20
Average Change in
Imprisonment Rate 9.118 13.463 50.880 -19.727
Note: The coefficients represent the average (of the aggregate state) change over time in imprisonment rate
per 100,000 state populations controlling for the variables presented in Model 2 of Table 2.2. This table
only presents combinations that existed in the data set. Combinations not observed are indicated with a "-"
symbol. All other control variables were set to their means for calculation. Intercepts for the unit fixed-
effects were not included in this table. Indeterminate sentencing was calculated by setting each of the
reform variables to zero. Imprisonment rate descriptives give a base by which to compare the calculated
coefficients. * Represents reform combinations where at least one of the reforms in the calculation were
significant. Italicized reforms indicate reforms or combinations in which change in sentencing is reduced.
Models 3 and 4 of Table 2.2, on the other hand, presents the same analysis as
Modell and 2, but includes controls for prison entries in the form of new commitments
and parole violators returned. The Models' (3 and 4) purpose is to assess the effects on
time served vs. total imprisonment (facilitating testing of hypotheses 4 and 5). Including
54
controls for new commitments and parole violators returned is designed to tum the
dependent variable into a "quasi-measure" of time served. While not the ideal measure
of time-served, the analysis indicates that while the coefficients have been reduced
(albeit, not significantly), statutory presumptive sentencing and three strike laws
remained significant as well as voluntary sentencing guidelines in the full model (Model
2), suggesting an increase in time-served (or "quasi-time-served"). A reduction in the
coefficients may have also suggested an effect on the number of individuals entering the
system.
To illustrate, if guidelines had both an effect on those entering the prison system
(net widening) and sentencing lengths, it is logical to conclude that the effects of
guidelines would be reduced, but remain significant when controls for new commitments
to prison were introduced. A comparison of the related coefficients in the matching
models (l and 2) indicates that this argument is not supported by statistically significant
reductions.3! These results should be taken with caution as the "quasi-measure" of 'time
served," is only a general proxy at best. These reservations notwithstanding, the results
lend support for hypotheses 4, but not for hypothesis 5, suggesting overall reforms have a
significant effect on how long individuals spend in prison (time-served), but do not
significantly affect the number of person going to prison (net-widening). This of course
does not suggest that net-widening, or the concerted effort to send more individuals to
31 Significant difference between coefficients was determined by building confidence intervals around the
two coefficients in question at p<.05.
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prison did not occur during this time, only that reforms were not significantly
associated with an even larger widening of the net.
The central finding in all the models of this investigation is the "fixed" sentencing
reforms significantly impact changes in imprisonment rates, indicating they led to larger
aggregate changes in rates of incarceration over time under some conditions, while
reducing them in other combinations. While Boerner and Lieb (2001) make note of a few
states that had not seen specific direct prison growth, this analysis suggests, on average,
across all states, some "fixed" sentencing reforms are associated with changes in
imprisonment rates. Furthermore, support for the argument that reforms will increase
lengths of sentences is found while a net-widening effect is not suggested.
Discussion
In general, this analysis has some significant advantages over previous research.
First, the analysis includes a long time period of historically relevant data that is current
to 2008 (analysis limited to 2007 due to the moving average). The "imprisonment binge"
began roughly in the early 1970's with 1972 often cited as the "start date." With data
beginning in 1965, the analysis can provide every year from 1967 (limited due to the
lagged terms and moving average) covering the effects more accurately than analysis
limited to 3 or 5-year gaps that has been previously used. Second, this analysis includes
almost all sentencing reforms of the period, a marked advantage over previous research.
Previous research has generally assessed one reform at a time (with notable exceptions)
limiting the analysis to that exact reform. As seen in this analysis, considerable change in
the effects of reforms can be observed when different combinations of the reforms are
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considered and failure to account for this may have mis-specified these effects in
previous research. Third, the analysis includes both cross-sectional and time-series data
giving it marked advantages over analysis that lacked one of these dimensions. Fourth,
the modeling technique employed takes a marked step away from previous research and
supplies a unique, yet arguably better, analysis, including the incorporation of a
conditional change score, fixed-effects for states, and the logged growth curve variable.
While the results do not allow for the complete state-by-state analysis (e.g., we can not
definitely calculate the change over time for Oregon vs. Washington), the aggregate
change scores do have substantive interpretation, outlining the average change over time
within states. Furthermore, while the base imprisonment rate often differed from state-to-
state (states had different rates of imprisonment in 1967 and thus they had different
intercepts), their individual growth rate (change over time) was more similar.
Table 2.4 may be the best way to illustrate the complete interaction ofthe
reforms. While this table is useful for understanding the average effects, the estimates
should be viewed with a few qualifications. First, this analysis represents the average or
aggregate change in imprisonment within states over time. While not useful in all
situations, it is useful for those seeking to draw large generalizable conclusions. Some
previous researchers, however, have argued that such analysis is undermined by the
variation in reforms from state-to-state, both in what they adopted and in actual
functional practice. For example, not all presumptive sentencing guidelines are the same
with some having tight ranges and some having wide ranges. This variation from policy-
to-policy alone is not enough to discount the results. After all, variation is inherent in
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measurement and almost never will two policies enacted by different states be
exactly the same. Typically such measurement error reduces the likelihood of finding
significant relationships. Policy variation may make the models less efficient, meaning
larger standard errors, they do not make them less accurate-as the point estimates are
still consistent. That being said, this analysis does not allow us to conclude that all states
or even one particular state observed the effects, it does on the other hand allow us to
conclude that, on the aggregate or on average, the reform is (or is not) significantly
associated with larger changes in imprisonment within states (Finkel 1995). Therefore,
the coefficients represent the average treatment effect across states. Finally, while it
might seem logical to advocate for more delineation among the six reform variables, such
a move is not without its statistical costs. Disaggregating the variables into smaller and
smaller groups reduces the statistical power of the analysis and the "pooling" of states
and their policy changes over time succumbs to an increased "slicing" of the data. This is
the delicate balance of variable specification and statistical power (Wooldridge 2000). In
this case the results presented in Table 2.4 indicate reforms do impact changes in
sentencing rates.
The analysis points to broad causal connections in support of the general
theoretical arguments of Beckett (1997), Scheingold (1991), and Simon (2007). They
suggest the law and order movement of the mid 1970's to today was, in part, driving the
shift to the "justice model" of imprisonment including "fixed" sentencing. The reforms
served to change the process, through the bureaucratization of the system as described by
Weber and others, from a system giving significant leeway to judges and in house prison
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officials to a system largely placing power into hands of elected political officials:
ultimately creating a system that is susceptible to political and social pressures. The final
result is a general increase in punitive incarceration in which "fixed" sentencing
represents a way to codify the punitiveness. These increases are likely regardless of the
stated political purposes or goals of the reforms (e.g., desire to be growth neutral).
Adding to the body of research in the field, but also suggesting a number of important
considerations for future research, this analysis outlines important broad causal impacts
of reforms.
Because many of these reforms were created in the "justice model" framework,
they are likely to have many consequences (e.g., rapid prison growth). This analysis
gives an important general picture of the structural frameworks of the reforms and allows
for the beginnings of an incremental assessment of a number of more specific policy and
theoretical implications (e.g., the growth in the racial and ethnic disparities in
imprisonment). This important first step has been largely overlooked or mis-specified in
the current literature. While some research has attempted to address reforms with a panel
model, this study presents results that should raise questions with past studies.
For instance, Stemen and colleagues (2006) study of the same reforms over a
similar time period suggests "front-end" sentencing reforms are not driving additional
prison growth, but that the "back-end" reform of determinate sentencing has helped to
drive this growth. While their study was long overdue, it also has some limitations.
First, it includes time intervals of every three years, which may limit the results by
leaving out important shifts in imprisonment between observations. Second, the results
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include dummy variables for shifts in sentencing types; these variables generally
misrepresent the "growth like" effects of the reforms. Third, they use trending
imprisonment rates to analyze their data. This study took a different approach and, in
addition to some other methodological advantages, includes fixed effects for panels, a
logarithmic growth curve to represent reforms, and conditional change scores, which
better represents the true nexus of the reform effects. Stemen et al.'s (2006) findings that
determinate sentencing is the chief reform driving higher rates of imprisonment runs
counter to the results of this investigation. It is likely the difference in finding is related
to the differences in model specifications.
The results presented here have useful policy and theoretical implications; an
important area for future research is the assessment of key contexts and social structures
that are likely to influence the adoption and implementation of these reforms. The
current project suggests general arguments for the particular theoretical mechanisms at
work, but more direct assessment is needed. In general, the effects ofguidelines were
consistent across models (3 and 4) that included controls for prison entries and across
models that did not (1 and 2), though the declines in the coefficients representing these
guidelines were not statistically significant. This suggested that reforms may have
affected time-served, but did not net-widening.
After controlling for violent crime rates, drug crime rates, percent black, percent
Hispanic, percent urban, population density, poverty rates, unemployment rates, log
curves for state senate and state house, state governor, new commitments to prison, and
parole violators returned to prison; the three front end "fixed" sentencing reforms remain
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positively associated with imprisonment rates and directly related to a portion of
the nearly 600% increase in imprisonment over the length of this study. Legislators
should consider this when designing sentencing procedures. The costs of locking
criminals up is increasingly expensive and "prison beds" are currently at critical levels in
a number of states (Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Shane-DuBow 1998). Rapid increases
in prison populations can be devastating to a system that is often slow to respond (Griset
1995; Kruttschnitt 2005).
The overall costs to individual states can be high. For example, Oregon, a state
that has implemented sentencing guidelines, spent $23,389 per inmate in 2003. When the
logarithmic growth curve variable is calculated out for seven years, the effect is about a
I-prisoner increase per 1000 for that year, indicating that guidelines have a relatively
large effect (considering the overall imprisonment rates are about 4 inmates per 1000).
The Oregon guidelines could cost the state 81.84 million dollars a year (based on 2003's
total state population).
The costs are likely to be even higher considering that these estimates do not
include capital investments such as construction costs of new prisons and increased
transportation. Additionally, increases in imprisonment places resource pressures on
public defenders and courts. While considerable variation from state to state exists, the
average cost per inmate across all states in 2003 was $22,650 suggesting costs are likely
to be high in all states (Boerner 2001). The problem is exacerbated by other recent
sentencing policies including truth in sentencing and three strikes laws that further
increase prison populations.
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While this chapter deals with the effects of sentencing reforms on shifts in
the total imprisonment rates, the next chapter deals with a component of imprisonment;
the effect of sentencing reforms on the odds of Black and Hispanic imprisonment. As
with this study, it assesses the effects of sentencing reforms on shifts in imprisonment
within U.S. states, but due to limitations in available data it only assesses the impacts
from 1978 to 2005. The study has implications for both theory and policy. Substantively,
the results indicate reforms significantly increase disparities in imprisonment for people
of color, which is counter to some public policy's state goals. Theoretically, the analysis
builds on the theory presented in this chapter to formulate a social chain theory. The
social chain suggests the socio-political context of the law and order movement interacted
with structural-procedural changes in the justice system that led to an unintended
consequence of rising racial disparities. The results suggest mechanisms are at work that
unintentionally "target" historically disadvantaged groups, perpetuating inequalities
within criminal justice system instead of easing them.
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CHAPTER III
THE IMPRISONNIENT RACE:
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF "FIXED"
SENTENCING ON PEOPLE OF COLOR OVER TIME
Introduction
Prior to 1975, imprisonment philosophy in the United States was largely based on
the rehabilitation model. It was believed offenders could be reformed by the prison
system. Upon release, the convict would reenter society as a socially functional and law
abiding citizen. Through this philosophy, sentencing structure allowed considerable
judicial discretion (Roberts 1996; U.S. 1996). Given a wide sentencing range by state
legislatures, the judge was bound by few set laws or procedures in rendering both the
type and degree of sentence. Usually parole boards, acting independently of other parts
of the judicial system and largely independent oflegislators, determined if the prisoner
had been properly rehabilitated and was ready for release (Albonetti 1997; Kempf-
Leonard and Sample 2001).
Beginning in the 1970s, as part of a larger criticism of the criminal justice system
as a whole, indeterminate sentencing policies came under scrutiny. Critics who focused
on sentencing argued it allowed far too much disparity in types of sentencing and time
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served. Of chief concern was the belief that the system was too lenient and was
aiding (or at least not stopping) a perceived rise in criminal activity. As a result, a push
to limit the perceived variability occurred (Griset 1995; Hebert 1997; Miethe and Moore
1985). In response, some states and the federal government adopted a number of new
sentencing procedures including sentencing guidelines, statutory presumptive sentencing,
determinate sentencing, truth in sentencing, and three strikes laws (Frase 2005; Stemen,
Rengifo, and Wilson 2006). The movement reached a climax in 1994 when congress
allocated billions of dollars in federal aid for reforms. Placing focus on the actions of
judges and parole boards, the reforms set out to create greater uniformity in punishment
(Reitz 1995; Spohn 2000).
Advocates cited a possible reduction in racial imprisonment disparities as one of
the benefits of reforms. The argument was twofold. First, on the "front-end", it was
believed that judges, taking cues from the general social setting and from personal biases,
sentenced people of color, particularly Blacks and Hispanics, to significantly longer
sentences. While it may be conventional to think of a judge as an orator of impartial law,
their decisions are "impacted by popular passions shaped by historical and contemporary
developments within democratic society (Crow and Gertz 2008: 363)." Second, but less
emphasized, was the belief that under the indeterminate-rehabilitation model, parole
boards, on the "back-end," covertly or unwittingly denied probation to minorities and the
poor, believing they had unsupportive families and meager job prospects and were likely
to reoffend. Thus, it was assumed that following sentencing reforms, which limit
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discretion, racial disparities would at least be significantly reduced, if not nearly
eliminated (Tonry 1994; Western 2001).
The current study assesses the effects of various sentencing reforms on the racial
and ethnic composition of imprisonment across 49 states32 and over time. As Crow and
Gertz (2008) point out, sentencing research on the micro level flourished under a number
of competing theoretical perspectives. Focusing on court communities and
environmental contexts, some micro-level research suggested, in some circumstances,
sentencing reforms have increased racial disparities. Conversely, macro-level policy
studies largely under-utilized theoretical explanations. These studies have produced
more mixed results and in some cases suggested reforms actually reduce imprisonment.
Additionally, the aggregated macro-level studies incorporating an analysis both over time
and across states have analyzed largely total imprisonment and have not assessed the
impact on the racial/ethnic composition of imprisonment (Spelman 2009; Stemen,
Rengifo, and Wilson 2006; Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn 2009). This paper diverges
from the prior macro research by drawing on social chain theory (Fine 2006; Merton
1936) to suggest unintended consequence resulted in an increase in racial disparities in
imprisonment.
Literature Review
Prior sentencing reform research has been conducted on both the micro and
macro-level. The macro research, while informative in our understanding of the changes
in total imprisonment rates and what may have been some of the prior determinates of
32 Vermont was excluded from the analysis, as race specific imprisonment data was not reported for most
years.
65
adoption of reforms, has, to date, not assessed aggregated changes in the
racial/ethnic composition of imprisonment. The micro-level research, while some have
assessed the effects of/on race, has typically not had broad genera1izabi1ity due to a lack
of comparisons across jurisdictions and/or a lack of analysis over time. Cross
comparisons and observations over time are both essential for a robust analysis of the
effects of reforms on people of color. This project utilizes a social chain theory to
suggest the law and order movement created a context for the adoption of specific
structural changes in sentencing that, while they may have had a stated goal of reducing
racial/ethnic disparities, actually had an unintended consequence of increasing them.
Before outlining the specifics of the social chain, I will briefly outline some of the
important contributions and some of the weaknesses of prior reform research.
Focusing on judicial departures (e.g., judges deviating from the average or
suggested sentence) affecting people of color, some micro-level research built on a
theoretical perspective drawn largely from symbolic interactionism has gained some
traction (A1bonetti 1997; Boerner 2001; Dalessio and Sto1zenberg 1995; Frase 1995;
Frase 2005; Griset 1996; Hebert 1997; Marvell 1995; Shane-DuBow 1998). In general,
researchers either appliedfocal concerns theory or a more structural perspective focusing
on the indirect effect ofrace on legal factors. For example, A1bonetti (1997) and
Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer (1998) used focal concerns theory to argue that when
judges are presented with limited information for assessing a defendant's likelihood of re-
offending, they may incorporate "perceptual shorthand" built on their own
preconceptions of risk. Research has shown racial disparities resulted in part because the
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defendants were seen as possessing certain "high-risk" extralegal characteristics,
such as lower socioeconomic status or if they fit certain stereotypes of criminals, and
received harsher sentences because of their "risky status". These extralegal factors in
tum are also related to their racial or ethnic group status.
Furthermore, while it was argued that, under sentencing reforms, the emphasis on
legal factors will serve to equalize the direct effect ofrace (e.g., racist judges) (Von
Hirsch 1985), the legal factors (e.g., crime committed or prior record) are often directly
influenced by racialized extralegal factors. The final result may actually be a more
pronounced effect of race connected through extralegal factors that on appearance make
the system seem race neutral, but in practice conceal and enhance disparities (Albonetti
1997; Kramer and Steffensmeier 1993; Kramer and Ulmer 1996; LaFree 1984; Nelson
1992; Spohn 2000; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer
1998; Wooldredge 2007). While informative, because of small sample sizes, a general
lack of observations over time, and a focus on contextual effects; most of the prior micro
level research lacked broad generalizability.
Limited to the specific context and sentencing structures of the particular state,
some single state research has assessed sentencing reforms over time, though often
limited to relatively short time periods (Johnson 2006; Marvell 1995; Ulmer and Johnson
2004). While incorporating change in sentences over-time and highlighting the need for
such measures, they lack broad cross-sectional applicability. Three studies to date (i.e.
Spelman 2009; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006; Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn 2009)
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are notable exceptions and did attempt cross-sectional time-series33 analysis of
similar reforms on an aggregate state level across a fairly long time span. But while these
studies do add to the literature on the effects of reforms on total imprisonment, they do
not address possible changes in the racial and ethnic composition of imprisonment. As
Johnson (2005) has argued, "additional studies are needed that assess the consequences
of changing guideline systems across time and place (791)."
Broadly, this analysis is designed to assess the consequences of changes in
sentencing policies across states and over time on the odds of imprisonment of people of
color. Drawing on work by Gary Fine (2006) the complete theoretical frame
incorporated in this analysis is presented as a series of chained social actions connected
through a cascading series of events that ends with an increase in racial disparities.
While each link in the chain possesses a distinct theoretical frame, the entire chain is
needed to understand why and how the changes in the racial and ethnic composition of
imprisonment were manifested. While this analysis ultimately focuses on unanticipated
or unintended consequences of policy shifts in sentencing, the unintended consequences
framework alone is insufficient in explaining the policy outcomes. Without the context
or the structural shifts the outcomes are likely to be quite different than what was
observed and without an understanding of the entire chain of actions different outcomes
may be anticipated.
33 The cross-sectional time series analyses referred to here are studies that compare states (all 50) over a
large section of time. These studies, like this study utilize the state as the unit of analysis and analyze
changes in imprisonment rate.
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Figure 3.1. Social Chain Theory Outlining the Frame Used in This Analysis
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Figure 3.1 outlines the general framework of the social chain. The three circles
represent an event or tangible social action that is preceded by a square (or a series of
squares in the case of the law and order movement) representing the distinct theoretical
frame for each link in the chain. While each link is important in its own right, the entire
chain is ultimately more important in explaining the outcome than anyone part. To
follow is a brief outline of each component and what part in the chain it played. In the
end the theoretical model suggests the politics of fear created a context (link 1: law and
order movement) that led to a structural shift through formal rationalization (link 2:
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sentencing reforms) that then led to an unintended outcome (link 3: increased
racial disparities).
Politics ofCrime and Fear:
Critics of the rehabilitation model of imprisonment advanced a number of
purported problems, including complaints about the arbitrariness of the sentencing
procedure, ineffectiveness of treatment and reform programs, lack of tough time, and
claims of rampant repeat offenders (Hebert 1997; Reitz 1995). "Getting tough on crime"
became a hot political topic and policy makers, both liberal and conservative, risked
political suicide if they appeared soft on crime andjustice (Glassner 1999; Hart 2005;
Hunter 1991; Trend 2007). As Scheingold (1991) and Beckett (1997) suggest, the shift
away from indeterminate sentencing represented the concerted effort by policy makers to
advance the ')ustice model" of crime and punishment that focuses on making criminals
pay and deterring those who might commit future crimes (Doob 2000; Frase 2005;
Simon 2007). Socio-politically, the policies of the movement represented the highly
connected push-pull between the media, politicians, and the public demand for
punishment fitted to the crime not the offender. The interaction resulted in the law and
order movement (illustrated in figure 3.1 by the three squares at the beginning of the
chain) (Abramsky 2007; Clarkson and Morgan 1995; Engen and Steen 2000; Gottschalk
2006; Spohn and Holleran 2000; Tonry 1995).
Scheingold (1991) further suggests, "policy changes are mostly likely to occur
when politicalleaders, in part by taking their cues from the media, choose to play upon
public anxieties that are themselves inflamed by media imagery and vicarious
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victimization rather than by crime as such (Scheingo1d 1991:44)". During the law
and order movement, an expansion of the justice model was often used to further political
agendas by playing on public fears of violent crime, resulting in advancement of an
individualistic view of crime as a function of societal deviants (Abramsky 2007; Glassner
1999; Hunter 1991; Simon 2007). Meanwhile, the media flamed the fear by continually
portraying images of crime, largely stressing violent offenders preying upon random
isolated individuals (Trend 2007). Completing the interaction, politicians then seized
upon the public fears to create law and order platforms focused on getting tough on
crime. This complex circle of interactions served to promote and sustain the
po1iticization of crime that reinforces punitive punishment (Beckett 1997; Scheingo1d
1991; Simon 2007).
Formal Rationality:
While the law and order movement provides an important historical backdrop that
highlights the cultural underpinnings of the reform movement, this part of the social
chain alone does not explain how reforms affected the racial/ethnic composition of
imprisonment. A focus on only the law and order movement might obscure the impact
that structural changes had and how they are undeniably connected to the context in
which they were adopted. To understand how reforms served to restructure sentencing
and possibly increase disparities, we must examine the second link in the social action
chain. While under indeterminate sentencing the judge was allowed considerable
discretion, under reforms the sentence is largely predetermined (or at least more
predetermined). The "fixing" of sentencing into a formalized predictable formula was a
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direct result of the law and order movement and is the driving force behind how
reforms are likely to result in increased disparities.
To explain the restructuring, Savelsberg (1992) argues that sentencing reforms34
are an ideal representation of what Weber (1978) called formal rationality; while
indeterminate sentencing, conversely, is more closely aligned with substantive rationality.
Both sentencing procedures are rational because they have "legalized" validity due to
their basis in codified law, but differ in the application of the law. Substantive decision-
making is subject to values, appeals to ethical norms, and historical precedent, focusing
less on uniformity of outcomes. Formal decisions, on the other hand, focus on limiting
subjective values-based decisions by stressing rationalized structural outcomes through
an emphasis on a technical procedural process. The technical procedure is grounded in
well-defined predetermined criteria designed to elicit a specific outcome. "The judge ...
is more or less an automaton of paragraphs: the legal documents, together with the costs
and fees, are dropped in at the top with the expectation that the judgment will emerge at
the bottom, together with more or less sound arguments - an apparatus, accordingly,
whose functioning is by and large calculable or predictable (Weber 1978: 17)." In the
end, sentencing reforms serve to bureaucratize the process with the specific goal of
removing subjective interpretations and outcomes (Bohm 2006).
Ultimately the suggestion that sentencing reforms would reduce disparities relies
heavily on the traditional notion of racism and suggests the new "color-blind" system
would cut into the racist actions of individuals holding the discretionary power to wield
34 Savelsberg (1992) only assessed the effects of sentencing guidelines. In this study, his theoretical frame
is extended to all reforms considered in this analysis.
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it. Unfortunately, the Weberian process described by Savelsberg (1992) may also
serve to fortify the institutionalization of racists policies (or at a minimum policies that
create racial disparities) into a form oflegitimized bureaucracy, creating a "legitimized"
justification for the higher rates of imprisonment among people of color (Ulmer and
Kramer 1998; Ulmer and Johnson 2004). The sentencing process can appear to be
justified due to its "race neutral apparatus" that focuses on crime and criminal history
rather than individual characteristics of the offenders. The apparent "color-blind" system
then suggests racial/ethnic disparities are a result of differential offending and not a result
of a racist system at the structural level. In actuality, it works to conceal and possibly
amplify the racial and ethnic disparities (Johnson 2003; Spohn and Holleran 2000;
Spohn, Welch, and GruhI1985).
To illustrate, the rhetoric (this is not to suggest that some of the advocates did not
believe reforms would have positive impacts) suggested a reduction in disparities among
people of color (Savelsberg 1992) and even some prior research by Tonry (1995) and
others assert racial and other extralegal (any factor not related directly to the commission
of the crime) disparities should be less likely under schemes utilizing "race neutral" legal
factors (Wooldredge 2007). But when considering how race and ethnicity is connected
indirectly to legal factors through extra-legal factors it becomes apparent that an increase
in disparities is possible, if not likely (Spohn 1990; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000;
Tayler 2000). On a structural level, reforms include many components shown through
prior research to, both directly and indirectly, increase disparities (Spohn, Gruhl, and
Welch 1982). For example, a number of the reforms included stated goals of reducing
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repeat offenders. People of color (especially Blacks) are more likely to carry a
criminal record due, in part, to guilty pleas to a relatively minor first offense. This first
offense, while it may not result in prison time, will most likely result in a more severe
sentence for the second offense. Furthermore, some crimes, for example crack cocaine
possession, which is more common among Blacks, were seen as more "dangerous" than
other drug possessions and received longer sentences35 (Engen and Steen 2000; Hebert
1997; Spohn and Holleran 2000).
It is important to remember that the structural changes did not happen in a
vacuum. The reforms were a result of the law and order movement that possessed
specific characteristics. Without the context of the law and order movement and the
demand for change that reflected the justice model, the structural changes the reforms
enacted would likely have been different. The law and order movement and the formal
rationalization of sentencing were undeniably connected and resulted in a contextually
and structurally specific change.
Unintended Consequences:
While the formal rational structural theory gives us the framework for
understanding how reforms changed the structure of the system and suggests a mode by
which reforms can increase disparities, the final link of the social action chain is built on
unintended consequences theory.36 The study of "unanticipated consequences of
35 • Prior research has shown the connection between race and crack cocaine and that it was one of the
driving forces behind the rise in young black males entering prison during the 1980s.
36 In this study second order, unanticipated, unintended or unrecognized consequences, and latent effects
will all be considered representing the general ideal of the laws of unintended consequences as defined by
Merton (1936).
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purposeful social action" (Merton 1936), has a long history, as far back as Adam
Smith's "invisible hand" or Herbert Spencer's discussion of unhappy guesses or even
Karl Marx, in Das Kapital, wrote about the likelihood of unanticipated outcomes (Fine
2006; Symonds and Pudsey 2008). Max Weber took it even further by naming it his
"paradox" of social action in which he stated "it is undeniably true, indeed a fundamental
truth of all history that the final result of political activity often, nay, regularly, bears very
little relation to the original intention: often, indeed, it is quite the opposite of what is
intended" (Weber 1978). More recently, contemporary authors Charles Tilly, Robert
Rosenthal, Lenore Jacobson, Raymond Boudon, and Gary Alan Fine have expanded and
applied the principal to a wide variety of social and political actions. While many have
written on the general principle, the single most influential theorist was Robert Merton,
who published his first of many important advancements of the theory in 1936 (Fine
2006). "Merton was, by no means, either the first or the last to recognize the importance
of 'second order consequences' , his general theory, however, is still the most influential"
(Fine 2006: 5).
Unintended consequences can come in many forms and many sizes, from Lillian
Rubin's (2007) study of public policy response to homelessness in San Francisco,
Ganapati and Frank's (2008) study of subsidized housing in Miami-Dade county, or to
Kovandzic, Sloan, and Vieraitis (2004) study of the three strikes law in California. These
studies and others show that the effect can be local and intense or can be widespread and
life changing (e.g., as in the passing of prohibition leading to the rise of organized crime)
(Fine 2006). In all of these situations, the attempt to address a specific social problem
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(e.g., homelessness, creation of affordable housing for racial minorities, the
problem of repeat offenders, or the social ills of alcohol consumption), while they may
have been well intentioned, also resulted in some unintended consequence. These
consequences may, at least in some of the situations, have actually outweighed the social
benefits (Fine 2006; Ganapati and Frank 2008). No matter how well intended, the
possibility of unintended consequences raises a caveat for any social policy, not only may
the policy not solve the problem it was designed to alleviate, it could exacerbate the
problem, and finally it may lead to a new unforeseen problem. The current study
suggests an unintended increase in racial and ethnic disparities in imprisonment occurred,
which is counter to the reforms' stated goals.
In general, unintended consequences can be broken down into 5 specific "types";
incomplete information, error in appraisal and implementation, narrow focus on
immediate future and ignoring long term effects, value based decisions operating beyond
the specifics of the policy (e.g., belief that felons deserved to be punished harshly
regardless of the effectiveness of the policy), and the self-defeating prophecy (Merton
1936). Under this typology, each of the five unintended consequences encompasses
varying degrees of likelihood with the specific "fixed" sentencing policies discussed in
this paper. Table 3.1 briefly outlines the typology and illustrates potential disparity
increasing outcomes that mayor may not be present in any given state.37
It should be noted that this frame is not intended to suggest that outcomes, even
the rise in the rate of imprisonment for people of color, from sentencing reform adoption
37 The table does not represent an exhaustive list. Instead the table is designed to illustrate the likelihood of
Merton-like unintended outcomes of sentencing reform adoption.
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is always unintended. In fact it is likely the same pitfalls and biased views of
people of color that may have affected judges, also affected legislators when drafting the
reforms. If for example, legislators or sentencing commissions view specific crimes
known to be prevalent among people of color as more dangerous and thus deserving of a
harsher sentence, they may knowingly increase the length of sentence for that particular
crime. While I do not intend to suggest that sentencing reforms' designs were completely
void of racist intentions, the choice to focus on unintended consequences as the fina11ink
in the chain was intended to concentrate on those who seemed to be both well intended
and optimistic that racial/ethnic disparities would be improved by sentencing reforms
(Blumstein, Cohen, Martin, and Tonry 1983; Crow and Gertz 2008; McDonald and
Carlson 1994).
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Table 3.1. Unintended Consequences Typology
Type General Pattern Specific to Reforms
Incomplete It is nearly impossible for policy makers In an attempt to make quick and
Information: to consider all possible variables and sweeping change, the policy makers
construct changes with full and complete failed to adequately consider all the
knowledge of the outcomes.' possible complexities of changing the
sentencing structure.
Error: Policy makers fail to fully comprehend Failure to recognize racial/ethnic
the information. disparities are tied to the legal factors
used to equalize sentencing.2
Focus on A narrow focus on the immediate future Because of the intense focus on crime
Immediate while ignoring long term effect of the and justice in the 1970s and 80s,
Future: policy reform. Often a result of an sentencing reforms often represented a
intense public pressure to "to something." narrow push for more punitive sanctions.
These "fixed" sentencing reforms met
the short-term goal of increasing
punishment, pacifying both the media
and the general pUblic, but unfortunately
they may have also had lasting long-
term effects. 3
Value Based When policy is driven by moral The sentencing reform movement was
Decisions: entrepreneurs, the policy can often be driven by what Becker (1963) called
pushed and molded, not by rationally moral entrepreneurs, who saw
constructed policy, but by emotional and sentencing as one of the sources of the
value based appeals to moral beliefs social problem of crime. They played
(Saltzburg 2001). upon public fears and media depictions
to push a social agenda that included a
focus on punitive sanctions. The result
was a swift move away from a
rehabilitation model that used
indeterminate sentencing to a justice
model focused on warehousing and
punishing.4
Self-Defeating The policy reform defeats itself by The judge may wittingly or unwittingly
Prophecy: focusing on the very individuals who are either downward deviates from average
likely to resist the most. Judges feeling sentences for White defendants and/or
they had lost the power to mold sentences upward deviate for people of color,
to the offender may actively work against resulting in a racial disparity in lengths
the "fixing" of their decisions and again of sentences.
deviate from the prescribed ranges.
Notes: I Of course, thIS partIcular type ofumntended consequence suggests It IS pOSSIble to know the mformatlOn, but they faIled to
consider it due to limitations. This differs from the second type that suggests information was considered, but an error was made in
assessing the current or future state of affairs or they failed to implement a needed course of action
2 Under this possible outcome the reform could actually increase racial disparities rather than reduce them.
3 At the minimum, they are likely to increase total imprisonment placing an undue burden on the justice system. The reforms could
also compound the racial disparity by ratcheting up punishment on repeat offenders. Research has shown that racial minorities are at
increased risk of being convicted of relatively minor first offenses. With this conviction, which may have not resulted in a prison
sentencing, they now carry a criminal record that increases the punishment for future crimes
4 Moral entrepreneurs also focused on second offenders and drug crimes which are two areas more highly associated with people of
color. The second order effect being a rise in racial disparities in imprisonment resulting from the adoption of the "fixed" sentencing
reform.
S Major obstacles to the limiting ofjudicial discretion are the judges themselves. Reform legislation was largely passed without the
support of the courts, particularly judges, who immediately disapproved, feeling they had lost their power to fit the offense with
appropriate sentence based on the contexts of the crime and offender (A1bonetti 1997; Miethe and Moore 1988; Savelsberg 1992).
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Hypotheses:
Unintended consequences as a result of the adoption of sentencing refonns is both
a social phenomenon, characterized by the interaction of the media, public, and politics
found in the law and order movement, and structural phenomenon, found in the fonnal
rationalization of the sentencing structure. While the rise in disparities among people of
color may be expected and unavoidable due to the structural detemlinism suggested by
Merton and others, the origins of the detenninism is rooted elsewhere: in this case the
social context preceding the structure. Without both previous links of the chain, the final
link, the rise in racial disparities in sentencing as an unintended consequence, is
insufficient to hypothesize a possible divergence from a stated goal of reduced disparities
(Wooldredge, Griffin, and Rauschenberg 2005). Furthennore, the social understanding
(the law and order movement) only "exists" outside the structure (fonnal rationalization)
because the structure exists regardless of the social schema creating it, but they are
undeniably intertwined. As Fine (2006) has suggested:
"Social problem solutions are path dependent, but they simultaneously
change those paths, producing unintended consequences. Policies are
imbedded in relations among actors, who also change those relations as
they act. Because of the reflexive features of social systems-latent as well
as manifest relations-few problem solutions are so narrowly targeted that
they alter only the behaviors that the moral entrepreneurs [or policy
makers] desire. This recognition provides an opportunity for sociologists
[or social scientists in general] to strip away the confident rhetoric that
surround proposed changes and to appreciate Robert Merton's claim that
behavior is interdependent, situated in a world that is tightly coiled (p.
15)."
The general aim of this research was not to identify the specific unintended
mechanisms (e.g., rational concealment) or to test the interconnectedness oflinks as
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presented in the social chain, but to test the existence of the overall unintended
effect of sentencing reforms on people of color in direct contrast to one of the stated goals
put forth by policy makers. Eventually the identification of the specific mechanisms
causing the racial disparity and the testing of the social chain theory at the individual
state level should be fully addressed. The analysis here is not intended to test the
connections between the links in the social chain or even the possibility of their
existence. Instead the theoretical chain is designed to highlight the likely causes of an
unintended rise in raciaVethnic disparities as a (unintended) consequence of sentencing
reforms. The substantive analysis is then designed to test ifthere was indeed a rise in the
racial/ethnic disparity in imprisonment suggesting the existence of an unintended
consequence.
Hypothesis 1: States implementing sentencing reforms in the form ofpresumptive
sentencing guidelines, voluntary sentencing guidelines, statutory presumptive
sentencing, determinate sentencing, truth in sentencing, and three strikes laws
will increase the odds ofBlack rates to White rates ofimprisonment more than
states that have not implemented sentencing reforms.
Hypothesis 2: States implementing sentencing reforms in the form ofpresumptive
sentencing guidelines, voluntary sentencing guidelines, statutory presumptive
sentencing, determinate sentencing, truth in sentencing, and three strikes laws
will increase the odds ofHispanic rates to White rates ofimprisonment more than
states that have not implemented sentencing reforms.
While the two hypotheses listed here represent the pooling of the six main
sentencing reforms under study, each hypothesis can also be seen as having six sub-
hypotheses testing each reform separately. Table 1.1 (Page 7) illustrates the use of
sentencing reforms, which now represent a majority of sentencing procedures in the U.S.
While considerable variation within the "types" of sentencing procedures exist,
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considerable variation in the overlap of sentencing reforms also exists (these
distinctions are discussed later). In the end, this investigation aims to test the general
effects of sentencing reforms on the odds of imprisonment for Blacks and Hispanics on
the aggregate state level over time.
Data
This study utilized state level data covering each year between 1978 and 2005
(1981 to 2005 for Hispanics) with data available for 49 states. This panel data has the
benefit of incorporating both cross-sections, in the form of states, and observations over
time, where changes in state odds of imprisonment of people of color due to sentencing
reforms can be assessed in comparison to states not adopting reforms. The study begins
in 1978 because prior to that year race and ethnic group specific imprisonment rates were
not recorded at the state level. It would have been ideal to include groups in addition to
Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, however small sample sizes and inconsistent recording of
groups over time and across states made this problematic.38 Additionally, Washington
DC39 and Vermont were excluded from the analysis, as race specific data were not
reported for most years.
Obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics4o, the dependent variables represent
the odds of Black to White and Hispanic to White imprisonment.41 While three separate
38 First, early in the data series, states did not record any racial groups beyond Whites, Blacks, and others
and used a separate question to assess Hispanic origin. Second, in some states, other racial groups
represent relatively small percents in the general public, often resulting in very few and sometimes zero
individuals in prison. This makes the analysis difficult, as the coefficients are unstable.
39 Along with incomplete data, Washington DC stopped housing its own prisoners in 2001.
40 Data for the years of 1978 to 1983 is available in the yearly publication: Prisoners in State and Federal
Institutions on December 31, 1972 (through 1983). Data for the years of 1984 to 1998 is available in the
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analyses of Black, Hispanic, and White imprisonment rates as individual rates
would allow for the assessment of individual effects, the results from each group are not
comparable to each other, as each dependent variable would measure a unique rate and
would not allow for direct comparison (Frost 2008).42 Therefore, the models incorporate
odds ratios of Black imprisonment rates per state Black population to White
imprisonment rates per state White population and Hispanic imprisonment rates per state
Hispanic population to White Imprisonment rates per state White population. These two
measures allow for testing of the increased likelihood (as odds ratios) of people of color
are going to prison, as compared to whites, resulting from adoption of reforms. On
average over the years under investigation, Blacks are 7.01 times more likely to go to
prison, while Hispanics are 1.98 times more likely.
yearly publication: Correctional Populations in the United States, 1984 (through 1998). Data for the years
of 1999 to 2005 is available in the yearly publication: Prisoners, 1999 (through 2005). All three
publications are produced and printed by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (see Citations). Rates per
1000 for each variable were computed by taking the raw number of prisoners for each state by year that
was provided by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and dividing by state population per 1000 as supplied by
the Bureau of the Census (see citation).
41 Unfortunately, early in the time period of this analysis, states only collected data on white, Black, and
other with a separate question assessing Hispanic heritage. This, of course, limits the analysis in those
groups and a number ofresearchers have pointed to the limitation of the "other" category as ajustifiable
measure. Furthermore, when disaggregated data did become available many states had little to no
individuals from a specific racial/ethnic group in prison (largely a result of small numbers in the general
population of that state), making analysis unstable (Beck and Katz I995; Halaby 2004).
42 For example, larger coefficients for Blacks (for each of the variables) over both Whites and Hispanics
and the larger coefficients for Hispanics over Whites were observed. This is at least partly a result of
differences in the dependent variables. For example, Blacks are incarcerated at higher rates; if therefore,
voluntary guidelines resulted in a 10 percent increase in imprisonment rates for each racial group, the
increase in the "effect" on Blacks would be greater than for the White rates and the coefficient associated
with voluntary guidelines in the Black equation would be greater than for the coefficient in the analysis of
the White imprisonment rates. This limitation necessitates the analysis presented in this paper, which
presents logged odds ratios of Black to White and Hispanic to White imprisonment. In addition, the
analysis has the added benefit of getting at the heart of the theoretical argument that reforms will have an
"unintended" consequence of increasing imprisonment rates for people of color more than Whites.
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While it is relatively straightforward to calculate the Black and White
imprisonment rates over the entire data series, the construction of the Hispanic
imprisonment rate data took more care. In contrast to our social schema of what it means
to be Black or White, which has been generally stable in the years under investigation,
other racial and ethnic categories are more fluid and influenced the consistency of the
Hispanic imprisonment data (Kamig and Mcclain 1985; Quillian 1995). Collected over
three decades, the Hispanic data, similar to the way the census changed, has taken on
three distinct categorizations. To account for these changes, the Hispanic rates were
"standardized" to the most recent categorical definition, where individuals are first
classified by a racial category which includes a relatively long list like White, Black,
Native American, Asian or Pacific Islander, and so on and then asked if they are of
Hispanic Origin.43 Additionally, in some states, especially early in the time series, the
population of Hispanic prisoners was small, making the analysis less stable. Even with
these complications with the Hispanic data, the data will allow the testing of both
hypothesis 1 and 2.
Table 3.2 outlines the six key independent variables representing sentencing
reforms. They were compiled from numerous sources including the Bureau of Justice
43 The "standardization" of percent Hispanic involved three steps. First, the most recent categorization
system began in 1990 and these percents were left unchanged and used as the "base" to adjust the
remaining years. Second, because the rates between 1980 and 1989 were collected under a different
definition and coding scheme, these rates were adjusted. The 1980 to 1989 rates were first converted to
state-specific change-scores. These change-scores were then matched to their respective state-specific
1990 percent by using the average change-score from 1990 to 1992 as an estimate of the change from 1989
to 1990. Then taking the 1990 percent and multiplying it by the three-year averaged change-score from
1990-1992, a percent for 1989 was estimated. Third, the estimated 1989 state-specific percent was then
used as the base rate to move backwards in time to generate percents based on the actual1980 to 1989
change-scores. The same procedure was then implemented for data prior to 1980 using the estimated 1980
percent as the base.
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Assistance (1996), Frase (2005), Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn (2009), and a
report by the Vera Institute (Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006). While most research is
in agreement on the general goals of the reforms, considerable variation in the design and
application of the reforms exists and there is little consensus about how to classify them
into appropriate groups (Frase 2005; Marvell 1995; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006;
Tonry 1995). Appendix A contains a detailed discussion of the general function of the
various reforms and how they are delineated in this study.
Table 3.2. The Six Reforms Included in Analysis
Refonn Description
Presumptive Sentencing They consist of a matrix of possible sentences with a
Guidelines l very narrow range within a sentencing category that is
defined by an offender's criminal history (prior
offenses) and offense severity. Judges generally must
follow the matrix. They are strict in their application;
only allowing very limited deviations,
Voluntary Sentencing Treats guidelines as formal recommendation, but does
Guidelines l not lezallv mandate they be followed by the iudge.
Statutory Presumptive They represent an attempt to create unifonnity within
Sentencingl similarly situated crimes, but act less like a sentencing
rubric. They specify an appropriate or "normal"
sentence for each offense as a baseline for a iudge.
Determinate SentencingZ Determinate sentencing is used to refer to a system
without discretionary parole boards.
Truth in Sentencingk They require offenders serve a statutorily defined
minimum amount of time. Only states meeting the
1994 federal omnibus crime bill minimum 85% time-
served ofthe original sentence are considered.
Three Strikes Laws3 They are a habitual offender law focused on three time
felony offenders. Generally the law suggests a severe
sentence (25 to life or life) for a third felony offense.
Notes: 1 Front-End Refonns, 2 Back-End Refonns, 3Sentencing Enhancement
There are two key points about the reforms that should be noted. First, all six
reforms represent a shift from the indeterminate-rehabilitation model to a punitive model
with a discretion-limiting sentencing or release structure. Second, presumptive
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sentencing guidelines, voluntary sentencing guidelines, and statutory presumptive
sentencing are considered independent and mutually exclusive "front-end" reforms and
may not, at any given time, coexist with either each other or indeterminate sentencing.
Third, the "back-end" limiting or elimination of discretionary release (truth in sentencing
or determinate sentencing) is considered separate because their focus on release allows
operation alongside the "front-end" reforms. Finally, the unique and independent nature
of three strikes laws allows it to occur alongside both the front-end and back-end reforms.
While states adopting reforms often adopted numerous types, their coexistence is not
absolute and different reforms were often instituted in different years (See Table 1.1 on
Page 7; e.g., Oregon adopted presumptive sentencing guidelines in 1989, abolished
parole in 1989, and adopted truth in sentencing in 1995) (Frase 2005; Stemen, Rengifo,
and Wilson 2006).
Additionally, because the dependent variable does not include county or local jail
populations, only individuals sentenced to more than one year are considered. To
account for this lag effect, reforms were coded as beginning one year after their actual
establishment. Second, while in the year following the reform there will be an
instantaneous effect on some portion of the imprisonment rate, not all individuals in any
given year will be "caught up" by the reform. Some of the rates (the race specific rates
used to construct the odds ratios) will be individuals who were already imprisoned and
sentenced under the old sentencing procedure. Over time, a greater proportion of
prisoners will be "caught up" by the reform. At some point a plateau at nearly full effect
will occur and only a small portion of the rate will be individuals' who were sentenced to
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long tenns under indetenninate sentencing. To address this issue and capture the
expected "logged growth curve" like effect, a new measure of refonns was implemented.
Using a logarithmic measure to model the effect of sentencing refonns represents an
important divergence of this study from previous analyses, which relied heavily on
dummy variables.44
To create the new sentencing measures, each state was coded as 1.00 the first year
of implementation and as e (2.71828) for year five through the last year of observation.
The intervening years between one and five were set at an equal distance between 1.00
and 2.71828. Finally, the absolute45 natural log of each score was taken. This procedure
created a "logarithmic growth variable" with a one-year lag (the log of 1 is 0) that
suggests full effect at five years. The measure represents an effect that approaches 1 (the
full effect) at an increasingly diminished rate (increases fast at first and then slows).
States with indetenninate sentencing were coded to zero and represent the reference
group. Finally, because in most states more than one refonn has been adopted,
interaction tenns are included to assess the combined effect of multiple refonns.
The independent variables for the analysis were assembled from a number of
different sources. The FBI's Unifonn Crime Report (UCR)46 supplied the data on violent
44 Coding the reforms as dummy variables for adopted or not suggests imprisonment rates would be
affected 100% by the new policy in the first year it was adopted. A logarithmic measure represents a more
appropriate theoretically expected effect and should lead to more robust results.
45 Removes the potential for negative scores.
46 Data from the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) is available in print and online from the U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation and is produced and printed yearly (see Citations).
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crime47 and drug crime arrests per 100048 and data from the U.S. Census49 was
used to construct the variables for percent Black, percent Hispanic, percent urban, and
population density. It also supplied total population for each state, which served as the
denominator to construct all rate variables. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1965-
2008a) supplied infoffi1ation to construct the data for unemployment rates, while the U.S.
Bureau of the Census (U.S. 2006) provided the data for poverty rates. Dubin (2007)
supplied the needed political party affiliation of state senate and house (or assemb1y)5o,
While the dummy code for the governor's political party was obtained from Hershey
(2007). Research indicates the controls presented in Table 3.3 (See Appendix E for
descriptive statistics of variables used in this analysis) represent key variables associated
with prison population making their inclusion warranted (A1bonetti 1997; Arvanites and
Asher 1998; DeFina and Arvanites 2002; Engen and Gainey 2000; Steffensmeier and
Demuth 2000; Tonry 1994; Western 2001; Western 2005).
47 Violent crime arrests represent the Uniform Crime Reports indexed crimes, which include the offenses of
murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.
48 In this project "violent crime" and "drug crime" rates refers to violent crime and drug crime alTests rates
recorded by the Uniform Crime Reports for each year (see Citations).
49 Data from the census is available online at census.gov maintained by the U.S. Bureau ofthe Census and
was compiled from both census data and population estimates (see Citations).
50 State house and senate variables were constructed by centering the percent Republican around 50% so
that Republican control represents positive deviations from 50%, while Democratic control represents
negative deviations. The absolute values of the deviations were then logged with the negative sign returned
to the Democrats to create a logarithmic scale with positive and negative deviation from zero to represent
the diminishing returns ofpolitical party concentrations.
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For this analysis, it would have been advantageous to have violent crime
rates, drug crime rates, unemployment rates, and poverty rates for each racial group (e.g.,
Hispanic violent crime rate for the analysis of Hispanic imprisonment rates), but some
issues made such analyses impossible. 51 While crime-specific rates for separate racial
groups would have been valuable, variables incorporating total population (cutting across
racial and ethnic groups) and variables specific to people of color test two different
substantive things. First, data specific to each racial group would control the race
specific change in each variable. For example, some researchers have suggested
(Albonetti 1997; Spohn, Gruhl, and Welch 1982; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer
1998), that unemployment among Blacks will increase Black imprisonment; thus,
controlling Black unemployment in models of black imprisonment rates would be ideal.
Conversely, critical race theory suggests Blacks can be viewed as a "threat" to the White
majority regardless of race specific crime rates and this can translate into imprisonment
disparities (Jacobs and Carmichael 2001 ; Jacobs and O'Brien 1998; Webster 2007).52 In
this sense, total rates may represent a more appropriate proxy of the "threat" because high
51 First, a number of states were missing this data across a number of years. Second, a set standard of racial
categorization was not used by individual states, making comparisons difficult; this is particularly true for
Hispanics where states have counted individuals as both an ethnic and/or racial group. Third, data on drug
crimes for separate racial groups is only available in the 1990s and is not available for violent crime on a
state level across all states. As a result, violent crime rates, drug crime rates, unemployment, and poverty
rates could only be calculated using total population per 100,000.
52 The theory suggests people of color are seen (overtly or contextually) as "criminals," particularly as
"violent criminals" and as more people of color enter a community, the perception of physical and social
threat increases. This perceived threat translates into more arrests, charges, convictions, and longer
sentences for minorities and this will translate into higher imprisonment rates for people of color. The
perceived threat does not need to be related to a real threat, and thus minorities may be imprisoned at
higher rates simply because they make up a larger portion of the population. The perceived "threat" can
take the form of either a threat of higher criminal activity and thus minorities will be targeted as "the
criminals" or a threat to social, political and/or economic dominance and again minorities could be targeted
by the criminal justice system as a form of social and economic control.
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rates of, crime will be attributed to people of color regardless of actual rates
among the separate racial groups (Quillian 1995; Spohn and Holleran 2000).
Methods
The panel data, with its 49 states observed over time from 1978 to 2005, are
analyzed using time-series cross-section (TSCS) regression (also known as panel
regression).53 Models were run using Prais-Winsten regression with panel corrected
standard errors developed by Beck and Katz (1995). Each model incorporated fixed
effects54 for states to correct for time-invariant omitted variable bias and an ARI term to
correct for autocorrelation. This model specification has been shown to be effective in
measuring within panel (e.g., states) changes over time (Halaby 2004; Wooldridge 2000;
Wooldridge 2005). When focusing on changes over time, fixed effects can be
implemented by including dummy variables for each state.55 This model controls the
S3 Several problems can arise in panel analysis. Parks (1967) developed a generalized least squared (GLS)
regression procedure to solve some of the issues and numerous studies have adopted the method (Beck and
Katz 1995). Park's method, however, may understate the standard errors of regression coefficients by as
much as 50 to 300 percent, seriously calling into question the use of this estimator. To counter this
problem, Beck and Katz (1995) recommend an approach that uses the Prais-Winsten regression with panel
corrected standard errors. Their method is a variant of ordinary least squared (OLS) regression and while
regular OLS is not particularly useful in TSCS. It can be correctly implemented when used in conjunction
with PCSE (an error correction that takes into consideration the tendency for panels (in this case the states)
to be correlated) and corrections for autoregression (the tendency for year to year observations to be
correlated with each other).
S4 The Hausman test can be used to determine whether the random effects model, a model that allows for
both tome variant and time invariant error to vary freely, is likely to suffer from omitted variable bias.
Omitted variable bias is a likely and potentially critical miss-specification of the models where unobserved
unit specific (in this case state-specific) variation is not accounted for. If this bias is present and
unaccounted for, the coefficient will be unstable and biased. In this case, the Hausman test indicates
omitted variable bias is likely in this analysis. In this case, because no additional variables can be added,
the fixed effect models should be used.
55 In effect, fixed effects for panels exploits within group variation by holding constant unexplained
between group variations. The estimates achieve an unbiased state even when the random effects
assumptions are violated. In this analysis the unit fixed-effects model offer significant advantages over the
random effects model (Halaby 2004)
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unobserved state level effects that are stable over time by holding the unexplained
time-invariant variation constant. The fixed effects model has the advantage of
correcting for any state-level omitted variables that can cause bias. This can substantially
improve the results and has the added benefit of controlling for any time-invariant state
differences that may be associated with sentencing reform adoption but not measured
(England, Kilbourne, Farkas, and Dou 1988; Halaby 2004).56 Additionally, if the study is
not primarily concerned with panel-to-panel variation, as in this analysis where the
interest lies in the patterns of change over time, then the panel specific fixed-effects
approach sacrifices little (Halaby 2004).57
The Hausman test can be used to indicate the need for fixed-effects for units and
in this analysis the test indicates that the random effects model is not warranted.
Conversely, if the Hausman test indicates the necessity of fixed effects for units, it does
not necessarily dictate the absolute need for fixed effects for time. The choice of fixed
effects for time is one largely based on theoretical interest (Halaby 2004; Wooldridge
2005).58 This is because when fixed effects for units is incorporated, most time variant
56 An important advantage in this analysis is that fixed effects for states will control for any regional
differences that may be present. For example, research has shown that the south has higher rates of
imprisonment and the analysis will control for this difference and remove its effect from the results
(England 1988). Though if someone were interested in state-to-state differences this model would not be
appropriate.
57 As long as the analysis includes controls for time variant bias, in which a significant number of controls
can be included in the analysis (e.g., AR controls for autocorrelation or moving averages).
58 It is not wise to use a random effects model when the Hausman test of the random effects vs. fixed
effects model for panels indicates that the fixed effect model is preferred. In most time-series cross-
sectional analysis issues of confounded errors that are likely in a full random effects model can often be
addressed with the inclusion of fixed effects for panels and controls for serial correlation (e.g., auto-
regressive controls). With the inclusion of fixed effects, the remaining variation becomes a measure of
within panel variation from each panel's mean. As this may be a measure that is of theoretical interest,
fixed effects for time would not be warranted. To illustrate, when fixed effects for both units and time are
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issues (including time-specific omitted variable bias) can be assessed with a large
number of proven procedures and while fixed effects for time is on the list of appropriate
tools to assess models suffering from unexplained time variant co-variation, their
inclusion changes the interpretation of the coefficients from change over time. Because
theory suggests it is desirable to leave the year-to-year variation intact in this analysis and
preserving the measure as change over time, it was decided not to include fixed effects
for years (e.g., period or time effects) and instead use AR(1) controls for serial
autocorrelation. The fixed effects for units models with an AR(1) have been shown to be
effective (Beck and Katz 1995; Halaby 2004).59
Results
Following the theoretical model that suggests an unintended consequence would
result due to a cascading chain of events, it was hypothesized that sentencing reforms
would affect the Black imprisonment rates more than White imprisonment rates. Table
3.460 presents two models testing this hypothesis. The first, Modell, present the base
model with only the conditional main effects of reforms and the first level interactions
included, the substantive interpretation of the coefficients become a measure of the panels' deviation from
time by unit specific mean that is stable over time, completely removing any unexplained time varying and
panel varying effects. This of course could be a measure of theoretical interest, but is substantively
different from the "change over time" measure of the panel-only fixed effects model. Whether a researcher
chooses to include fixed effects for time is one of substantive interest informed by the research question,
while the choice of the inclusion of fixed effects for panels is one of availability of appropriate controls
ine1evant of the research question (Halaby 2004).
59 Both a Mundlak and Hausman test of the time and unit specific fixed effects vs. the unit only fixed
effects model suggest the AR(l) term is sufficient in addressing serial correlation and other time variant
model concerns. Additionally, a Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test suggests that the AR(l) model is
sufficient in conecting any possible autoregressive process. Models ran without an AR( I) term failed the
test, while models with the term passed.
60 Control variable coefficients were not presented here, but can be found in Table 3.5.
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between reforms. The model serves as a baseline to compare the results of the full
model: Model 2. Model 2 on the other hand includes the control variables presented in
Table 3.3. In Table 3.4 the coefficients represent the change in the odds of Black
imprisonment when shifting from the reference group of indeterminate sentencing
(represented as a 0 for all reform variables including interaction terms) to a state with at
least one reform being fully implemented (represented by a 161 ) or combination thereof.
In Modell, only presumptive sentencing guidelines and an interaction of statutory
presumptive sentencing and determinate sentencing are significant.
While Model 1 serves as the base, Model 2 is the model of most theoretical
interest. The model controls for state level crime, demographic and political effects. Of
note is the large change in R-squared between Models 1 and 2. While in Modell the
reforms only account for about 23% of the variation, Model 2 accounts for a robust
85.6% of the variation, suggesting that these state level controls that change over time are
important in explaining differences between states. Model 2 suggests the conditional
main effects of both types of sentencing guidelines, presumptive and voluntary, as well as
truth in sentencing significantly increased the logged odds of Black to White
imprisonment. Considering that the average odds of Black imprisonment under
indeterminate sentencing were about 7.01 times that of White imprisonment, the
conditional main effects are relatively large (though smaller than the effect on the
Hispanic odds). For example, when truth in sentencing is fully implemented, it leads to
an increase in the odds of Black imprisonment of about .308 or a 4.4% increase.
61 Or the natural log of e, which is 1.
93
Additionally, both presumptive and voluntary guidelines increase the odds by .184
and .228 respectively.
It should be noted that few states implemented only one reform. This fact
necessitated the inclusion of interaction terms. These terms simulate the simultaneous
effects of two reforms "co-existing" in one state. In general the interaction terms served
as a mitigating effect, reducing the additive conditional main effects of reforms. As
expected, because of their significant main effect, significant interactions between both
types of sentencing reforms and truth in sentencing are observed. So while the
conditional main effects of presumptive sentencing guidelines and truth in sentencing
increased the odds of Black imprisonment by .184 and .308 respectively, the interactive
effect is .0616 or only a 0.9% increase for the average state. In addition to the expected
interaction terms, an interaction between determinate sentencing and truth in sentencing
was also observed. While the conditional main effects of truth in sentencing were
significant, the conditional main effects of determinate sentencing were not. This may be
a result of the strong main effects of truth in sentencing making the interaction significant
despite determinate sentencing not being significant. Some previous research suggests
that sentencing reforms would have a greater effect on Black imprisonment rates than on
White imprisonment rates (Arvanites and Asher 1998; Engen, Gainey, Crutchfield, and
Weis 2003). The analysis here supports this prior research for at least some of the
reforms.
Table 3.4. The Odds of Black Imprisonment Compared to White Imprisonment
Modell Model 2
Reforms
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Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines
Voluntary Sentencing Guidelines
Statutory Presumptive Sentencing
Determinate Sentencing
Truth in Sentencing
Three Strikes
Interaction Terms
Presumptive Guide * Determ. Sent.
Presumptive Guide * Truth in Sent.
Presumptive Guide * Three Strikes
Voluntary Guide * Determ. Sent.
Voluntary Guide * Truth in Sent.
Voluntary Guide * Three Strikes
Statutory Presum. * Determ. Sent.
Statutory Presum. * Truth in Sent.
Statutory Presum. * Three Strikes
Determ. Sent. * Truth in Sent.
Determ Sent. * Three Strikes
Truth in Sent. * Three Strikes
Observations
R-squared
Rho
0.268*
(0.194)
-0.000402
(0.1 06)
-0.180
(0.300)
0.138
(0.232)
0.238
(0.356)
0.464
(0.466)
-0.0846
(0.426)
-0.526
(0.382)
-0.400
(0.624)
-0.788
(0.944)
0.0456
(0.330)
-0.300
(0.272)
-1.186**
(0.594)
0.376
(0.302)
0.0582
(0.452)
0.330
(0.358)
0.158
(0.338)
-0.101
(0.276)
1321
0.227
0.764
0.184*
(0.098)
0.228*
(0.118)
0.167
(0.240)
0.115
(0.168)
0.308***
(0.106)
0.133
(0.142)
-0.282
(0.228)
-0.416*
(0.214)
-0.0791
(0.208)
-0.332
(0.510)
-0.348**
(0.152)
0.129
(0.122)
-1.142
(0.722)
0.0944
(0.251)
0.311
(0.204)
0.596**
(0.268)
-0.390
(0.280)
0.0958
(0.146)
1287
0.856
0.638
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
Note: Control variables are presented in table 3.6
This table presents OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors of the log odds ratio
of Black imprisonment rate per 1000 Black state population to White imprisonment rate
per 1000 White state population for the years 1978 to 2004 with AR1 correction for
autocorrelation and fixed effects for states for the six reforms and their interactions.
95
Table 3.5. Control Variables presented in Table 3.4 of the Odds of Black
Imprisonment
Crime Variables
Violent Crimes
Drug Crimes
Demographics
Percent Black
Percent Hispanic
Unemployment Rate
Percent Poverty
Population Density
Percent Urban
Political Variables
State House Republicans
State Senate Republicans
Republican Governor
Observations
R-squared
Rho
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
Standard errors in parentheses
Modell
1321
0.227
0.764
Model 2
0.105***
(0.037)
0.013
(0.055)
-0.620***
(0.010)
0.202***
(0.053)
-0.200***
(0.042)
-0.040
-0.026
-0.00546**
(0.003)
0.00527*
(0.003)
0.092
(0.058)
-0.035
(0.055)
0.121
(0.111)
1287
0.856
0.638
Also based on the social chain theory outlined above, it was hypothesized that the
same increase observed in the odds of Black imprisonment would be observed on the
odds of Hispanic imprisonment (Hypothesis 2). Tables 3.6 outlines the effects of reforms
on the odds of Hispanic to White imprisonment. The models are structured the same way
as in the analysis of the odds of Black imprisonment, but the results suggest important
differences.
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First, in the base model (Modell), only determinate sentencing and three
strikes laws are significantly associated with increases in the odds of Hispanic
imprisonment. Four of the interaction terms were also significant and served as a
mitigating effect, reducing the overall conditional main effects. The model (Modell)
explained more of the variation in the analysis of Hispanic imprisonment odds than the
Black imprisonment odds, but not in the full model (Model 2). The Black imprisonment
models explained 31 % more of the variation and this difference was likely the result of
two factors. First, due to less available data, the Hispanic models include three less years
than the Black imprisonment models leading to fewer observations and, thus, less
statistical power. Second, while the Black imprisonment data has generally indicated
consistent high rates of disparities compared to whites, the Hispanic data has been more
mixed, with some states showing low levels of disparities, while others show high levels.
Additionally, while the Black imprisonment odds rose steadily throughout years, the
Hispanic imprisonment odds remained relatively stable until the late 1980s and then rose
steadily until the early 1990 before leveling back off and rising at a much slower rate than
Black imprisonment.
As with the analysis of the odds of Black imprisonment the conditional effects
should be interpreted with care as few states adopt only one reform and the interaction of
the reforms can significantly change the outcome. For example, three strikes laws by
themselves increase the odds of Hispanic imprisonment by 16.4%, but when taken in
combination with voluntary guidelines the combo only increased the odds by 6.3% over
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the average effect of indeterminate sentencing of 1.85. It should be noted that
only Vermont, a state dropped from the analysis, adopted only a three strikes law.
In Model 2, the full model, again the conditional main effects of three strikes and
determinate sentencing significantly increased the odds of Hispanic imprisonment, but
additionally truth in sentencing was significant. Additionally, presumptive sentencing
guidelines, while not significant by themselves, did show signs of interaction with all
three of the back-end reforms. Voluntary guidelines also significantly interacted with
three strikes laws, while statutory presumptive sentencing interacted with none of the
back-end reforms. Again as with the Black imprisonment models, the non-significant
conditional main effects may be a result of the strong interaction effects that are masking
any main effect. In general, the effects of reforms are larger for the Hispanic
imprisonment rates than the Black imprisonment rates. For example, while the average
state adopting voluntary sentencing guidelines and truth in sentencing resulted in a 2.7%
increase in the odds of black imprisonment, the same combination of reforms resulted in
a 10.8% increase in the Hispanic odds. Of note is the significant interaction of statutory
presumptive sentencing and determinate sentencing. This finding is consistent with this
paper's hypothesis, but is counter to the expectations of some prior research. Both
Stemen et al. (2006) and Zhang et al. (2009), while their research only focused on total
state imprisonment, suggests the abolishment of parole may actually decrease
98
imprisonment. The results in this analysis suggest differently, indicating that the
presence of determinate sentencing actually increased racial/ethnic disparities.62
In the analysis of both racial/ethnic groups the only reform that significantly
increased both odds of imprisonment was truth in sentencing. This back-end reform
mandates an offender serve 85% of the original sentence. This reform also received
significant federal support in the mid 1990s and was adopted by a number of states. The
strong effect may be a result of increased political pressure to cut into perceived rising
recidivism rates. Additionally, for both analyses, statutory presumptive sentencing was
not significant (though it sometimes significantly interacted with other reforms). Finally
while both types of sentencing guidelines did increase the odds of Black imprisonment
and determinate sentencing and three strikes did not, the opposite was true for the
Hispanic odds, suggesting important differences exist. It should also be noted that the
increase in the odds of both Black imprisonment and Hispanic imprisonment is not a
result of a reduction in White imprisonment. In an analysis of each racial/ethnic group
separately (not shown), reforms increase White imprisonment as well; suggesting the
increase in the odds of imprisonment for people of color is related to an increase in
imprisonment beyond the increase in White imprisonment.
62 It should be noted that Stemen et al. (2006) and Zhang et al. (2009) did not actually test the racial
composition of imprisonment and their research was intended to only highlight the effect on the total
imprisonment rate.
Table 3.6. The Odds of Hispanic Imprisonment Compared to White Imprisonment
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Reforms
Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines
Voluntary Sentencing Guidelines
Statutory Presumptive Sentencing
Determinate Sentencing
Truth in Sentencing
Three Strikes
Interaction Terms
Modell Model 2/\
0.112 -0.154
(0.183) (0.166)
0.109 0.114
(0.230) (0.159)
0.0971 0.168
(0.218) (0.179)
0.229*** 0.240***
(0.0202) (0.0201 )
0.166 0.198*
(0.141) (0.119)
0.413*** 0.356***
(0.144) (0.126)
Presumptive Guide * Determ. Sent.
Presumptive Guide * Truth in Sent.
Presumptive Guide * Three Strikes
Voluntary Guide * Determ. Sent.
Voluntary Guide * Truth in Sent.
Voluntary Guide * Three Strikes
Statutory Presum. * Determ. Sent.
Statutory Presum. * Truth in Sent.
Statutory Presum. * Three Strikes
Determ. Sent. * Truth in Sent.
Determ Sent. * Three Strikes
Truth in Sent. * Three Strikes
Observations
R-squared
Rho
-0.661 **
(0.328)
-0.532*
(0.299)
-0.365
(0.318)
-0.423
(0.474)
-0.115
(0.252)
-0.386**
(0.178)
-0.627*
(0.340)
-0.249
(0.223)
-0.0965
(0.167)
-0.410
(0.283)
0.117
(0.379)
-0.0812
(0.208)
1209
0.342
0.704
-0.513*
(0.305)
-0.871 ***
(0.295)
-0.581*
(0.325)
-0.277
(0.389)
-0.184
(0.175)
-0.396***
(0.139)
-0.525
(0.341)
-0.361 *
(0.216)
-0.0476
(0.176)
-0.627**
(0.260)
0.178
(0.376)
-0.279*
(0.180)
1179
0.549
0.601
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05, * p<O.1
Note: /\ The control variables are not presented but will be made available upon request.
This table presents OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors of the log odds
ratio of Hispanic imprisonment rate per Hispanic state population to White imprisonment
rate per White state population for the years 1981 to 2004 with AR1 correction for
autocorrelation and fixed effects for states for the six reforms and their interactions.
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Table 3.7. Control Variables presented in Table 3.6 of the Odds of
Hispanic Imprisonment
Crime Variables
Violent Crimes
Drug Crimes
Demographics
Percent Black
Percent Hispanic
Unemployment Rate
Percent Poverty
Population Density
Percent Urban
Political Variables
State House Republicans
State Senate Republicans
Republican Governor
Observations
R-squared
Rho
*** p<O.OI, ** p<0.05, * p<O.1
Standard en'ors in parentheses
Modell
1209
0.342
0.704
Discussion
Model 2
-0.024
(0.060)
0.223***
(0.053)
-0.137***
(0.025)
0.185***
(0.026)
-0.211***
(0.065)
0.129***
(0.032)
-0.00817***
(0.001)
0.006
(0.004)
0.030
(0.060)
0.110**
(0.049)
0.584***
(0.093)
1179
0.549
0.601
Previous research indicates that sentencing reforms have increased total
incarceration rates in a number of states (Albonetti 1997; Dalessio and Stolzenberg 1995;
Frase 1995; Frase 2005). It should be noted that the intensity or even the presence of the
unintended consequence suggested by this research is not likely to be the same from state
to state and will depend on a number of social and structural components specific to each
state (Fine 2006; Frase 2005). The structural components are important in understanding
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the complexities of an individual state and in a sense researchers who have
focused on the individual states are not wrong. Their individual state analyses allow for
the inclusion and analysis of state level contexts and state specific legal and political
subcultures that are key to their specific outcomes. While these analyses are justified and
needed, they lack the ability to be generalized across states. This study, on the other
hand, draws its power by exploiting within state variation across 49 states to make
statistically broad inferences about possible unintended consequences ofpolicy shifts on
sentencing at the aggregate state level. The results here further prior research by
indicating reforms are also associated with increased racial disparities on average across
49 states. The results are more generalizable than much of the earlier single-state studies
and suggest a number of important considerations for future research. This analysis
brings a more theoretically driven analysis than much of the earlier aggregated studies.
Much of the earlier policy analysis tended to focus purely on outcomes with less attention
to what might be driving the changes (Tonry and Hatlestad 1997; Webster 2007; Zhang,
Maxwell, and Vaughn 2009). The theoretical model presented here helps to ground the
analysis in contemporary understandings of the criminal justice system.
The central findings indicate some sentencing reforms have had a significant
impact on the odds of imprisonment for Blacks and Hispanics, leading to a widening of
the disparity between Whites and people of color. A finding that is counter to most stated
goals (or rhetoric) surrounding the reforms and suggests a significant unintended
consequence. Notably, the results occur in an analysis that includes fixed effects for
states. Such models examine changes over time controlling for state-level characteristics
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that are constant over time. In addition, the logarithmic growth curve measure
for the effects of reforms should be a more theoretically appropriate indicator of the
effects than measures used in previous studies. In general, the findings support
Hypothesis 1 (increase in the odds of Black imprisonment) for the front-end sentencing
guidelines and truth in sentencing on the back-end for the odds of Black imprisonment.
However for the odds of Hispanic imprisonment, only the back-end reforms increase the
odds, suggesting the loci of the unintended consequences for them is in the changes to the
release mechanism and not the changes to the sentencing procedure (supporting
Hypothesis 2). The divergent effect is curious and why this difference exists is not fully
explained by this analysis. Further research is warranted and may be able to shed light on
the causes. In the end there is support for both hypotheses 1 and 2, suggesting sentencing
refonns led to an unintended consequence of increasing imprisonment of people of color
more than Whites.
While this study does indicate a disproportionate unintended effect at the
aggregate state level, why this disparity is exacerbated cannot be fully explained in this
study. Previous research has indicated that while the discretion previously held by judges
under indetem1inate sentencing may have been removed from the judge, it has not been
removed from the process. It is possible reforms have inadvertently given more
discretionary power to prosecutors (who determine the severity of charges filed), which
might reproduce or exacerbate the racial bias the reforms were intended to address
(Kempf-Leonard and Sample 2001). Analysis with inclusion of racially disaggregated
data for crime rates, poverty rates, and unemployment rates may be able to shed some
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light onto other possible effects as well. A few studies have found that
prosecutors are more likely to take into consideration factors outside of the offender's
crime and prior record (directly or indirectly associated with race and/or other factors) in
determining prosecution of violent and drug crimes, but less likely for property and other
non-violent felony cases (Engen, Gainey, Crutchfield, and Weis 2003; Ulmer, Kurlychek,
and Kramer 2007). In the end, the discretion has not been removed or reduced, but has
been "displaced" from one group to another (Wooldredge and Griffin 2005).
Other research has indicated that Blacks are more likely to be convicted of a
relatively minor crime (Shane-DuBow 1998). If true, an increase in the odds of Black
imprisonment (and possibly Hispanics) may be linked to sentencing reforms through their
greater emphasis on prior record (particularly for drug crimes) as a determinant of
sentencing length (Inciardi, McBride, and Rivers 1996; McShane and Williams 1997).
When this information is combined with the political desire to ratchet up the penalties on
drug crimes, the connection between race and drug crimes as a driving force of a
disparity in sentencing becomes more plausible. Future research should focus on
determining why reforms have affected people of color more than Whites and if it is
connected to prior record, specific crimes, or displaced discretion (Griset 1995;
Wooldredge, Griffin, and Rauschenberg 2005).
While each of the unintended consequences outlined in Table 3.1 could represent
a type at play in any given state, the focuses of this paper instead is on general unintended
effects across states. While considerable variation from state to state exists in the degree
and type of reform (there is no one size fits all). It is also likely the policy shift,
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regardless of the actual structure ofthe policy itself, is likely to result in a latent
effect, in this case, the rise in the disparity of imprisonment rates for people of color. The
indication that sentencing reforms increase imprisonment disparities is not one that
should be considered positive or minor (Fine 2006; Merton 1936). Finding an unintended
consequence does not suggest a policy failure per se. After all, it is important to
remember that these reforms are embedded within complex, dynamic, and interconnected
social systems that can lead to what Fine (2006) called "chained social problems". Policy
reforms are culturally path dependent, tied to what we can imagine, network embedded,
cOllilected to our social understandings and stereotypes, constrained by our social
institutions, and related heavily to the power dynamics that surround us. What has failed
here is not the desire to reform the system (a value judgment lying beyond this analysis),
but the failure to adequately assess the impacts of the reforms. As Merton's theory tells
us, the consequences of public actions often significantly deviate from the desired
outcome (Merton 1936). This deviation was not foreseen and intended and it is important
to not rely solely on the rhetoric of what is supposed to happen. This study suggests
policy makers need to seriously assess and possibly reconsider sentencing reforms to
alleviate the increased imprisonment disparities.
The next chapter focuses on the changes in the female imprisonment rates
compared to males due to the adoption of sentencing reforms or changes in criminal
arrest rates, as a compositional trend that extends over the period from 1970 through
2008. Research has shown that the gender gap in imprisonment has been narrowing over
105
the last four decades (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003; Steffensmeier 1993). We63 focus
our investigation on two potential explanations for part of this narrowing: the sentencing
reform movements that occurred from the 1970s through the beginning of the 21 st century
and changes in the gender ratio of female to male for serious crimes. We hypothesize the
law and order movement along with a shift in women's' roles in society combined to
create an environment where female imprisonment rates rose faster than male rates. We
suggest that both sentencing reforms and differential arrest rates were part of the reason
the female rates rose faster.
The analysis of the next chapter draws on similar data as this chapter and the
previous chapter, but here we take a slightly different approach to the modeling. First,
this analysis includes a slightly different panel model; a cross-sectional time-series
regression with clustered errors as opposed to the panel corrected standard errors
incorporated in the previous models. Second, these models utilize period fixed effects in
addition to unit fixed effects. Third, the models include some additional control variables
not presented in earlier chapters.
63 Chapter 4 was co-authored with Dr. Robert M. O'Brien
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CHAPTER IV
"FIXING" THE GENDER GAP IN SENTENCING:
THE EFFECT OF SENTENCING REFORMS ON THE ODDS OF
FEMALE IMPRISONMENT OVER TIME
The material in this chapter will be published with Robert O'Brien as a coauthor. I
collected and analyzed the data, and Dr. O'Brien prepared the methods and results
sections. Both of us contributed to the introduction and discussion sections and a
drafting of the [mal paper.
Introduction
When referring to the epidemic of youth homicide that occurred in the mid- to
late-1980s, criminologists do so with a sense of astonishment at the doubling of homicide
rates for those 15 to 19 years of age in less than a decade. An even more astonishing
"imprisonment epidemic" occurred in the United States beginning in the 1970s. At the
start of the 1970s the rates of incarceration per 100,000 U.S. residents hovered at slightly
below 100 inmates per 100,000 U.S residents, but by 1980 had moved upward to 139 per
100,000. This upward movement increased to 297 in 1990 and by 2007 stood at 506 per
100,000. This amounted to an astonishing five-fold increase in the rate of incarceration
over a forty-year period (Pastore and Maguire 2007).
The increased rates of imprisonment involved both men and women. The rate for
men rose from 191 per 100,000 men in the 1970 to 955 per 100,000 by 2007. The rate for
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women rose from 5 per 100,000 in 1970 to 69 per 100,000 by 2007. Despite the
higher rise for women, throughout this period men continued to constitute well over 90%
of those imprisoned. These increases are plotted in Figure 4.1 for both men and women
(rates for men are represented by the triangles and rates for women by the squares and
these rates correspond to the left hand axis (Pastore and Maguire 2007).
Graph 4.1. Imprisonment Rates for Males and Females and the Percentage of Those
Incarcerated Who Are Females: 1970 to 2007
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Over this period the percentage of those imprisoned who are women has risen
markedly faster than males (represented by the stars on the stippled line in Figure 4.1). In
1970 women constituted 2.87% of those incarcerated, but by 1980 this percentage had
risen to 3.90%. By 1990 the percentage of those incarcerated who were women had
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grown to 5.48% and by 2007 it stood at 6.88%. This represents a more than
doubling of the percentage of prisoners who were women from 1970 to 2007 (Pastore and
Maguire 2007).
Although the upward trend in incarceration rates has been the focus of much
literature in both scholarly venues (Garland 2001; LaFree 1984; Zimring 2001) and in the
popular press. Much less attention has been paid to the female-male compositional trend
in U.S. prison populations (Kruttschnitt and Gartner 2003). Our interest focuses on this
compositional trend that extends over the period from 1970 through 2008. Specifically,
we focus our investigation on two potential explanations for part of this increase: the
sentencing reform movements that occurred from the 1970s through the beginning of the
21 st century and changes in the ratio of female to male serious crimes.
The War on Crime and the Sentencing Reform Movement
The origins of the "get tough on crime" movement64 are often linked to the decade
of the 1960s and increasing urban unrest that resulted in riots, radical youth and black
power movements, assassinations of top political figures, and increasing crime rates
(Beckett 1997; LaFree 1998; O'Brien 2003). These factors interacted with and were
enhanced by media coverage (Scheingold 1991), public concerns (Warr 1995), and the
political responses to these problems. In a sense, these interactions created a perfect
storm that fostered the law and order movement. In response, the federal government set
up the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice in
64 In this paper the "get tough on crime" movement and the law and order movement are treated
synonymously and refer to the same general period and movement aimed at increasing the punitive nature
of the criminal justice system in response to a perceived rise in criminal activity.
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1969 and passed legislation setting up the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration - the LEAA - (part ofthe Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968). The LEAA supplied funds to law enforcement agencies to professionalize their
operations and improve their record keeping (Marvell 1995).
The growing concern with crime as a social problem, helped to generate concerns
about the effectiveness of the criminal justice system in general. Issues such as the
amount of discretion at all levels of law enforcement, concerns that some offenders were
not receiving stiff enough sentences or being released too soon, and general issues of
fairness for victims and offenders in the criminal justice system took on a new salience.
These issues formed some of the key elements of a sentencing reform movement, which
was part of the larger law and order movement, which eventually resulted in a
restructuring of sentencing laws and a more determinate sentencing structure (Blumstein,
Cohen, Martin, and Tonry 1983).
Until the 1970s judges retained much discretion in the sentencing of convicted
offenders and parole boards were accorded much leeway in the determination of the
release of offenders. There were, of course, maximum sentences for most crimes, but
often there were no minimum sentences and in almost all cases there was a relatively
wide range of sentences that could be imposed by judges. Parole boards, acting
independently of judges, also had limits on their discretion in terms of paroling prisoners,
but these limits were often wide and typically their decisions could not be appealed. This
model of sentencing reflected the rehabilitation model of justice, where the focus
centered on rehabilitating offenders within prisons through work and educational
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programs. The sentencing model reflected a criminal-centered approach designed
to pattern punishment to each offender's rehabilitation needs to facilitate the reform
process (Blumstein, Cohen, Martin, and Tonry 1983).
Blumstein et al. (1983) suggest several reasons for the sentencing reform
movement, including prison uprisings (raising questions about rehabilitation), concern
about individual rights and the control of discretion, demand for accountability,
disillusionment with rehabilitation, disparity and discrimination in sentencing and parole,
and crime control. As they note (Blumstein, Cohen, Martin, and Tonry 1983: 3), "[t]hese
factors, among others, coalesced into a compelling case against indeterminate sentencing.
The indeterminate sentencing system that was all but universally supported in the 1950s
had few defenders by the late 1970s."
The shift away from indeterminate sentencing represented a movement toward a
"justice model" of crime and punishment that was in line with the get tough on crime
movement that focused on making criminals pay and deterring those who might commit
future crime. In a sense, the movement took to heart the three tenets of deterrence theory:
to be effective punishment must be swift, certain, and severe. In terms of policy change
they were most successful in instituting the latter two tenets. The demand was for the
punishment to fit the crime (be certain) and be severe enough (at least more severe than
before the reforms) to deter crime and/or at least incapacitate the offender. The legal
emphasis on "due process" makes it difficult to increase the swiftness of punishment. By
the mid-1970s the sentencing reform movement began to have concrete effects on
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legislation with the adoption of several sentencing reforms (Dohm 2006; Garland
2001; Tonry 1995).
The sentencing reforms passed by state legislatures can be categorized as: (1)
reforms that focused on the front-end (those that occur at the initial sentencing of
convicted offenders) and (2) reforms that occurred at the back-end (those that focus on
how much of a sentence that a judge makes must be served (when and if parole can be
considered) (Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006; Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn 2009).
Three major types of front-end reforms are evaluated in our research.
Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines: Table 1.1 (Page 7) shows when states passed
various types of sentencing reform. In 1982 Pennsylvania passed presumptive sentencing
guidelines and their lead was followed by nine others states so that by 1996 ten states had
presumptive sentencing guidelines on the books. They constitute the most rigid and
severe of the front-end reforms. Presumptive sentencing guidelines consist of a matrix of
possible sentences with a very narrow range within each sentencing category that is
defined by the offender's criminal history (prior offenses) and offense severity. Judges
generally must follow the matrix, since the presumptive sentences are strict in their
applications, allowing only very limited deviations (Frase 1995; Stemen, Rengifo, and
Wilson 2006; Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn 2009).
Voluntary sentencing guidelines and statutory presumptive sentencing: These
reforms are not as rigid as presumptive sentencing guidelines.65 In Table 1.1, we see that
California was the first state to institute statutory presumptive sentencing in 1976 and
65 There is some discretion in categorizing these reforms, which will be discussed in the methods section of
this paper.
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was followed by seven other states for a total of eight states having instituted
these guidelines by 1980. Voluntary sentencing guidelines were first instituted by
Maryland in 1983 and by 1997 seven states had instituted these guidelines. Voluntary
sentencing guidelines are not as binding as presumptive sentencing guidelines. The
guidelines are treated as a formal recommendation, but the judge is not legally mandated
to follow them. Even milder, in terms of rigidity, are statutory presumptive sentencing
reforms - these reforms represent an attempt to create uniformity within similarly
situated crimes. They specify an appropriate or "normal" sentence for each offense as a
baseline for a judge (Frase 1995; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006; Zhang, Maxwell,
and Vaughn 2009).
A second set of reforms concentrates on how much of a sentence made by a judge
must be served and, thus, they are sometimes referred to as back-end reforms. Truth in
sentencing legislation was instituted in Illinois in 1978 and twenty-four states now have
such laws. These laws require that those convicted serve a statutorily defined minimum
amount oftime.66 The second major back-end reform now includes 12 states and
involves the elimination of discretionary parole boards. We refer to this reform as
determinant sentencing (Frase 1995; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006; Zhang,
Maxwell, and Vaughn 2009).
The final sentencing reform that we consider involves an enhanced sentencing
procedure called three strikes-laws. Although California may be most famous for this
law, there are 24 states with some form ofa three-strikes law. These laws focus on
66 In our coding of this variable we included only states meeting the 1994 federal omnibus crime bill
minimum 85% time served of the original sentence.
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habitual offenders who are convicted of a third felony. Typically the law
suggests severe sentences (25 years to life or a life sentence) for the third felony offense
(Frase 1995; Kovandzic, Sloan, and Vieraitis 2004; Lotke, Colburn, and Schiraldi 2004;
Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006; Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn 2009). For a fuller
explanation of these reforms see Appendix A.
Why the Increasing Proportion of Women Prisoners
There are many potential explanations for the increasing proportion of women
prisoners. The two traditional explanations involve changes in the behavior of women
and changes in the attitudes toward and treatment of women with regards to criminal
behavior (O'Brien 2001). A more recently developed explanation involves changes to
laws themselves. Sentencing reforms fit most easily into this later category because they
represent a shift in the structure and application of sentencing based on changes in the
law. While it is conceivable that some of the underlying reasons for sentencing reforms
may result from changing attitudes towards women's behavior, the discussion here
focuses on how the law impacts the odds of female to male imprisonment and not on the
why the laws were changed.
One explanation of changes in the odds ratio of female to male involvement in the
criminal justice system focuses on changes in women's societal roles and suggests that as
these changes occur women's rates of crime became more similar to those of men (Adler
1975; Simon 1975; Sutherland 1947). In criminology this idea dates back, at least, to the
work of Clarence Darrow (1922: 78) who wrote that as women enter "the fields of
industry formerly occupied by men ... she will be more and more judged as men are
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judged, and will commit the crimes that men commit, and furnish her fair quota
of the penitentiaries and jails." This theory contains elements from both of the two
traditional perspectives referred to above; first, that as women's roles change their
behavior will change and they will commit the crimes that men commit. Part of any
change in the proportion of women's involvement in the criminal justice system that
resulted from an increase in the proportion of women committing crimes may be referred
to as an offender-generated explanation (O'Brien 2003; Schwartz and Rookey 2008;
Schwartz, Steffensmeier, and Feldmeyer 2009).
Second, Darrow notes that as women's roles change they will be increasingly
judged as men are judged. That is, changes in attitudes toward women offenders means
that they will be less likely to be treated differently in terms of culpability or to receive
"chivalrous" treatment (Visher 1983). Confounded with this change is the
professionalization or bureaucratization in law enforcement that emphasizes treating
(ideally) all people the same. O'Brien (1999) refers to these changes as recording-
generated changes and Schwartz et al. (2009) refer to these changes as changes in the
law-in-action. These are changes in policing, reporting, and tolerance of behavior. To the
extent that these two types of changes differentially affect males and females, they should
suspect the gender composition of those arrested and that should lead to changes in the
composition of those incarcerated. In our analyses we will include the ratio of females to
males arrested, but we will be unable to disentangle the reasons for changes in this odds
ratio over time within states. Any changes could be due to behavioral changes or to
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changes in enforcement. They could also be due, as we will discuss below, to the
changes in laws-on-the-books.
A rather different explanation for changes in the composition of those arrested is
in changes in law-on-the-books. Such changes in laws will likely mean changes in the
number and, often, the characteristics of people who are caught up in the criminal justice
system. When changes catch up more individuals in the criminal justice system, it is
often referred to as net-widening (Cohen 1985; McMahon 1990; Steffensmeier,
Schwartz, Zhong, and Ackerman 2005). When discussing net-widening Cohen (1985: 44)
state: "(1) there is an increase in the total number of deviants getting into the system in
the first place and many of these are new deviants who would not have been processed
previously (wider nets); (2) there is an increase in the overall intensity of intervention,
with old and new deviants being subject to levels of intervention (including traditional
institutionalization) which they might not have previously received (denser nets); (3) new
agencies and services are supplementing rather than replacing the original set of control
mechanisms (different nets)."
To illustrate how net-widening can occur, a paradigmatic example can be given.
Schwartz and Rookey (2008) describe a net-widening event due to changes in the law and
how it affected the composition of those involved in the criminal justice system. They
report that in many states the Blood Alcohol Content that defined the level of legal
impairment was reduced from ".10 percent to .08 percent, or even to .02 percent for those
under 21 years of age," and they note that "[p]olicies that redefine the legal criteria used
to determine driver intoxication may inadvertently increase women's representation in
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official statistics, without any underlying change in women's actual drunk-
driving behavior" (Schwartz and Rookey 2008: 646). In this case, and in several others
in the area of criminal justice, women are likely to commit less serious offenses. Thus, if
one widens the net to include more minor forms of deviant behavior one is likely to catch
a relatively larger portion of women and, in the process decrease the gender gap. They
provide a number of pieces of evidence to show that this is the case for driving under the
influence.
Net widening occurs in many ways. In the example above it is in response to a
change in laws. It can also be in response to a change in how laws are enforced. Is the
response of law enforcement agents chivalrous? What is the style of law enforcement:
service oriented, legalistic, or as "watchmen" (Wilson 1978)? Each of these styles has
implications for how many arrests occur and how serious the crime must be to warrant an
arrest.
In this paper we will not be able to determine the specific mechanisms by which
net-widening might change the gender composition of those incarcerated. We will not
even be able to separate the effects of net-widening from the effects of differential
changes in the criminal behavior of men and women: changes in the gender composition
of criminal behavior. But we do expect that changes in the law and the enforcement of
the laws that catch-up more people will be associated with a change in the characteristics
of people who are caught up in the criminal justice system. To the extent that these
changes catch up people who typically commit less serious offenses and sentence them to
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longer punishment, we expect that they will have a differentially greater impact
on women than on men.
When we examine the effects of the odds ratio of female to male violent crimes,
property crimes, and drug crimes, we expect that the greater these ratios the greater the
odds of female to male imprisonment. In particular the literature has suggested that the
US drug policy "the war on drugs," has been a major influence on the increase in prison
populations (Blumstein, Cohen, Martin, and Tonry 1983; Payon 2006). This war
escalated after the term was coined by Richard Nixon in 1969 (Baum 1997; Inciardi,
McBride, and Rivers 1996; Payon 2006). Nixon's drug wars were implemented as part of
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 and have continued
under different administrations during the period covered in this paper. Although much
has been written about the differential impact of the war on drugs and the imprisonment
ofblacks and whites (especially with respect to differential sentencing for crack and
powder cocaine), little research has examined its differential impacts on women and men.
But some scholars have drawn attention to this differential (Belknap 2002; Chesney-Lind
1997; Owen 2000).
Hypotheses Relating to the Ratio ofFemale to Male Arrestees:
We expect that the greater the ratio of female to male arrests for violent crimes
within states, the greater the odds of incarceration of females to males within states; the
greater the ratio of female to male arrest for property crimes within states the greater the
odds of incarceration of females to males within states; and the greater the ratio of female
to male arrests for drug crimes within states the greater the odds of incarceration of
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females to males within states. Given the previous literature, we expect this
relationship to be especially salient for drug crimes (Chesney-Lind 1997; DPA 2003).
We also expect that sentencing reforms have contributed to the increased ratio of
women to men incarcerated in the United States. As discussed above, these changes in
the law are likely to widen the net of those caught up in the criminal justice system and
are likely to affect women more than men, both in the number of women who are
imprisoned and longer sentences (both of which would increase the rate of female
imprisonment). What are the effects when discretion is taken away from judges; when
mandatory minimum sentences are imposed for crimes that at one time might have led to
probation; when sentences that might have at one time led to early release on parole are
no longer eligible for such forms of release? To the extent that these reforms have led to
harsher treatment for more minor crimes and have made it more difficult to fit sentences
to extenuating circumstances (childcare, perceived probability of repeat offending) -
there is good reason to expect that the reforms have differentially impacted women
whose criminal behaviors are likely to be less serious than men's (Jacobs 2003;
Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000).
Hypotheses Relating to Sentencing Reforms:
Given the discussion above we expect that sentencing reforms will lead to
increases in the rates of incarceration of women relative to those of men. Specifically,
we expect that the adoption of presumptive sentencing guidelines, voluntary sentencing
guidelines, statutory presumptive sentencing, truth in sentencing, and determinant
sentencing will be associated with an increase in the ratio (odds) of females to males
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incarcerated in states controlling for other relevant variables (Jacobs 2003). We
also examine the effects of the adoption of three strikes legislation - but are not sure how
it will affect the relative rates of incarceration of females and males. Our hesitance in
making a prediction in this case is, in part, due to the tendency of men to commit more
serious offenses and the specific targeting of these laws to repeat felony offenders.67
Additionally, while five of the reforms were passed over an extended period of time and
involved considerable legislative debate, three strikes laws were passed in a short intense
flurry of social and political pressure. Some prior research has also indicated that
because of the relatively few criminals, outside of California and Georgia, to be
sentenced under the law, it has had little actual substantive impact (Dickey and
Hollenhorst 1999; Kovandzic, Sloan, and Vieraitis 2004).
Analytic Strategy
To test our hypothesis, we need a method that will allow us to compare rates
before and after sentencing reform has been instituted. Ideally such comparisons would
be made with other cases where sentencing reforms have not been instituted so that we
could compare changes in rates for cases where reform occurred to changes in rates for
cases where reform did not occur.
The best method available for conducting such comparisons for a large number of
cases over a period of time are methods designed to analyze cross-sectional time-series or
67 Our research addresses most directly whether sentencing reforms are associated with changes in the ratio
of male to female incarceration. The reasons for this change are more difficult to pin down. It may be
simply that more women are incarcerated as sentencing targets less serious behaviors and mandates harsher
sentences for less serious behavior, but it may involve other factors (e.g., differences by gender in terms of
plea bargaining or charges filed by district attorneys) that are more indirectly tied to sentencing reform.
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what are labeled in the econometric literature as panel models (see Baltagi 1995;
Wooldridge 2002). Since sentencing reforms have been enacted at the state-level, we
will use states as our units (cases) and we have obtained data on imprisonment rates for
men and women separately from 1970 to 2008. This gives us 1950 state-years of data for
our analysis.
We are not the first to recognize the advantages of using panel analysis to study
the effects of sentencing reform. Nicholson-Crotty (2004); Spelman (2009); Stemen,
Rengifo, and Wilson (2006); and Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn (2009) have used this
form of analysis to investigate the effects of sentencing reform on the total rate of
imprisonment. But we know of no research, to date, that has used this technique to
investigate the potential effects of sentencing reforms on the relative rates of female to
male incarceration.
Since our focus is on the effects of female to male crime rates and sentencing
reform changes on the odds ratio of females to males incarcerated, we use a fixed effects
model that will control for all variables at the state level that are constant over time. We
also control for a number of variables within states that vary over time and theoretically
may be related to the ratio of female to male incarceration within states; including
unemployment rates, poverty rates, population density, percent urban, percent black,
percent Hispanic, Republican state senate power, Republican state assembly power,
Republican governor, state revenues per capita, and state correctional spending per
capita. These controls allow for testing the conditional association of the key
independent variables (sentencing reforms and the ratios of females to males arrested
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within states) with the gender composition of the incarcerated state populations
over time. As a final control we used fixed effects for periods which controls for the
association of exogenous shocks (e.g., the passage of the Omnibus Crime Bill Legislation
of 1994 or the national election of a Republican president or a Republican majority in the
Senate) with state level passage of sentencing reforms or law enforcement in action and
state-level incarceration rates. The analysis allows for the modeling of the fluctuations in
the composition of incarceration within states that are greater than in other states over
time. The regression coefficients represent the average effects in the fluctuation of the
independent variables on the dependent variable for the average state (Finkel 1995;
Halaby 2004).
Data
Dependent Variable:
Data on the number of women and men incarcerated in the 50 states for each year
from 1970 to 2008 were obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (U.S. 1965-1983;
U.S. 1984-1998; U.S. 1999-2008).68 We used Bureau of the Census (U.S. 1965-69,
1971-1979,1981-1989,1991-1999,2001-2008; U.S. 1970,1980,1990,2000) population
estimates to convert the state incarceration figures for males and females into rates per
100,000 resident males and females. 69 To measure shifts in the relative size of the female
68 Data for the years of 1978 to 1983 is available in the yearly publication: Prisoners in State and Federal
Institutions on December 31, 1972 (through 1983). Data for the years of 1984 to 1998 is available in the
yearly publication: Correctional Populations in the United States, 1984 (through 1998). Data for the years
of 1999 to 2005 is available in the yearly publication: Prisoners, 1999 (through 2005). All three
publications are produced and printed by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (see Citations).
69 Rates per 100,000 for each variable were computed by taking the raw number of prisoners for each state
by year that was provided by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and dividing by each state's female or male
population per 100,000, respectively, as supplied by the Bureau of the Census (see citation).
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to male population of those incarcerated, we divided70 the female imprisonment
rate by the male imprisonment rate and then logged this ratio. Logging the ratio of
female to male imprisonment rates insures that our results are not dependent upon
whether we take the ratio of male to female rates rather than female to male rates (the
only difference would be to change the signs of the coefficients for the independent
variables in our analyses.
Sentencing Reform Variables:
These variables are probably the most difficult to measure as there is no
commonly agreed upon measurement (and thus their measurement warrants an extended
discussion). They were drawn from several sources including the U.S. Bureau of Justice
Assistance (1996), Frase (1995), Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn (2009), and a report by
the Vera Institute (Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006). While most research is in
agreement on the general outlines of the reforms discussed in this paper, there is not
consensus on the exact classification of each state into particular sentencing reform
categories. Thus researchers would likely disagree about whether a particular reform
should be classified as a "presumptive sentencing guideline" or as a "voluntary
sentencing guideline" or as something in between with a different name (Frase 1995;
Marvell 1995; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006; Tonry 1995). There is consensus,
however, that within any category of sentencing reform there are differences in the
specific reforms from state to state. Appendix A contains a discussion of the general
function of the various reforms as delineated in this study. Because of this heterogeneity
70 Dividing the two rates creates an odds ratio that measure the odds of female imprisonment per 100,000 to
male imprisonment per 100,000.
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within and between our categories of sentencing refonn, we will group various
sets of refonns to see if there is a relationship between the entire set of reforms and the
odds of females to males incarcerated and subsets of these refonns as well as the refonns
individually (as categorized by us).
All six reforms in Appendix A represent a shift from the indetenninate model to a
more punitive model with a discretion-limiting sentencing or release structure. We have
coded presumptive sentencing guidelines, voluntary sentencing guidelines, and statutory
presumptive sentencing as mutually exclusive "front-end" refonns that may not coexist
with each other or indeterminate sentencing at any given time. They are ordered from the
most rigid of the front-end sentencing reforms to the least rigid. The next two refonns in
Appendix A are back-end reforms that eliminate or limit discretionary release
(determinate sentencing and truth in sentencing). These reforms can operate in
conjunction with any of the front-end reforms. The final refonn in Appendix A, three
strikes laws, is a sentencing enhancement law and can go with any of the refonns above.
In our analyses we will interact some of these variables to investigate whether different
combinations (e.g., presumptive sentencing guidelines and detenninate sentencing) have
an amplified effect on the ratio of female to male incarceration. Additionally it should be
noted that these reforms were often made at different times both across and within states.
For example, Oregon adopted presumptive sentencing guidelines in 1989, abolished
parole in 1989, and adopted truth in sentencing in 1995 (U.S. 1996; Zhang, Maxwell, and
Vaughn 2009).
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Traditionally dummy variable coding has been used in most prior
research to represent the period without the reform (coded with zeros) and after the
reform is instituted (coded with ones). This assumes that the effect of these reforms on
(in our case) the ratio of females to males imprisoned is somehow instantaneous even
though most of those incarcerated were in prison before the legislation. To ameliorate
this problem, we created a new sentencing measure where each state was coded as 1.00
for the first year of implementation as well as for the years before implementation and as
e (2.71828) for years five through the last year of observation. The intervening years
between one and five?1 were coded in an equal intervals manner between 1.00 and
2.71828 (an increase of .42957 per year). We then calculated the natural log of these
numbers to create a variable that was zero for the years before implementation, a logged
growth curve during the first five years of implementation, and then a constant of one
(the natural log of2.71828) thereafter. The rationale was that the first year of
implementation would not result in a change in the gender composition of inmates, since
there would not be enough time to have the new inmates incarcerated. The logarithmic
growth from year one to five seems more realistic than the instantaneous full effect in
gender composition implied by the use of dummy variables to code sentencing reforms.
The other key independent variables are more straightforward to code. We code
the three variables representing the gender composition of arrests as the natural log of the
ratio of female arrest rates to male arrest rates. Specifically, the three arrest ratios are
71 Year five was chosen as the last year of the logged increase because the average (medium) offender is
sentenced to a little less than 2.5 years. Very few offenders actually serve a sentence longer than five years
making year five seem an appropriate stopping point of the logarithmic growth curve.
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based on arrest rates for females and males for violent crimes (murder, forcible
rape, robbery, and aggravated assault), property crimes (burglary, larceny, and motor
vehicle theft), and drug crimes (distribution and possession) over time. Data on the
number of female and male arrestees were obtained from the FBI (U.S. 1965-2008b)
while population data for the states were obtained from the U.S. Census (US. 1965-69,
1971-1979, 1981-1989, 1991-1999,2001-2008; US. 1970, 1980, 1990,2000). These
data allowed us to construct yearly arrest rates for females and males and their ratios.
Control Variables:
In order to determine whether the sentencing reforms had an effect on the ratio of
females to males incarcerated in states (an average treatment effect), it is important to
control for other variables within states that might have increased or decreased this ratio
(especially those that might be correlated with our key independent variables). The
Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. 1965-2008a) supplied information to construct data on
unemployment rates, while the Census (US. 2006) provided data for poverty rates.
Dubin (2007) supplied data on political party affiliation for state senate and house (or
assembly) from which we constructed a Republican control index by centering the
percent Republican around 50% so that Republican control represents positive deviations
from 50% and Democratic control represents negative deviations. We then logged the
absolute value of the deviations and returned the negative signs to the Democratic
deviations and a zero to an evenly split body. This made the transition from Democratic
to Republican control the most important part of the scale. A dummy coded variable for
governor's political party was generated from data supplied by Hershey (2007). Finally,
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we controlled for state revenues per capita and state correctional spending per
capita (Stemen 2007). These control variables represent variables that have been shown
to affect prison populations in past research (See Appendix E for descriptive statistics of
variables used in this analysis) (Albonetti 1997; Arvanites and Asher 1998; DeFina and
Arvanites 2002; Engen and Gainey 2000; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000; Tonry 1994;
Western 2001; Western 2005; Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn 2009).
Results
We first tested our panel data to see if they contained a unit root. This is
accomplished by running a unit root test on the dependent variable across all of 50 panels
of state data. If the panels contain a unit root this suggests that the data should be first
differenced. A unit root occurs when a random shock at one period is perfectly
transmitted to the next period ("perfect memory") and is particularly likely to occur when
the dependent variable is based on a "stock" rather than a "flow." In our case the
proportion of females to males imprisoned in a given year is largely based on the
composition of the stock ofprisoners the year before with a small flow component based
on those who leave prison and those who enter prison. We used both the Dickey-Fuller
and Phillips-Perron tests as modified for STATA, which uses a Fisher based meta-
analysis that combines p-values from the independent panels to obtain an overall statistic
for testing the results over all 50 panels. We used lags of two and three periods, which
should be enough to model any autocorrelation that would remain after first differencing.
As long as we demeaned the data as suggested by Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) or included
a drift or trend term (which is also appropriate) in all cases we reject the null hypothesis
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that the panels contain unit roots at greater than the p = .001 level. Therefore, we
did not first difference this panel data.
We used STATA's xtreg program in our analyses because it allows us to estimate
panel models for random or fixed effects and to consistently estimate the standard errors
of our coefficients even with serial correlation within panels and heteroscedasticity
between panels by using the cluster option. In our analyses we use fixed effects for units
(states) to control for all characteristics associated with states that do not vary over time.
This is crucial because our analysis focuses on changes in the gender composition within
states over time.72 In addition the Hausman test73 indicates that we should use fixed
effects for states. We also include dummy variables for periods, because the F-test
indicates significant variation over time in the predicted values of the dependent variable
across periods (indicated by the F-values in the last row of Table 4.1) and because the
Hausman test indicates a need to include the fixed effects for periods.74
72 Fixed effects for panels exploits within group variation by holding constant unexplained between group
variations. The fixed effects estimates are unbiased even if some time invariant state level characteristics
are correlated with other independent variables and the dependent variable. This is not the case in random
effect models when these correlations are present. In our analyses the unit (state) fixed-effects model offers
significant advantages over the random effects model (Halaby 2004)
73 The Hausman test can be used to assess the likelihood that a key assumption of the random effects model
is correct: that no unobserved time invariant state characteristics are correlated with the independent
variables in the model and the dependent varaible. If this assumption is not correct, then the coefficient
estimates based on the random effects model will be biased. Our results, based on the Hausman test,
indicate that using the random effects model would result in biased coefficients and, thus, we use the fixed
effect model for states in all of our analyses (Baltagi 1995).
74 This Hausman test assesses whether period characteristics are correlated with the independent variables
in the model and the dependent variable. If they are, not including fixed effects (dummy variables) for
periods would result in biased coefficient estimates. This Hausman test compares the fixed effects for
states model with the fixed effects for states and periods model (with both models including other time
varying independent variables), the test indicates that we should include fixed effects for periods.
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Table 4.1 contains the results of our analyses. We begin with a baseline
model that contains the log of the ratio of female to male arrest rates for violent crimes,
the log of female to male arrest rates for property crimes, and the log of female to male
arrest rates for drug crimes. Each of these has been suggested as a potential reason for
the increasing incarceration rates of females relative to males. Perhaps somewhat
surprisingly, only the logged ratio of female to male arrest rates for the drug crimes is
significantly related to the logged ratio of female to male incarceration rates for these 50
states across the period 1970 to 2008. Since both the dependent and independent
variables are logged, we can interpret the coefficient associated with the gender
composition of drug crime arrests as indicating that a 1% change in this ratio is
associated with a .341 % change in the ratio of females to male incarcerated.
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Table 4.1. The Change in the Odds of Female to Male Imprisonment Over Time
Crime Variables Modell Model 2 Model 3 Mode14
Violent Crime 0.071 0.071 0.069 0.040
(0.062) (0.067) (0.060) (0.058)
Property Crimes 0.007 0.011 -0.015 -0.119
(0.116) (0.112) (0.118) (0.089)
Drug Crime 0.341*** 0.306*** 0.283** 0.184*
(0.097) (0.099) (0.095) (0.089)
Reforms Variables
Pres. Sent. Guidelines -0.153 -0.172 -0.184/'0
(0.121 ) (0.114) (0.107)
Voluntary Sent. Guidelines -0.115 -0.131 -0.145
(0.087) (0.090) (0.093)
Statutory Presumptive Sent. 0.149 0.167 0.181
(0.129) (0.129) (0.125)
Determinate Sentencing 0.078 0.088 0.090
(0.125) (0.119) (0.115)
Truth in Sentencing -0.117/'0 -0.114* -0.119*
(0.065) (0.058) (0.054)
Three Strikes -0.021 0.013 0.074
(0.083) (0.085) (0.074)
Control Variables
Percent Black -0.006 -0.005
(0.006) (0.005)
Percent Hispanic -o.oor -0.011 **
(0.004) (0.003)
Percent Unemployment -0.008 -0.003
(0.010) (0.005)
Percent Poor 0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.005)
Population Density -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Percent Urban 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Republican. State House 0.009 0.012
(0.012) (0.012)
Republican State Senate 0.0012 -0.001
(0.012) (0.011)
Rep Governor -0.002 -0.001
(0.026) (0.024)
State Revenues 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Linear Period Effect 0.034***
(0.004)
Intercept -2.744*** -2.799*** -2.715*** -69.72***
(0.232) (0.224) (0.291) (7.883)
Observations 1880 1880 1880 1880
R-squared 0.666 0.680 0.686 0.672
F(38,49) 46.10*** 50.83*** 29.28***
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.OOI, ** p<O.OI, * p<0.05 /'0 p<0.10
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Mode12 adds the sentencing reform variables to the analysis. None of
them is statistically significantly associated with the gender composition of prisoners at
the .05 level, but the adoption oftruth-in-sentencing laws is marginally significant at the
.10 level for a two-tailed test. We note that this coefficient is negative (not the
hypothesized direction). Controlling for these sentencing reforms changes the
relationships for the variables in Modell only slightly. Only the ratio of females to male
drug crime arrestees is statistically significant (here at the .01 level) and it relationship is
just slightly less strong than in Modell: a one percent change in this variable is
associated with a .306% change in the gender composition of the incarcerated population.
Model 3 adds a long list of control variables that have been found to be associated
with imprisonment in past studies and all of them are measured for each state yearly from
1970 to 2008: percent black, percent Hispanic, unemployment rate, percent living below
the poverty level, population density, percent urban, Republican control ofthe
assembly/house, Republican control of the senate, Republican governor, state revenues
per capita, and correctional spending per capita. None of these variables are significantly
related to the gender composition of those incarcerated in the states, although percent
Hispanic is significant at the .10 level and negatively related to the ratio of females to
males incarcerated. Again truth-in-sentencing is marginally significant at the .10 level
and its coefficient is nearly identical to Model 2. The logged ratio of female to male drug
arrests remains the only statistically significant variable in predicting the logged ratio of
rates of females to males incarcerated at the state level.
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We tried several other auxiliary analyses. We interacted each of the front
end sentencing refonn variables (presumptive sentencing, voluntary sentencing, and
statutory sentencing) with each type of back end refonn (detenninate sentencing and
truth-in-sentencing) - for a total of six interaction tenns. None of these interactions were
even marginally statistically significant. We use an F-test to see if the front end, back
end, or all of the refonn variables together were statistically significant and found that
they were not. For the time period covered in this analysis, we find only one of the
variables that we examined to be significantly related to the gender composition of those
incarcerated; the gender composition of those arrested for drug crimes. None of the
sentencing refonn variables has a statistically significant relationship with the gender
composition of those incarcerated over this period.
Some authors (Beck and Katz 1995; Ha1aby 2004; Wooldridge 1995) worry about
controlling for differences between periods using dummy variables for each period (with
the exception of the reference period). We know from the F-test at the bottom of Table
4.1 that in each of our models the 38 dummy variables for periods account for a
statistically significant amount of variability in the dependent variable controlling for all
of the other independent variables in each modeL We also know from Hausman tests that
fixed effects for time should be used rather than using no control for time trends. Model
4 represents a more modest approach to modeling the trends across periods: it contains a
linear trend for periods. We settled on this modeling of period variation because when
we added quadratic and cubic period effects they did not significantly improve the fit of
the model (they were not statistically significant). Additionally, we found that with no
-------------
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dummy variables for period Model 3 has an R2 within panels of .585 when these
dummy variables are added to the model the R2 within panels is .686 (as reported at the
bottom of Table 4.1). When we run Model 3 with no dummy variables for periods, but
with the linear trend for periods, we find that the R2 within panels is .672 (as reported in
Model 4). Model 4 seems to do almost as well as including all of the dummy variables
for period in terms of modeling the trends within panels. Finally, when we use a
Hausman test to compare Model 3 to Model 4 we find that both models are appropriate in
terms of providing consistent estimates. While we might still prefer the model with
dummy variables for periods (Model 3) because of its rigorous controls, Model 4 may be
more appropriate because it does not "wash out" as much variation and is likely more
efficient. When we interpreted the results from Model 4, we still find that the effects of
drug crimes (ratio of female to male) were significant, but now the effects of truth-in-
sentencing and percent Hispanic are both statistically significant. And, of course, the
linear effect of period is positive and statistically significant at the .001 level in this no
period dummy variables model. Each increase of one year in time is associated with a
3.458 percent increase in the ratio of females to males incarcerated - the annual rate of
increase [(exp(0.034)-1) x 100].
Discussion
Net-widening, for us, involves an increase in the proportion of people who are
caught up in the criminal justice system. It is often accompanied by a shift in the
demographic composition of the people caught up in that system. In terms of arrest rates
there was a trend upward in both violent crimes from 1970 to the early 1990s with a
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substantial drop after that date and for property crime rates there was an increase
from 1970 to the early 1980s followed by a period of fluctuating rates with a definite
downturn after the early 1990s. In the case of arrests there has been an active literature
on changes in the gender gap for serious violent and property crimes (for example,
O'Brien 1999; Schwartz, Steffensmeier, and Fe1dmeyer 2009; Steffensmeier 1980;
Steffensmeier 1993). Overall the literature suggests a slight narrowing of the arrest rates
gap between males and females for some of these crimes.
Drug crime arrests have increased for both males and females over the period
covered by this study, but have been growing at a significantly higher rate for women.
America's 25-year war on drugs has had a massive impact on the criminal justice system.
Drug arrests have tripled since 1980; as a result, the number of all inmates imprisoned for
drug offenses in 2000 equals the total number of all inmates in u.S. prisons and jails in
1975. Research has shown that the rates of women going to prison due to drug offenses
have increased more rapidly than for men (DPA 2003; Greenfeld and Snell 1999).
Though men still represent the majority of drug arrests, women now make up the fastest
growing sub-group of the population going to prison because of drug crimes. In the mid-
1990s the proportion of women in prison for drug crimes was double that of men
(Greenfeld and Snell 1999).
In our analyses, we find that the gender composition of those arrested for serious
violent and property crimes in states is not significantly associated with the gender
composition of those incarcerated in the states, but the gender composition of those
arrested for drug crimes is associated with the gender composition of those incarcerated.
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The effect is strong and consistent across all of the models used in our analysis
including Models 3 and 4, which should provide consistent estimates in the face of both
unit and period time invariant variables. This finding reinforces the perspective that the
war on drugs is in part a war (even if unintentionally) on women (Belknap 2002; Owen
2000). Of note is research that has shown that the war on drugs was also racialized and
affected blacks and Hispanics more than whites. It is likely that the rise in female
imprisonment has not been the same across racial/ethnic groups; in fact research has
shown that black women's imprisonment rates are the single fastest growing group
(Griffin and Wooldredge 2006; Owen 2000; Steffensmeier 1993). With Black women
more likely to be involved in drug crime arrests (Spohn, Welch, and GruhI1985), future
research should focus on testing the possible connection between the war on drugs and
the very rapid increase in the imprisonment of women of color.
We did not find, however, that the sentencing reforms examined in this study are
associated with the ratio of females to males incarcerated in states over this time period.
This finding contradicts our own expectations and those of others. For example, Jacobs
(2003:3) states that the increase in women's imprisonment "corresponds directly to the
mandatory minimum sentencing laws in effect since the early 1970s. Since more women
are convicted on non-violent, drug related crimes than for any other, these sentencing
policies have had a particularly profound effect on women."
The contradictory patterns may be a result of the choice of our dependent and key
independent variables. Our dependent variable does not assess directly the ratio of
female to male incarcerations for drug crimes. If it did, we might well find that the
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sentencing refonns are related to differences in this ratio. We also have not
coded our key independent variables on sentencing refonns with an eye towards their
treatment of drug offenses. Such a coding of refonns might well find that refonns
specifically and harshly targeting drug crimes were related to the ratio of female to male
incarcerations. Such an investigation is a topic for future research.
Net-widening has certainly occurred in the area of incarceration and that increase
is graphically portrayed in Figure 4.1. Also portrayed is the differential increase of the
proportion of women incarcerated over time that has accompanied this increase. One
reason that some have cited for the increase in imprisonment is the institution of
sentencing refonns that have accompanied the war on crime (Steffensmeier and Demuth
2000). To the extent that these refonns have contributed to net-widening, we might also
expect that they have contributed to changes in the gender composition of those
incarcerated (Greenfeld and Snell 1999). An important finding of this research is that we
find no evidence of this for any of the front-end refonns, the back-end refonns, or for
three strikes laws. We also examined whether combinations of these front-end and back-
end refonns were associated with the changes in the gender composition of offenders at
the state level. The results were negative in each case. What this research does find is
strong evidence that the war on drugs has contributed to a narrowing of the gender gap in
incarcerations.
The next chapter addresses the relative "risk" that a state will adopt a sentencing
refonn. While this chapter and the previous two substantive chapters deal with the
effects of sentencing refonns on a component of imprisonment, the next chapter shifts the
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focus to which state-level environmental factors are associated with the rate of
reform adoption. The analysis used a number of social, criminal, demographic, and
political variables to model the change in reform adoption rates across all 50 states from
1972 to 2008. Through event-history modeling, the analysis assesses the change in the
relative risk of reform adoption due to changes in the state-level variables.
The next chapter diverges from the previous chapters on two fronts. First, instead
of relying on a larger meta-theory to explain the expected outcome, the analysis focuses
on building a number of small arguments for why a number of factors may
simultaneously impact reform adoption. The smaller theoretical postulates are tested
through a series of variables that are expected to impact the rate of reform adoption.
Second, this chapter's analysis employs event-history analysis. This technique has the
advantage ofbeing able to model the risk of the shift from the indeterminate-
rehabilitation model to the more predetermined discretion-limiting-determinate model,
while being able to assess the change in the risk rate when state-level characteristics are
controlled for.
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CHAPTER V
INCREASING THE REFORM RISK:
MODELING SOCIAL, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND POLITICAL
CHARACTERISTICS THAT INCREASE THE RATE OF REFORM
ADOPTION
Introduction
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, critics began to advance a number of critiques
of the justice system, including complaints about ineffectiveness of treatment and reform
programs, cozy correctional facilities, and rampant repeat offending (Hebert 1997; Reitz
1995). Critics focusing on sentencing charged that it allowed far too much disparity in
sentencing types and time served. In response, beginning in the 1970s, legislators (or
voters) passed a series of sentencing reforms with more pre-determined structures that
limited officials' discretion during sentencing or release (Clarkson and Morgan 1995;
Griset 1995; Hebert 1997). Prior to these reforms, indeterminate sentencing dominated
the United States criminal justice system. This model ofjustice focused on rehabilitating
offenders within prison through work and education programs (Frase 1995; Roberts
1996). Reflective of the rehabilitation goal, judges (and in a few jurisdictions, the jury)
were given wide discretion, sentencing offenders to loose ranges (e.g., 5 to 25 years) to
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facilitate the rehabilitation process. Parole boards acting independently of other
parts of the judicial system and largely independent of legislators then determined if the
prisoner had been properly rehabilitated and was ready for release (Albonetti 1997;
Kempf-Leonard and Sample 2001; Marvell 1995). The sentencing model reflected a
criminal-centered approach designed to pattern punishment to the offender's
rehabilitation needs. But under sentencing reforms, the model became a crime-centered
approach where the judge is reduced to handing down pre-determined sentences based on
limited information like the offense type and prior record. The end result was a shift to a
crime-centered warehousing model of punishment with significant reduction in the
rehabilitation focus.
This paper assesses the relative likelihood that a state adopted one of four
sentencing reforms passed after 1972 when controlling for state-level characteristics. I
considered two "front-end" reforms, sentencing guidelines and statutory presumptive
sentencing, which are considered independent and mutually exclusive reforms that focus
on limiting the actions ofjudges. These may not, at any given time, coexist with each
other or indetenninate sentencing (the previous sentencing system). Conversely, on the
"back-end", the analysis also considered two reforms that either limit (truth in
sentencing) or eliminate (determinate sentencing) the use of discretionary release. The
back-end reforms can operate alongside the "front-end" reforms. While states adopting
reforms often incorporated numerous types (e.g., Oregon which adopted presumptive
sentencing guidelines in 1989, abolished parole in 1989, and then adopted truth in
sentencing in 1995), their coexistence is not absolute and were often instituted in
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different years (See Table 5.3 for complete list of reforms). I also assess the
over-all rate of reform adoption cutting across the four reforms in an all-reform model.
This later analysis is designed to give the general effect across all reforms and will serve
as a base with which to compare the analysis of the separate reforms (Frase 2005;
Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006; U.S. 1996).
The aim of the study is to determine which social, political, and demographic
state characteristics are likely to increase the rate of sentencing reform adoption. Using
event-history analysis, the impact of state-level characteristics can be modeled on the rate
of sentencing reform adoption over time.75 The numerous crime and justice,
demographic, and political variables have been theorized in prior research to impact the
criminal justice system. The goal of this study is to shed light onto the broad patterns of
state-level variation, measured through the state-level variables, had on the adoption of
refornls. The analysis will further allow for the comparison of the relative magnitude of
the impact and how it changed depending on the reform being adopted.
Given certain characteristics, it is possible that a state is more likely to adopt a
reform and these different characteristics are likely to affect reforms in different ways. In
the end, the results suggest that the adoption of sentencing reforms are impacted by a
number of key crime, demographic, and political characteristics. Chief among them, the
analysis suggests that high rates of drug crime arrests, percent black, unemployment rate,
and Republican control of state politics significantly increase the rate of reform adoption.
75 Or said another way, the analysis can model the "risk" a state will adopt a sentencing reform and what
effect state-level characteristics have on the rate (e.g., how the variables may increase or decrease the
relative risk).
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Literature Review
With a few notable exceptions, the previous research assessing sentencing
reforms largely fall into two categories. The first focuses on extra-legal effects like the
influence of race or gender on judicial departures from baseline sentence
recommendations (e.g. Griffin and Wooldredge 2006; Johnson 2006; Kramer and
Steffensmeier 1993; Kramer and Ulmer 1996; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer 1998;
Ulmer and Kramer 1998; Wooldredge and Griffin 2005; Wooldredge, Griffin, and
Rauschenberg 2005; Wooldredge 2009), while the second focuses on the influence of
policy changes on sentencing outcomes (e.g. Arvanites and Asher 1998; Brewer, Beckett,
and Holt 1981; Dalessio and Stolzenberg 1995; Frase 1995; Frase 2005; Griset 1996;
Johnson 2006; Tonry 1995). In both cases the body of literature largely utilized data on
individual states, counties, or cities. While providing important insights, they are limited
to the specific context and sentencing structures of the particular jurisdiction and lack
broad cross-sectional applicability. While a few studies analyzed year-to-year changes
over time, these studies have also largely been limited to a single state,76 calling into
question their generalizability beyond the single case.77
Smaller subsets of studies have focused on policy assessment. These studies are
less concerned with the social or political impact of reforms and are more concerned with
describing the structural impact of reforms (Nicholson-Crotty 2004; Spelman 2009;
76 A few studies have also assessed the federal system (e.g., Albonetti 1997).
77 Previous analysis in this study indicated that considerable state-to-state variation in imprisonment rates,
which further calls into question the generalizability of the single state approach.
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Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006). An even smaller subset focused on
explaining the social contexts that influenced the adoption of reforms. This study follows
this later group of policy papers. Some of these studies, (for example work by Spohn and
Holleran (2000) and Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer (1998)) found that race, ethnicity,
gender, and age are all important covariates with sentencing outcome and sentencing
type. These micro-level studies show the power these demographic factors have on
sentencing outcomes. I shift the focus from the micro-level onto a larger aggregate state-
level analysis. Following a study by Spelman (2009), which incorporates similar data
and suggests that state revenues are the primary driving factor in policy adoption, our
research suggest reforms are not adopted in response to this factor alone and state context
is highly influential in the adoption of reforms.
This paper does not draw on one all encompassing theoretical perspective to build
an expected outcome. Instead, it uses a series of variables grouped into broad categories
that are likely to be associated with the adoption of sentencing reforms. Within each
group of variables a brief discussion of the prior research is provided and an expected
outcome is hypothesized. The discussion does not advocate one particular theoretical
frame over another. Instead it outlines possible effects and the relative significance of
their impacts. The end product is an exploration of the various possible impacts, finding
whether they are significantly associated with sentencing reform adoption, and their
relative impact in comparison to the other variables included in the analyses. The paper
begins with a discussion of the state characteristics modeled in the analysis and why they
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are expected to influence the adoption rate, followed by an outline of the models
included, and finally a discussion of the findings.
Independent Variables and Hypotheses
The independent variables in this analysis represent the social, political, and
demographic characteristics of a state that may have influenced the adoption of one or
more of the sentencing reforms. Each characteristic or group of characteristics is outlined
below and brief discussions of the possible impacts are given (See Appendix E for
descriptive statistics of variables used in this analysis).
Imprisonment:
Beginning in 1972 the America imprisonment rate began an unprecedented and
steady increase. State governments responded to the perception that crime was on the
rise and the general public was unsafe78 and began to devise various policies to combat it,
among them sentencing reforms. Across most political perspectives and clearly across
the political ideology of the two dominant political parties, a "get tough on crime" culture
prevailed (Griset 1995). Specific criminal and public policy legislation has increased the
overall punitiveness of sentences, causing a significant portion of the nearly 550%
increase in imprisonment over the period of time covered in this study (Bohm 2006).
Imprisonment has been tied to sentencing with some prior research showing that states
may be able to better control staggering climbs in overcrowding by adopting sentencing
reforms (Dalessio and Stolzenberg 1995).
7800ttschalk (2006; 2009) notes that prior to the late 1960s crime rarely registered as a top public issue and
not until the law and order movement did the public begin to demand substantial change.
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Others have argued that imprisonment is tied to sentencing through socio-
political connections that exploit public fears of crime to fuel a drive towards a repressive
and punitive justice system (Abramsky 2007; Beckett 1997; Simon 2007). Scheingold
(1991) suggests "policy changes are mostly likely to occur when political leaders, in part
by taking their cues from the media, choose to play upon public anxieties that are
themselves inflamed by media imagery and vicarious victimization rather than by crime
as such" (Scheingold 1991:44). This complex circle of interactions served to promote
and sustain the politicization of crime characterized by the "politics of fear" that stressed
"getting tough on crime," resulting in the model of punishment featuring among other
things, sentencing reforms (Beckett 1997; Simon 2007). Given the politics of the law and
order movement characterized by the politics of fear, Hypothesis 1 states:
States with high rates ofimprisonment will be more likely to adopt sentencing
reforms.
The hypothesis draws from the assumption that states that are already punitive in
their imprisonment practices will be more likely to adopt a reform. This variable
represents state imprisonment rates per 100,000 and was obtained from the Bureau of
Justice Statistics (U.S. 1965-1983; U.S. 1984-1998; U.S. 1999-2008)79. This data allows
for the measurement of the impact that state imprisonment has on the likelihood a state
adopts a sentencing reform. Additionally, a number of prior studies point to concerted
79 Data for the years of 1965 to 1983 is available in the yearly publication: Prisoners in State and Federal
Institutions on December 31, 1972 (through 1983). Data for the years of 1984 to 1998 is available in the
yearly publication: Correctional Populations in the United States, 1984 (through 1998). Data for the years
of 1999 to 2008 is available in the yearly publication: Prisoners, 1999 (through 2008). All three
publications are produced and printed by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (see Citations). Rates per
100,000 for each variable were computed by taking the raw number of prisoners for each state by year that
was provided by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and dividing by state population per 100,000 as supplied
by the Bureau of the Census (see citation).
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efforts by policy makers to connect overcrowding and reforms. They suggested
that sentencing refornls were adopted after the spike in sentencing and would be effective
in curtailing a continued rise (Boerner 2001; Tonry and Hatlestad 1997; Von Hirsch
1985). Thus high rates of imprisonment would be associated with higher rates of reform
adoption.
Arrests for Violent and Drug Crimes:
The violent crime arrest rates have been shown to be an important contributor to
both the rise in imprisonment rates (particularly in the 1980s) and the adoption of
sentencing reforms. One of the primary justifications for reforms given by public policy
makers was that they were needed to counter a perceived growth in violent crime in
America (Abramsky 2007; U.S. 1996; Von Hirsch 1985). Of course this argument is not
unique to sentencing reforms, but is particularly relevant in this case. Drug crimes are
also important to consider. During the late 1970s and early 1980s the U.S. stepped up
legislation and enforcement against possession and use of drugs. Part of the push for
sentencing reforms was to increase the focus on drug crimes (Inciardi, McBride, and
Rivers 1996; McShane and Williams 1997). The FBI's Uniform Crime Report (UCR)8o
supplied the data on violent crime8! and drug crime arrests per 100,000 used in this
analysis. Because of the important impact these two crime variables have on the justice
system and their likely influence in the adoption ofrefonns, Hypothesis 2: states:
80 Data from the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) is available in print and online from the U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Federal Bureau ofInvestigation and is produced and printed yearly (see Citations).
81 Violent crime arrests represent the Uniform Crime Reports indexed crimes, which include the offenses of
murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.
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States with high violent crime and drug crime arrest rates will be more
likely to adopt sentencing reforms.
The South:
The South occupies a unique place in the study of the criminal justice system.
Research has consistently shown that the South is more violent and more punitive than
the majority of the rest of the nation (Clarke 1998). The South82 has a long history of
both direct and indirect racism (Clarke 1998; Jacobs and O'Brien 1998; Kamig and
Mcclain 1985; Messner, Baller, and Zevenbergen 2005). Studies of the former
Confederate states in the period after the Civil War reveal a time dominated by direct
civil violence targeted at Blacks. The violence was not limited to, but often took the form
of lynching. Lynching was highly prevalent and nearly exclusive to the South until the
1930s, when less overt forms of violence began to replace it. From the 1930s to the
1960s a steady decline in lynching occurred, and by the mid-1960s lynching became
practically non-existent (Jacobs and O'Brien 1998; Kamig and Mcclain 1985; Messner,
Baller, and Zevenbergen 2005). Some researchers have theorized that the history of
violence in the South targeted at Blacks has led to cultural, political, and social conditions
that make the South unique in the study of criminal justice. Racism and violence are not
limited to the South, but found its most savage and enduring forms in the South (Crow
and Gertz 2008; Engen and Steen 2000; Griset 1995).
Some researchers have argued that informal social control in the form of violence
targeted at minorities in the South (i.e. lynching) has simply been replaced by formal
82 The South includes the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia;
these states represent the south as defined by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (see Citations).
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state sanctioned controls. As overt civil violence in the South steadily declined
in the 20th century, the use of the criminal justice system as a form of social control of
Blacks in the South grew (Crow and Gertz 2008). The highest per capita rates of
execution occur in the South with Blacks' having disproportionately higher rates; black
males are particularly more likely to be executed (Clarke 1998; Harries 1988; Messner,
Baller, and Zevenbergen 2005).
A number of competing theories have attempted to explain this disparity. Popular
in early research, Durkheim's theory of legal mechanisms of social control gained
considerable initial support. This theory suggests that as legal forms of social control
gain acceptance, extra-legal controls such as lynching will decrease. This may help to
explain why the South has significantly higher rates of imprisonment. But empirical
testing of this theory has produced mixed results, offering both support and considerable
doubt concerning its validity (Clarke 1998; Jacobs and Carmichael 2001). Wolfgang and
Ferracuti (1967) suggest an alternative theory that the South's higher rates of
imprisonment are a result of a subculture of violence in the south. 83 Because of the
punitive nature of sentencing reforms and the history of violence and repression in the
South, Hypothesis 3 states:
States in the South will be more likely to adopt sentencing reforms.
83 Wolfgang and Ferracuti's (1967) theory is often referred to as the Subculture of Violence. They argue
that the South has a cultural and societal structure that supports violence. They suggest that this pervasive
ethos cuts across generations, age, class and sex in a way that violence becomes a part of being a Southern
woman or man and that the South has come to accept violence as a natural paIt of life. It can be shown that
homicide and violent crime rates are significantly higher in the South (Harries 1988; Messner et al. 2005),
suggesting that high imprisonment rates and execution in the South are a direct result of significantly
higher rates of violence.
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Race and Ethnicity:
Research focusing on Blacks indicated that until the middle ofthe 1970s being
Black had a direct and significant effect on sentence outcomes; this was particularly true
for violent crimes (Hebert 1997; Johnson 2003; Walker, Spohn, and DeLone 2004). In
the South, it was found that when a rape victim was white and the offender was black, the
sentence was three times more likely to be death (when a sentence of death was legal)
(Clarke 1998). A more recent examination has produced different results. Direct racial
discrimination that dominated findings by researchers in the first half of the twentieth-
century has been largely replaced by a focus on indirect and contextual evidence of
discrimination (Doob 2000; Quillian 1995). Research indicates that race is significantly
associated with educational level, type of crime committed, likelihood of being in
poverty, and likelihood of being unemployed. Inciardi, McBride, and Rivers (1996) point
out that during the increased criminalization of drugs, crack users received longer
sentences than powder cocaine users when the amounts were relatively equal and that
race is directly linked to type of cocaine used (crack cocaine is more prevalent among
black users and powder cocaine is more prevalent among white users). In these
situations, while race is not directly linked to type and length of sentence, race is linked
indirectly through sentencing differentials in crime classifications and demographic
considerations (Arvanites and Asher 1998; Pettit and Western 2004; Ulmer and Kramer
1998; Western 2001).
Hypothesis 4 states: States with high percentages ofBlacks or Hispanics will be
more likely to adopt sentencing reforms.
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Hypothesis 4 finds considerable support in the racial threat literature.
The theory suggests that minorities are perceived as a "threat" to the majority population
(Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; McDonald and Carlson 1994). Research has shown that
Blacks are seen (overtly or contextually) as "criminals," particularly as "violent
criminals" and as more Blacks enter a community, the perception of physical and social
threat increases (Plumper and Troeger 2007; Spohn and Holleran 2000; Spohn, Welch,
and Gruhl1985). The perceived threat does not need to be related to a real threat, and
thus minorities may be at increased risk of imprisonment simply because they make up a
larger portion of the population (Berndt 2003; Jacobs and Carmichael 2001 ; Quillian
1995). The perceived "threat" can take the form of either a threat of higher criminal
activity and thus minorities will be targeted as "the criminals" or a threat to social,
political and/or economic dominance. Minorities could be targeted by the criminal
justice system as a form of social and economic control that sentencing reforms help to
make possible (Kramer and Steffensmeier 1993). To test the relative impact that the
concentration of people of color in a state may have on reform adoption percent black
and percent Hispanic variables were constructed. The data used for the variables were
obtained for each state over time from the U.S. Census (U.S. 1965-69, 1971-1979, 1981-
1989,1991-1999,2001-2008; U.S. 1970, 1980, 1990,2000).84
Unemployment and Poverty:
While a large number of studies have pointed to the connection between criminal
activity, race, and the increased punitiveness of the criminal justice system, a few studies
84 Data from the census is available online at census.gov maintained by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and
was compiled from both census data and population estimates (see Citations).
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have found that poverty and unemployment are also important driving forces for
the law and order movement (Western and Pettit 2000; Worrall 2008), suggesting they
may be significantly associated with the likelihood a reform is adopted. This prior
research suggests that class and the social pressure that poverty and unemployment place
on individuals make them more likely to participate in criminal activity. This argument
would then suggest that states with high rates of unemployment and poverty are more
likely to adopt sentencing reforms in response and thus Hypothesis 5 states:
States with high unemployment or poverty rates will be more likely to adopt
sentencing reforms.
Robert Agnew (1992) has argued that individuals will feel strain due to the actual
or anticipated failure to achieve positively valued goals, actual or anticipated removal of
positively valued stimuli, and actual or anticipated presentation of negative stimuli
leading to interpersonal strain. The theory is referred to as Social Strain Theory. In
essence the theory suggests strain emerges from negative feeling towards others because
individuals are not expecting to be treated well or they are not being treated the way that
they want to and thus they will lose their positive belief in others (Rosenfeld and Messner
1994). Therefore in their anger and frustration with things like unemployment and
poverty (or seeing those people unemployed or in poverty as problems) the public will be
more likely to support sentencing reforms as a punitive measure that punishes and deters.
To measure the unemployment rate and poverty rates for each state over time data was
collected from two different sources; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1965-2008a)
supplied information to construct unemployment rates, while the U.S. Bureau of the
Census (2006) provided the data for poverty rates.
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Urban and Population Density:
Also drawing from Social Strain Theory, Burton, Cullen, Evans, and Dunaway
(1994) argue that in addition to unemployment and poverty, being placed in an
environment that is crowded, sometimes overcrowded, will create strain. The strain may
come from actual or perceived struggles for resources and opportunities or the strain can
be a more general feeling of social pressure (e.g., feeling lost in the crowd or boxed in).
The strain will in tum, in addition to leading to more criminal activity in places with high
population centers (e.g., urban settings), will also lead to increased demands to do
something about the system (Boerner 2001; DeFina and Arvanites 2002; Rosenfeld and
Messner 1994). Thus similar to unemployment and poverty, hypothesis 6 states:
States with high population density or percent urban will be more likely to adopt
. ,£ 85sentencmg reJorms.
Politics:
Both liberals and conservatives championed the reform agenda; conservatives saw
this as an opportunity to limit the powers of what they called "activist judges" who used
their power to be lenient. Liberals used the argument as a perceived opportunity to limit
the discretion ofjudges who might be using their power to be overly arbitrary and
punitive (Bohm 2006; Clarkson and Morgan 1995; Doob 2000; Griset 1996). Across
most political perspectives and clearly across the political ideology of the two dominant
political parties, a "get tough on crime" perspective prevailed (Dalessio and Sto1zenberg
1995; Kovandzic 2001). While research has shown that being tough on crime and
85 The U.S. Census supplied the data for percent urban and population density and is available online at
census.gov maintained by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and was compiled from both census data and
population estimates (see Citations).
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supporting tough sentencing reforms cuts across political perspectives,
Republicans have generally been more stalwart in their pushing of reforms (Abramsky
2007; Barker 2006; Gottschalk 2009; Griset 1995; Scheingold 1991). Therefore
Hypothesis 7 states:
States with more Republican state legislative power and/or have a Republican
governor will be more likely to adopt sentencing reforms.
Republican governor was measured with a simple dummy code and was supplied
by Hershey (2007). The political influence of Republican control of the state legislators
was measured by a unique variable constructed specifically for this analysis. With data
supplied by Dubin (2007), both the variables for state house and state senate were
constructed by centering the percent Republican around 50% so that Republican control
represents positive deviations from 50%, while Democratic control represents negative
deviations. The absolute value of the deviations were then logged, with the negative sign
returned for the democratic control, to create a logarithmic scale with positive and
negative deviation from zero to represent the diminishing returns of political party
concentrations. Positive scores represent Republican control, while negative scores
represent Democratic control.
Financial Resources:
A recent debate has emerged in response to an article written by William Spelman
(2009) in which he argues that state revenues are the single most important driving factor
determining why imprisonment rose more in certain states. His argument suggests that as
state's tax-bases increased they were afforded the opportunity to spend money in areas
they could not do so in the past and they directed more money to law and order. While
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his argument has drawn criticism (Gottschalk 2009), this article suggests that
states with higher revenues will put more resources into the criminal justice system and
presumably sentencing reforms, thus Hypothesis 8 states:
States with high state revenues will be more likely to adopt sentencing reforms. 86
Prior Reforms:
This analysis will ultimately test the likelihood of adopting one of four sentencing
reforms. Additionally, a general assessment of whether a state implemented any reform
was performed. For the four independent reforms, it should be noted that a state could
only adopt only one of the front-end reforms, either sentencing guidelines or statutory
presumptive sentencing. They can, however, additionally adopt one or both of the back-
end reforms (determinate sentencing and/or truth in sentencing) in addition to the front-
end reforms. While states adopting reforms often implement numerous types, their
coexistence is not absolute and different reforms were often instituted in different years
(See Table 5.1) (Frase 2005; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006). Because states are
likely to incorporate more than one reform and because states may be more likely to
adopt a reform if they have previously done so, Hypothesis 9 states:
States that have already adopted a sentencing reform will be more likely to adopt
an additional sentencing reform.
Table 5.1 outlines a few of the key descriptive statistics for the independent
variables included in this analysis. The percentile scores will become important in the
86 Data used to construct the state revenue variable was supplied by Stemen (2007) and was found online
through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (see Citation).
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analysis as they can highlight the relative effect the change in the independent
variable on the rate of reform adoption.
Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables
Mean St Dev. 25th Per 50th Per 75th Per
Crime & Justice Controls
Imprisonment Rate 223.622 162.612 92 173 328
Violent Crime Arrest Rate 156.8338 115.292 77.507 129.029 207.716
Drug Crime Arrest Rate 272.446 209.335 109.622 238.034 388.369
Demographic Controls
South*
Percent Black 10.288 9.304 3.130 7.801 15.042
Percent Hispanic 5.685 7.868 1.067 2.457 6.679
Percent Unemployment 5.059 2.417 3.300 5.000 6.400
Percent Under Poverty 12.895 4.330 9.700 12.00 15.328
State Population Density 139.427 183.367 30.833 74.781 149.990
Percent Urban 66.922 8.837 55.772 69.318 81.233
Political Controls
Republican State House -.853 2.434 -2.971 -1.882 1.792
Republican State Senate -.760 2.499 -3.037 -1.609 1.998
Republican Govemor*
State Revenues 359079.7 239502.1 219517.1 321616.3 420762.6
* Indicates a dummy variable
Methods
This study tests nine different hypotheses. Some of these hypotheses include
more than one variable and they should be seen as having multiple sub-hypotheses, one
for each of the variables. Utilizing state-level data (data available for 50 states) covering
each year between 1972 and 2008, this study tests the relative rate of adopting sentencing
reforms over time through event-history analysis. This technique has the advantage of
being able to model the relative "risk" a state has of adopting sentencing reforms over
time. To this end, the dependent variables are a series of dummy codes representing the
adoption of sentencing reforms. Because I am primarily interested in the social,
demographic, and political environment that leads to increased risk of adoption, I code
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the first year a state adopted a particular refonn the year the law was passed,
even if the new law did not have a substantive effect until a few years after the refonn
was adopted (Xie 1994). Table 5.2 outlines the four key dependent variables
representing sentencing refonns. In addition to these four refonns, a general assessment
of the risk of adopting any refonn (collapsing across these 4 refonns) will also be
assessed, resulting in five different substantive analyses to test the nine hypotheses.
Table 5.2. Refonns Included in Chapter V
Reform Description
Sentencing Guidelines* They consist of a matrix of possible sentences with a very narrow
range within a sentencing category that is defined by an offender's
criminal history (prior offenses) and offense severity.
Statutory Presumptive They represent an attempt to create uniformity within similarly
Sentencing situated crimes, but act less like a sentencing rubric. It specifies an
appropriate or "normal" sentence for each offense as a baseline for a
judge.
Determinate Sentencing Determinate sentencing is used to refer to a system without
discretionary parole boards.
Truth in Sentencing They require offenders serve a statutorily defined minimum amount
of time. Only states meeting the 1994 federal omnibus crime bill
minimum 85% time-served of original sentence are considered.
* The analysIs mcludes only a general vanable for all sentencmg gmdelme states and not two separate
variables for presumptive and voluntary guidelines. The decisions to only include the combined variable
lies mostly in the lack of observations when the variable is separated and the general consensus that the
same general effects of both types are likely present.
Another important sentencing refonn passed during the period covered in this
analysis was three strikes laws. While the refonn was passed with much fanfare and
early support, research has shown three strikes has had little impact beyond a handful of
states that included Florida, Georgia, and California (Dickey and Hollenhorst 1999;
Kovandzic, Sloan, and Vieraitis 2004). But even in these states the impact was limited to
a small subset of individuals making the effect on the general population smalL In this
analysis it was decided not to include three strikes as the refonn was passed under unique
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social and political pressures not likely affecting the other reforms in the same
way. First passed in 1992 by the state of Washington, three strikes gained considerable
traction due to a handful of highly publicized criminal cases that fueled intense pressure
to adopt it. In three short years 23 more states would adopt three strikes laws
(Kovandzic, Sloan, and Vieraitis 2004). This short intense period of policy shifts likely
operated outside the social and political environmental factors included in this analysis
and differentiated it from the analyses of the other reforms. Thus three strikes laws were
not included.
The list of reforms was compiled from numerous sources including the Bureau of
Justice Assistance (1996), Frase (2005), Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn (2009), and a
report by the Vera Institute (Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006). While most research is
in agreement on the general goals of the reforms, considerable variation in the design and
application of the reforms are present and little consensus on how to classify them into
appropriate groups exists (Frase 2005; Marvell 1995; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006;
Tonry 1995). Appendix C is a detailed discussion of the general function of the various
reforms and how they are delineated in this chapter. Table 5.3 on the other hand outlines
when the various reforms were adopted and by which state, highlighting the considerable
variation present in both the year and the combinations in which a reform was adopted.
Table 5.3. Distribution of Sentencing Reforms Across the United States as of
2008 for Chapter V
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- - - -
- 1980 - -
- 1978 1994 1994
1994 - - -
- 1976 - 1994
- 1979 - -
- - - 1995
1987 - 1990 1990
1983 - 1983 1995
- - - 1995
- - - -
- - - -
- - 1978 -
- 1977 - -
- - - 1996
1983 - - 1993
- - - -
1992 - - -
- - 1976 1995
1983 - - -
- - - -
- - - 1994
1980 - 1982 1993
- - 1995 1995
1997 - - 1994
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- 1977 - -
- 1977 - -
- - - 1995
1994 - 1994 1994
- - - 1995
1996 - 1996 1996
- - - -
1989 - 1989 1995
1982 - - 1991
- 1980 - -
- - - -
- - - 1996
1989 - - 1995
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Is.
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Sent Guide Stat Presum Det Sent Truth In Sent
- - - -
1993 - - 1985
- - - -
- - 1995 1995
1983 - 1984 1984
- - - -
1985 - - -
- - - -
17 8 12 24
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Table 5.3. (continued)
State Sent Guide. Stat. Presum. Det Sent Truth In Sent
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Total
Note: Table 5.3 represents the current sentencmg type used by each state as of2008. Presum.
Guide. stands for presumptive sentencing guidelines. Vol. guide. Stands for voluntary
sentencing guidelines. Stat. Presum. Sent. Stands for statutory presumptive sentencing. Deter.
Sent. stands for detenuinate dentencing. Truth in sent. stands for truth in sentencing. Three
strikes refers to three strikes laws. All other states utilize indeterminate sentencing.
All four reforms represent a shift from the indeterminate-rehabilitation model to a
more punitive model with a discretion-limiting sentencing or release structure, along with
the "all reform analysis," they are then modeled against a series of independent variables
to assess the change in risk status associated with a specific state characteristics
(independent variables). In this analysis it is assumed the pressure to adopt a sentencing
reform is continuous (though not necessarily at the same rate) over the entire period of
study. Public perceptions of a failing criminal justice system first became an important
social issue in the early 1970s. Therefore, while particular social, political, or
demographic characteristics may alter the risk that a state will adopt a reform; states were
assumed to be continually "at risk" of reform adoption. I use a piecewise constant
exponential event-histOlY analysis technique that models reform adoption as a
continuous-time (within the three separate time periods) discrete-state stochastic process.
That is, a model in which the probability of the event (reform adoption) is continuous
over time and where each state occupies only one of a finite number of discrete
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conditions (two possible conditions; reform or no reform) at all times (Eldelman
1990). In event-history analysis, one models the rate at which states adopted sentencing
reforms (also known as the "instantaneous transition rate"), which is defined as "the
transition probability over a unit of time where the unit is infinitesimal" (Carroll 1982).
The rate is not directly observable, but it can be calculated from observations of the
timing of events.
In the analysis ofpolicy shifts, event-history analysis has several advantages over
conventional statistical analysis techniques. First, because I am interested in explaining
the environment in which a state is more likely to adopt the reform rather than explaining
the current distribution of sentencing reforms or how those sentencing reforms may
impact the environment, event-history analysis supplies a technique particularly
appropriate for measuring such an outcome. Thus the technique models reform adoption
as a dynamic process, allowing specification of state characteristics that change over time
and affect adoption rates. Second, event-history analysis allows for changing values of
exogenous variables (e.g., the state unemployment rate or Republican control of the
Senate) over time and for changing impacts of the exogenous variables over time. Third,
in modeling the rate of reform adoption, event-history analysis takes into account right
censoring in the data; that is, the waiting time since first observed or since the last event
is taken into account in establishing the instantaneous transition rate (Elde1man 1990; Wu
2008; Xie 1994).
In the end, event-history analysis is appropriate for the study of sentencing
reform adoption, because sentencing reform is a discrete state dependent variable. That
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is the risk of reform adoption is continuous over time, but is intertwined with
changing political, social, and demographic characteristics of the states resulting in
differential adoption rates. While, in general, event-history analysis is appropriate for
this study, not every event-history model is appropriate. First, while models included
data recorded only once per year over 37 years, the data measurement is assumed to be
continuous over time. This assumption is made because it is assumed that each variable
will be relatively stable within years. With this assumption it is possible to use
exponential event-history modeling, but the exponential model also assumes the rate is
proportional year-to-year across the data (Xie 1994). That is, the relative risk that a state
will adopt a reform will be the same each year. If this assumption cannot be met, the
simple exponential model cannot be used (Wu 2008).
Fortunately, in the exponential model, if the differential risk rates are era
dependent, a relatively simple procedure can be instituted. Called the piecewise method,
the differential risk proportions are corrected for by induding dummy codes for the
appropriate eras (Carroll 1982). In this analysis, it is likely the risk of reform adoption
will vary over three distinct time periods. The first runs from 1972 to 1985. This
constitutes the early years of reforms and is marked by both high political pressure for the
adoption of reforms and rising crime rates. The second period runs from 1986 to 1993.
This period marks the height of the crack cocaine epidemic and also was a period of high
public demand for reforms. The third period runs from 1994 to 2008. This is the post
omnibus crime bill period and is a time where high public demand for reforms and high
public perceptions of crime began to subside. These dummy codes for the eras in
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question allow the exponential event-history model to be correctly specified
(Reitz 1995; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006).
Results
The analysis below includes five separate dependent variables; each designed to
test a different configuration of sentencing reforms. The first analysis consists of all
reforms adopted during the period of study, including sentencing guidelines, statutory
presumptive sentencing, determinate sentencing, and truth in sentencing. Three strikes
laws are often included in analyses of this type, but were excluded as the reform has both
a unique structure (deals with habitual offenders) and a unique social and political history
revolving around their adoption.87 Therefore, it was decided not to include them in the
overall analysis or as a separate reform. Following the all reforms analysis, four separate
event-history models were constructed to test, separately, the effects of the four reforms
considered in this analysis.
All Reforms:
For the all reforms analysis, four models are presented. The first three models are
designed to test three main categories of expected effects, which were the crime and
justice characteristics model, the state demographic characteristics model, and the
87 Due to their focus on habitual offenders, three strikes laws are considered an additional reform beyond
the previous more structured reforms affecting sentencing or release. They too fall under the umbrella of
sentencing reforms because of their design to limit discretion through an apparent push away from the
rehabilitation model. But unlike the other reforms, three strikes laws were passed in a relatively short and
intense political movement in response to a few highly publicized criminal cases. The intense pressure
resulted in an unprecedented passage of three strikes laws in a very short two-year period of time starting in
1992 (Dickey and Hollenhorst 1999; Lotke, Colburn, and Schiraldi 2004). Research has generally found
that three strikes laws have had little substantive impact (Boerner and Lieb 2001; Griset 1995; Kovandzic,
Sloan, and Vieraitis 2004, Spohn 2000).
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political characteristics model, respectively. Modell in Table 5.4 outlines the
change in the base rate of reform adoption when imprisonment rate, violent crime arrests,
and drug crime arrests are controlled for. As hypothesized (Hypothesis 2), it was
expected that drug crime arrests would be an important contributor to the rate of reform
adoption and in Model 1 drug crime arrests do significantly increase the rate of adoption.
Conversely, both violent crime arrests and imprisonment rates were not significantly
associated with reform adoption. The lack of significant impacts of imprisonment rates
and violent crime rates on reform adoptions runs counter to Hypothesis 1. The models
also included two dummy variables, one for 1986-1993 and one for 1994-2008 and were
included because it was expected that the base rates for the adoption of reforms would
vary by era (DeFina and Arvanites 2002; Greenberg and West 2001). As indicated in the
model, the two variables are significant, suggesting that something about the risk of
adoption is higher in these two periods than in the period of 1972-1985.
,-------~--
162
Table 5.4. All Reforms
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Crime & Justice Controls
Imprisonment Rate 0.0128 0.0182
(0.010) (0.014)
Violent Crime Arrest Rate 0.00141 -0.00031
(0.001) (0.001)
Drug Crime Arrest Rate 0.00145** 0.00331 ***
(0.001) (0.001)
Demographic Controls
South -1.040* -1.011
(0.590) (0.738)
Percent Black 0.0829*** 0.0656*
(0.026) (0.039)
Percent Hispanic -0.00342 -0.0315
(0.028) (0.040)
Percent Unemployment 0.685*** 0.669***
(0.065) (0.075)
Percent Under Poverty Line -0.184*** -0.164**
(0.066) (0.071)
State Population Density -0.000933 -0.000114
(0.001) (0.001)
Percent Urban 0.00755 0.0117
(0.008) (0.009)
Political Controls
Republican State House 0.138 0.427***
(0.116) (0.126)
Republican State Senate 0.123 0.313**
(0.118) (0.128)
Republican Governor 0.0237 -0.525
(0.338) (0.366)
State Revenues 0.0479 -0.117
(0.080) (0.161)
Time Controls
Years 1986-1993 4.287*** 2.778*** 5.092*** 2.206***
(0.558) (0.503) (0.478) (0.593)
Years 1994-2008 5.410*** 5.438*** 6.279*** 4.265***
(0.486) (0.365) (0.414) (0.657)
Constant -9.468*** -9.710*** -8.856*** -9.744***
(0.376) (0.840) (0.367) (1.054)
Log Likelihood 63.89 18.77 32.62 97.39
Observations 1705 1718 1690 1690
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
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Model 2 tests the effects of the demographic controls. A number of the
controls significantly changed the rate of adoption. As expect (hypothesis 4), percent
black significantly increased the rate. This may suggest that high percentages of Blacks
represent a threat to the white majority and thus reforms are being adopted as a way to
control this perceived threat (Johnson 2003; Quillian 1995). This argument is not
supported for Hispanics, as their percentage of the population did not significantly
increase the rate. Percent unemployment also is associated with the rate of reform
adoption, lending support for the social strain argument. Conversely, percent under the
poverty level actually significantly decreased the rate of reform adoption. This finding
was unexpected and runs counter to social strain theory. Another curious finding was the
significant reduction in the rate of adoption the South had. This again was unexpected
given the socio-historical evidence that the south has a tendency to be more violent and
more punitive (Clarke 1998; Kamig and Mcclain 1985).
One interesting finding in this analysis was the 35% reduction in the rate of
reform adoption for the 1986-1993-era control when state demographics are controlled
for. This reduction may be explained by the strong expected effects the demographics of
a state for this era had over the other two periods. One of the key driving forces for the
era was the perceived rise in a dangerous underc1ass and the specter of the crack cocaine
epidemic. Many of the indirect effects of these two constructs (the underc1ass and crack
cocaine) are encapsulated in the state demographics. For example, research has shown
that Blacks, particularly young black men were highly connected to the "crack cocaine
epidemic" and were often targeted under the reform movement (Baum 1997; Beckett,
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Nyrop, Pfingst, and Bowen 2005; Berndt 2003; Engen and Steen 2000; Mosher
and Akins 2007).
Model 3 includes only the four political controls. Oddly, on their own, none of
the four variables increased the rate of reform adoption. This, of course, runs counter to
Hypotheses 7 and 8 as it was expected that Republicans would be more likely than
democrats to adopt sentencing reforms. This analysis may suggest that the social
pressure to adopt reforms as a tool to combat a perceived rise in criminal activity cuts
across political perspectives. The fact that state revenues also were not significantly
associated with the rate of adoption runs counter to the prior findings by Spelman (2009),
who suggested high state revenues were the chief driving force behind the imprisonment
binge.
Model 4 is the full model, including all of the crime, demographic and political
controls. This model is the most appropriate theoretical model as it allows for the
simultaneous testing of the various theories and their hypothesized effects. The results
for Model 4 are also presented in Table 5.5 as the full model, but this table also includes
three reference points to give the coefficients some context. With exception of the two
dummy codes for the eras and Republican governor, a predicted change in the rate of
reform adoption for each coefficient was calculated using their 25th, 50th, and 75th
percentile score. These scores can be used to give the average change in the rate of
adoption for each percentile for the average state. While some of the variables
significantly increase or decrease the rate, their impacts vary greatly across the
percentiles. For example, unemployment at the 25th percentile increased the rate of
adoption by a factor of9.095, but the rate increased by a factor of72.356 at the
75th percentile or about an eight-fold increase.
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Table 5.5. All Refonns with Percentile Ranks for Model 4
Full Model 25 Percentile 50 Percentile 75 Percentile
Crime & Justice Controls
Imprisonment Rate 0.0182 1.048 1.157 1.316
(0.014)
Violent Crime Arrest Rate -0.00031 .933 .893 .840
(0.001)
Drug Crime Arrest Rate 0.00331 *** 1.36 2.133 3.609
(0.001)
Demographic Controls
South -1.011 -1.011 -1.011 -1.011
(0.738)
Percent Black 0.0656* 1.228 1.668 2.682
(0.039)
Percent Hispanic -0.0315 .967 .926 .810
(0.040)
Percent Unemployment 0.669*** 9.095 28.361 72.356
(0.075)
Percent Under Poverty Line -0.164** 0.204 0.140 0.081
(0.071)
State Population Density -0.000114 .996 .991 .982
(0.001)
Percent Urban 0.0117 1.920 2.250 2.587
(0.009)
Political Controls
Republican State House 0.427*** 0.281 0.448 2.149
(0.126)
Republican State Senate 0.313** 0.387 0.604 1.869
(0.128)
Republican Governor -0.525 .592 .592 .592
(0.366)
State Revenues -0.117 .733 .664 .599
(0.161)
Time Controls Rate Change
Years 1986-1993 2.206*** 9.079
(0.593)
Years 1994-2008 4.265*** 71.164
(0.657)
Base Rate
Constant -9.744*** 0.000
(1.054)
Log Likelihood 97.39
Observations 1390
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
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In the Full Model as with Modell in Table 5.4, drug crime arrests
significantly increase the rate of adoption, again supporting Hypothesis 2. But as in
Modell, violent crime arrests and imprisonment rates were not significantly associated
with an increase in the rate of reform adoption. Percent Black and percent unemployed
continued to significantly increase the rate of adoption, while percent under the poverty
line significantly reduced the rate. Differing from Modell, in the full model, when crime
and justice variables and political variables are controlled for, the South is no longer
significant. Also in the full model, Republican control of the state house and state senate
now significantly increase the rate of adoption, suggesting that while the social and
political pressure to adopt reforms may cut across political parties, Republicans are more
likely to adopt reforms. The results for the political controls in the full model lend some
support for Hypothesis 7, but not Hypothesis 8.
One conspicuous observation worth noting is the large effect (a full 71.164
increase in the rate) the 1994 to 2008 dummy code has in the model. This may be a result
of the strong effect the 1994 omnibus crime bill had on the adoption of truth in
sentencing laws. The law allocated billions of dollars to state governments as long as
they adopted truth in sentencing with a mandated 85% of the original sentence being
served.
Sentencing Guidelines:
While the all reform analysis gives a general picture of how state characteristics
affected reform adoption across all four reforms included in the analysis, it is possible the
characteristics that affect one reform differ from the characteristics that affect another.
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The differential effects may be particularly likely between the front-end and the
back-end reforms as they affect different areas of the process. I will begin the discussion
with the analysis of sentencing guidelines adoption. This reform is generally referred to
as the most "radical" of reforms as it has the most structurally deterministic design and
has led to the largest of substantial change in the process of sentencing (D.S. 1996;
Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn 2009).
Only the Full Model, the same model as Model 4 in Table 5.4 and Full Model in
Table 5.5, is presented in Table 5.6 for each of the separate reforms. An additional
control for prior reforms is also included in this analysis. The prior reform control is
designed to indicate if and when a state adopted a reform prior to sentencing guidelines.
This dummy code is expected to be highly influential with the potential of significantly
increasing the rate of sentencing reform adoption (Frase 1995). As seen in Modell of
Table 5.6, the base rate is increased 4.702 by the presence of a prior reform, lending
support for Hypothesis 9 (see Table D.2 in Appendix D for a more detailed table of the
analysis presented here).
As with the all reform analysis, drug crime arrests significantly increase the rate
of sentencing guideline adoption, suggesting that states with a large number of drug
arrests will adopt reforms. For example, when controlling for other state characteristics,
states at the 75 percentile are 3.12 times more likely to adopt sentencing guidelines. The
analysis may suggest the war on drugs was a key component in the push for sentencing
guideline adoption (Gottschalk 2006; Mosher and Akins 2007). Percent Black does not
significantly increase the rate of adoption, while percent Hispanic significantly reduces
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the rate. This finding is counter to the expected outcome and suggests an
outcome counter to the racial threat argument (Hypothesis 2). As with the all reform
analysis, percent unemployed increased the rate of adoption, while percent under the
poverty line decreased the rate.
Percent unemployment's relative strength is a notable finding. For sentencing
guidelines, the analysis suggests that unemployment, across all three reported percentiles
is the single largest influence on the rate of adoption. Unemployment's influence is even
more notable when considering that the controls for the era will take into account
differential rates of adoption for 70s and early 80s when unemployment nationally was
relatively high (England, Kilbourne, Farkas, and Dou 1988; U.S. 1965-2008a).
Again, Republican control of the state legislatures, both the house and the senate,
significantly increased the rate of sentencing reform adoption. This suggests that while
the political pressure to adopt reforms is likely to be high for both major parties, the
political and cultural identity of Republicans increased the rate of adoption more; again,
supporting Hypothesis 7.
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Table 5.6. Individual Reforms
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Sent. Guide. Stat. Presum. Deter. Sent. Truth in Sent.
Crime & Justice Controls
Imprisonment Rate 0.00477 -0.00207 0.0161 0.0098
(0.018) (0.108) (0.021) (0.016)
Violent Crime Arrest Rate 0.00305 0.00666* -0.00328 -0.000518
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Drug Crime Arrest Rate 0.00388*** 0.000978 0.00457* 0.00398***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Demographic Controls
South 0.567 -10.94 -0.512 -2.837*
(1.047) (33.270) (1.389) (1.149)
Percent Black -0.0267 -0.337 0.0602 0.0741
(0.061) (0.217) (0.072) (0.050)
Percent Hispanic -0.351 *** 0.224** -0.208* -0.185***
(0.131) (0.095) (0.114) (0.062)
Percent Unemployment 0.523*** 0.873*** 0.480*** 0.181
(0.119) (0.239) (0.148) (0.213)
Percent Under Poverty Line -0.230** -0.320 -0.0579 0.0885
(0.113) (0.255) (0.134) (0.083)
State Population Density -0.00166 0.00891 ** -0.00563* -0.00228
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Percent Urban 0.00983 -0.00751 0.0191 * 0.012
(0.011) (0.026) (0.011) (0.013)
Political Controls
Republican State House 0.439*** 0.982*** 0.540** 0.293**
(0.190) (0.324) (0.236) (0.143)
Republican State Senate 0.427*** -0.0122 0.659*** 0.109
(0.192) (0.335) (0.224) (0.156)
Republican Governor -0.692 -3.287* 0.651 0.787
(0.551 ) (1.977) (0.719) (0.510)
State Revenues -0.133 1.444 -0.095 -0.555***
(0.151) (0.820) (0.254) (0.217)
Prior Reform 1.548* -11.82 4.967 *** 1.897***
(0.836) (48.670) (1.162) (0.578)
Time Controls
Years 1986-1993 2.399*** -21.56 -0.850 0.505***
(0.848) 149.880 (1.264) 0.147
Years 1994-2008 1.463 -27.34 -0.922 3.935***
(1.227) 47.990 (1.419) (0.139)
Constant -8.522*** -15.52*** -11.130 -12.46
(1.498) (3.799) (1.960) (1.752)
Log Likelihood 29.770 21.492 15.337 76.135
Observations 1715 1769 1767 1754
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<O.OI, ** p<0.05, * p<O.1
Note: Sent. Guide. stands for sentencing guidelines. Stat presum. Stands for statutory presumptive
sentencing. Tmth in sent. stands for tmth in sentencing. Det. Sent. stands for the elimination of parole
boards.
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Statutory Presumptive Sentencing:
The analysis of statutory presumptive sentencing differs substantially from the
analysis of sentencing guidelines. A finding that is curious considering both reforms
represent changes on the front-end of sentencing (Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006;
U.S. 1996). It was expected that the findings would be more similar than they are. While
both sentencing guidelines and statutory presumptive sentencing are front-end reforms,
shifting sentencing to a more predetermined structured system, they are substantially
different in their functional application. Statutory presumptive sentencing served as more
of a baseline recommendation and had less actual restructuring of sentencing than
sentencing guidelines, where the grid makes the reforms very rational and bureaucratic
(Nicholson-Crotty 2004; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006; U.S. 1996).
The differences begin in the crime and justice variables. For statutory
presumptive sentencing violent crime significantly increased the rate of reform. In fact,
the impact of violent crime on the rate of statutory presumptive sentencing adoption is
profound where the rate increase was 42.229 at the 75th percentile (see Table D.3 in
Appendix D for a more detailed table of the analysis presented here), almost a 10 fold
increase over the rate increase for the 25th percentile. The impact of violent crime arrests
on statutory presumptive sentencing adoption may be a result of the time in which this
reforms adoption rate was the highest, the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was a period
of time when crime rates were actually on the rise and this reform may have been
influenced more heavily by the rising crime rate than the other reforms.
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Differences in the demographic variables can also be seen between
sentencing guidelines and statutory presumptive sentencing. While the South and percent
Black are not significant for statutory presumptive sentencing, and percent Hispanic
decreased the rate for sentencing guidelines, for statutory presumptive sentencing,
percent Hispanic significantly increased the rate. Additionally, percent unemployment
was significant, with a relatively strong effect. While percent under the poverty line did
not affect the rate.
State population density was significant, increasing the rate. This finding
supports Hypothesis 6 for statutory presumptive sentencing, but in no other models does
population density increase the rate of reform adoption. This is the only analysis in
which population density is positive and statistically significant. This is the only analysis
in which the variable Republican Governor is significant, and the analysis suggests the
rate of the reform adoption was significantly reduced when a Republican governor was in
office. This analysis may suggest that highly populated states, which also happen to have
more Democratic governors, are adopting statutory presumptive sentencing at a higher
rate (Barker 2006). Furthermore, Republican control of the state house (or assembly)
significantly increased the rate of statutory presumptive sentencing adoption, which was
similar to the previous reforms, while Republican control of the senate was not
significant.
Another important distinction between sentencing guidelines and statutory
presumptive sentencing lies in the era and prior reform variables. For prior reforms, it
was hypothesized (Hypothesis 9) that states adopting a prior sentencing reform would be
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more likely to adopt statutory presumptive sentencing, but in this analysis
(Mode12 of Table 5.6) prior reform does not increase the rate. This finding may reflect
the relatively early implementation of this reform and the relatively few states that
actually had a reform prior to statutory presumptive sentencing. In fact, in most cases
statutory presumptive sentencing preceded other reforms (Spohn 2000; Stemen, Rengifo,
and Wilson 2006; U.S. 1996). Finally, the era dummy codes are not significant,
suggesting the rate is proportional across the time periods.
Determinate Sentencing:
In the first of the two separate analyzes of the back-end reforms, the determinate
sentencing model (Model 3 of Table 5.6) revealed results similar to those observed in the
sentencing guidelines analysis. Determinate sentencing represented the first attempt by
lawmakers to limit the indeterminateness of sentencing, but unlike sentencing guidelines
or statutory presumptive sentencing, the focus of determinate sentencing is not on the
sentence, but in the process of release. In general, it refers to a system without
discretionary parole boards (Frase 2005; U.S. 1996).
The result from the full model suggests, like some of the previous models, drug
arrests significantly increased the rate of determinate sentencing adoption (see Table DA
in Appendix D for a more detailed table of the analysis presented here). The effect was
strong for higher drug arrest rate states, but the effect was observed across all levels.
Again percent Black and the South were not significant predictors of the rate of reform
adoption, while percent Hispanic significantly reduced the rate. For determinate
sentencing, the analysis lends no support for Hypotheses 3 and 4.
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Conversely support for Hypotheses 5 and 6 are present. Unemployment,
like sentencing guidelines and statutory presumptive sentencing, significantly increased
the rate of adoption with large increases in effect size as unemployment rates go up.
Hypothesis 3 is not supported for percent under the poverty line. While population
density unexpectedly lowered the rate of reform adoption (rumling counter to the social
strain argument), percent urban significantly increased the rate, giving mixed support for
hypothesis 4. In general the analysis of determinate sentencing only weakly supports the
social strain argument across the four variables testing strain effects.
Politically, the analysis again suggested Republicans are more likely to adopt
sentencing reforms with both the house and senate variables increasing the rate of
determinate sentencing adoption. This model again suggested support for Hypothesis 7
for state legislators, but not for state governor. As expected (hypothesis 9), states with a
prior sentencing reform were more likely to adopt determinate sentencing (Spohn 2000;
Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006; U.S. 1996). Somewhat surprisingly, the model does
not suggest the era matters (or at least the rates do not very across the time periods).
Truth in Sentencing:
Truth in sentencing is the most popular sentencing reform to date, with 24 states
adopting the reform (Barker 2006; Boerner 2001). For the crime and justice controls,
drug crime arrests, again, were the only significant variable; increasing the rate of
adoption. This again lends support for Hypothesis 2 for drug atTests, but not violent
crime arrests. As with all previous models (Models 1-3 of Table 5.6), imprisonment rates
were not significantly associated with truth in sentencing adoption rate. This finding was
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consistent across the four separate refonns and the full model of the all refonns
analysis and runs counter to a number of prior studies, which have pointed to concerted
efforts by policy makers to connect overcrowding and refonns (See Model 4 of Table
5.6). They suggested that sentencing refonns were adopted after the spike in sentencing
and would be effective in curtailing a continued rise (Boerner 200 1; Tonry and Hatlestad
1997; Von Hirsch 1985). The models here suggests otherwise (see Table D.5 in
Appendix D for a more detailed table of the analysis presented here).
While in no other model was Southern location significant, in the truth in
sentencing analysis, the South significantly reduced the rate of adoption. This finding is
curious as it runs counter to the expected finding (Hypothesis 3), suggesting the South
may not be more punitive in this respect (Clarke 1998; Wolfgang 1967). As with a
number of the previous models, percent Hispanic significantly reduced the rate of truth in
sentencing adoption, running counter to hypothesis 4. But unlike other models, the South
and percent Hispanic were the only demographic controls to significantly change the rate
of adoption, suggesting no support for any of the four social strain variables.
Republicans, again, were more likely to adopt a sentencing refonn, this time truth
in sentencing. The effect is only observed for the state house (or assembly) and not for
the state senate or governorship. Thus, as with the previous models, the results here
support hypothesis 7, albeit with more limitations for truth in sentencing.
One of the most interesting findings in the entire analysis (including all previous
models) was the significant reduction in the truth in sentencing adoption rate for state
revenues. While this was the only model where a negative effect was observed, the rest
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of the models suggested state revenues were not significantly associated with
adoption of reforms. Perhaps states with higher revenues were not as swayed by the
money offered in the 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill for states that adopted truth in sentencing
reforms. In any case, these findings run counter to the expected outcomes (hypothesis 9)
and reject the argument by Spelman (2009) that state revenues were the chief driving
force behind reform adoption.
As expected (Hypothesis 9), the results here suggest the presence of a prior
reform significantly increased the rate of truth in sentencing adoption. Additionally, the
era dummy codes were also significant, but an interesting phenomenon with the time
periods was observed. First, while the rate of adoption is higher from 1986 to 1993
compared to 1972-1985, the rate is much higher for 1994-2008. In fact, 31 times greater.
This larger effect is likely the result of the 1994 omnibus crime bill, which, among other
things, set aside federal subsidies tied to truth in sentencing adoption at the state level.
The effect of this legislation was profound as 18 of the 24 states to adopt truth in
sentencing laws did so in the three years immediately following the federal bill (Bohm
2006; Tonry 1995).
Discussion
This analysis has several significant advantages over previous research. First, the
analysis includes data covering an extended time period from 1972 to 2008. The
"imprisonment binge" began roughly in the early 1970's with 1972 often cited as the
"start date" (Abramsky 2007; Gottschalk 2006). With data beginning in 1972, the
analysis includes every year from the start of the binge, covering the effects more
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accurately than analysis limited to 3 or 5-year gaps (Hsiao 2003; Wu 2008).
Second, this analysis includes almost all sentencing reforms of the period, a marked
advantage over previous research (Spelman 2009; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006).
Previous research has generally assessed one reform at a time (with notable exceptions)
limiting the analysis to that exact reform (e.g. Griffin and Wooldredge 2006; Johnson
2006; Kramer and Steffensmeier 1993; Kramer and Ulmer 1996; Steffensmeier, Ulmer,
and Kramer 1998; Ulmer and Kramer 1998; Wooldredge and Griffin 2005; Wooldredge,
Griffin, and Rauschenberg 2005; Wooldredge 2009). As seen in this analysis,
considerable change in the effects on reform adoption is observed when different reforms
are modeled. Failure to account for the differential effects may miss-specify the results
(Stimson 1985). Third, the analysis includes both cross-sectional and time-series data
giving it a marked advantage over analysis that lack one of the dimensions. Fourth, the
modeling technique, event-history analysis, has the advantage of predicting the relative
influence state-level characteristics have on the rate of reform adoption. 88 Unlike other
regression models where reforms can be used to show the effect of covariates like racial
disparities, imprisonment rates, or judicial departures, in this analysis the models can
show how the environment, socially, politically, and demographically affect the
likelihood that a state adopts a reform (or the increase in the rate of adoption) (Blossfeld
and Rohwer 2002; Carroll 1982; Wu 2008; Xie 1994).
The models assume all states are "at risk" of adopting a sentencing reform. Or
said another way, the model assumes that a state will eventually adopt a reform, though
88 No research to date could be found that systematically analyzed all sentencing reforms across all states
over time using event-history analysis.
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the model takes into account right censuring where a state is never "observed"
adopting a reform (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002). Of course it is possible not all states
will adopt a sentencing reform and while the model assumes a state will, at some time
(though the rate of adoption can be so functionally small that it has no real effect), adopt
a reform, the important consideration in this analysis is the effect the various controls
have on the overall rate of adoption. After all, the main purpose of this analysis is not to
predict when a state will adopt a reform, but under what conditions a state is more likely
to adopt a reform. This later focus has important substantive implications as it may point
to state-level characteristics that knowingly or unknowingly influenced state policy
decisions (Carroll 1982). These state-level characteristics operate at the structural level
and identifying them may help in understanding the role social stratification,
demographic shifts, and/or political affiliation has on social policy choices.
It was hypothesized that high percentages of ethnic/racial minorities would
increase the rate of reform adoption. The argument follows that high percentages of
Blacks or Hispanics would represent a perceived threat to the white majority and reforms
would be used as a tool of social control of the underc1ass (Hypothesis 4) (Engen,
Gainey, Crutchfield, and Weis 2003; Hebert 1997; Johnson 2003; Quillian 1995). This
analysis offers only scant support for such a hypothesis with percent Black significantly
increasing the rate of the all reform models and sentencing guideline adoption models.
Additionally, when percent Hispanic was significant, the models suggest the rate of
adoption was reduced (counter to the racial threat argument).
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In general, the analysis suggests that the unemployment rate was the most
powerful influence on the rate of reform adoption across most models, supporting
hypothesis 6. Thus the results suggest that high unemployment placed a social strain on
states increasing the desire of the state to "do something about the problem" (Kruttschnitt
2005; Nicholson-Crotty 2004; Quillian 1995; Ulmer and Johnson 2004). This "do
something" pressure resulted in, among other things, the adoption of sentencing reforms
as a form of social control to alleviate the strain.
As expected, with the exception of statutory presumptive sentencing, drug crime
arrests increased the rate of reform adoption. This finding was consistent with previous
research, which had suggested that drug crimes or at least the increased criminalization of
drugs were highly connected to reform adoption. A number of prior studies have shown
the deep connection between the law and order movement, which sentencing reforms
were a part of, and the rise of drug crimes as a perceived social threat (Hamid 1998;
Radosh 2008; Spohn, Gruhl, and Welch 1982; Wooldredge and Griffin 2005).
Conversely, violent crime arrests were not generally associated with the increased rate of
reform adoption. Some prior research had suggested reforms were at least partly a
response to rising violent crime rates, especially in the late 70s and 80s (Tonry 1995; Von
Hirsch 1985). But in this analysis this hypothesis was not supported.
Another consistent finding across all of the models was the significant impact
Republican control of the state legislatures had on the rate of reform adoption. This
finding was expected as Republicans have historically supported a more strict crime and
justice platform (Gottschalk 2009). While the law and order movement was a key
180
driving force behind the refonn movement and Democrats certainly participated
in the movement, Republicans seem to have a significantly larger impact on refonn
adoption (Abramsky 2007; Barker 2006).
Future research should focus on the various characteristics that may have worked
together to create certain environment "types" where refonns are the most likely to
emerge. It is likely the refonn movement was influenced by a number of competing and
complementary effects acting simultaneously. In the end, the analysis suggests refonn
adoption did not happen in a vacuum. This analysis sheds some light onto the socio-
political context by which reforms were adopted and which state characteristics
influenced the rate of adoption suggesting a number of important forces are acting upon
the system.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The analyses contained in this dissertation have some significant advantages, both
methodologically and theoretically, over previous research studying the effects of
sentencing reforms on changes in imprisonment. First, the analyses include data from
1965 to 200889, which represents a relatively long period of historically relevant data that
includes the beginning of the "imprisonment binge" that began roughly in 1972. The
analysis also includes data for every year, providing finer grained coverage than analysis
limited to 3 or 5-year gaps. Second, previous research has generally assessed one reform
at a time (with notable exceptions) limiting the analysis to that exact reform. We
included almost all sentencing reforms of the period and found considerable change in
the effects of reforms when different combinations of the reforms were taken into
account. Accounting for these differential affects provides a more complete picture of
the effects of sentencing reforms. Third, the different model specifications employed
diverged from previous research and supplied arguably better modeling, including the
incorporation of a conditional change score, fixed-effects for states, a new growth curve
variable coding of the effects of sentencing reforms, odds ratios, and an event-history
analysis. Fourth, the analysis included all 50 states allowing comparisons across states,
89 Some of the models include fewer years.
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comparing states that have adopted reforms to states that have not, and allowing
for greater statistical power and greater generalizability than much of the previous
research. While the results do not allow for the complete state-by-state analysis (e.g., we
can not definitely calculate the change over time for Oregon vs. Washington), the results
do have substantive interpretation, outlining the average changes over time within states
in imprisonment and imprisonment composition by race and gender. Fifth, the analyses
included not just the assessment of changes in total imprisonment, work conducted in
prior research, but also the effects of reforms on the racial/ethnic and gender90
composition of those imprisoned. Sixth, one of the chapters examines the environmental
and social demographic characteristics of states that influence the rate of reform adoption
for states using an event history analysis.
Much of the earlier policy analysis tended to focus purely on outcomes with less
attention to what might be driving changes in imprisonment (Tonry and Hatlestad 1997;
Webster 2007; Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn 2009). The theoretical model incorporated
in this analysis helps to ground the analysis in contemporary understandings of the
criminal justice system. This framework supplied the analysis with strong expected
outcomes that are generated from a theoretical model. The social chain theoretical model
may best be applied to the analysis of the racial/ethnic composition of imprisonment
found in Chapter 3. Flowing from a social chain theory presented in Figure 6.1, where
the context of the law and order movement (Abramsky 2007; Beckett 1997; Scheingold
1991) interacted with the structural shifts characterized by the formal rationalization
90 The gender composition is a slight misnomer as prisons truly divide the population on sex not gender.
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theory described by Weber (Weber 1978) to cause an untended consequence
(Fine 2006; Merton 1936). In Chapter 3, it was theorized to result in the rise in the racial
and ethnic disparities in imprisonment as the final link in the chain. The findings, which
supported the expected outcome for some of the reforms, ran counter to the stated goals
of policy makers, who had suggested reforms would actually reduce the disparity (U.S.
1996; Von Hirsch 1985). These findings should not be taken lightly as the growth in
imprisonment disparities among people of color should be a primary concern of criminal
justice reforms. This analysis raises an alarm for both policy makers and social science
researchers (Hebert 1997; McDonald and Carlson 1994; Tonry 1995).
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Figure 6.1. Social Chain Theory Outlining the Frame Used in Chapter III
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The focus of Chapter 3 was not to explain which of the specific unintended
outcomes were at play. Instead the focus was on the general unintended effects across all
states. It was expected that the policy shifts, regardless of the actual structure the policy
took on, resulted in a latent effect: in this case, the rise in the disparity of imprisonment
rates for people of color (Fine 2006; Merton 1936). At the same time, a finding that an
unintended consequence was likely present does not suggest a policy failure per se. After
all, as stated previously, it is important to remember that these reforms are embedded
within complex, dynamic, and interconnected social systems that can lead to what Fine
(2006) called "chained social problems". What has failed here is not the desire to reform
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the system, which clearly has faults that should be addressed, but the failure to
adequately predict the likelihood reforms would result in an unintended effect and to
assess the actual outcomes (Merton 1936). The unintended effect may have not been
foreseen and intended, but the results should not be ignored simply because it was not
expected by policy makers. After all, the lack of the expectation of an unexpected
outcome does not guarantee the absence of one (Kleck 1998). This only underscores the
importance of not relying solely on the rhetoric of what is supposed to happen and
focusing on the observed effects, like those presented in this analysis.
This study suggests policy makers need to seriously assess, and possibly
reconsider, sentencing reforms to alleviate the increased disparities in imprisonment.
Previous research has indicated that while the discretion previously held by judges under
indetenninate sentencing may have been limited under reforms, it has not been removed
from the process altogether. It is possible reforms have inadvertently shifted the
discretion to prosecutors (who detennine the severity of charges filed), where the bias has
simply been moved to another set of hands (Kempf-Leonard and Sample 2001). A few
studies have found that prosecutors are more likely to take into consideration factors
outside of the offender's crime and prior record (directly or indirectly associated with
race and/or other factors) in determining prosecution of violent and drug crimes, but less
likely for property and other non-violent felony cases (Engen, Gainey, Crutchfield, and
Weis 2003; Ulmer, Kurlychek, and Kramer 2007). In the end, the discretion has probably
not been removed or reduced, but has been "displaced" from one group to another
(Wooldredge and Griffin 2005).
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Other research has indicated that Blacks and possibly Hispanics are more
likely to be convicted of a relatively minor first offenses (Shane-DuBow 1998). If true,
an increase in the odds of Black imprisonment may be linked to sentencing reforms
through their greater emphasis on prior record (particularly for drug crimes) as a
determinate of sentencing length (Inciardi, McBride, and Rivers 1996; McShane and
Williams 1997). When this information is combined with the political desire to ratchet
up the penalties on drug crimes, the connection between race and drug crimes as a driving
force of disparity in sentencing becomes more plausible (Griset 1995; Wooldredge,
Griffin, and Rauschenberg 2005). This connection may underscore the possibility that an
unintended consequence of sentencing reforms is present.
Chapter 4 focuses on the shifts in the female imprisonment rates compared to
males due to the adoption of sentencing reforms or changes in criminal arrest rates. Our
interest focuses on this compositional trend as it extends over the period from 1970
through 2008. Specifically, we focus our investigation on two potential explanations for
part of this increase: the sentencing reform movements that occurred from the 1970s
through the beginning of the 21 st century and changes in the ratio of female to male rates
for serious crimes. Similar to the previous two chapters, the analysis suggests that the
law and order movement combined with a shift in women's roles in society (unique
perspective for this chapter) to create an environment where female imprisonment rates
rose faster than males rates. We hypothesize that both sentencing reforms and
differential arrest rates were part of the reason the female rates rose faster (See Graph 4.1
on Page 107).
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The analysis of the odds of female to male imprisonment draws on the
net-widening literature. For us, net-widening, involves an increase in the proportion of
people that are caught up in the criminal justice system. It is often accompanied by shifts
in the composition of those "caught up" in the system. For the female offenders, it was
suggested that the imprisonment net caught up women at a higher rate than previously
because they are more likely to be involved in relatively minor crimes and reforms
moved these relatively minor crimes from non-prison sentences to prison sentences.
But research also indicates that a narrowing of the gap in both arrests and
imprisonment has occurred between females and males. Both of these phenomena were
theorized to at least be partially a result of the law and order movement (Beckett 1997;
Blumstein, Cohen, Martin, and Tonry 1983; Scheingold 1991; Simon 2007). The
analysis points to the particularly strong effects of drug crimes. This finding confirms
prior research that has pointed to drug crimes as perhaps the most important factor in the
narrowing of the gender gap (Jacobs 2003; Schwartz and Rookey 2008). The finding that
sentencing reforms were not significantly associated with the narrowing of the gender
gap was counter to our expectations. We expected, as in the other areas of imprisonment
studied, that the law and order movement was driving shifts in sentencing that created a
more predetermined and less discretion based system that would have the effect of
making sentencing in general more punitive and with a greater reach. As this happened
women would be caught up more by an expanding sentencing net and thus the gender gap
would be reduced. But in this analysis, we found no direct effect of reforms on the odds
of female imprisonment. It may be possible that while there was a direct effect on total
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imprisonment and a direct effect on the racial/ethnic composition of
imprisonment, the law and order movement is pushing a narrowing of arrest rates that
results in narrowing of the imprisonment rates between women and men.
Table 2.5 from Chapter 2 (Page 53) may be the best way to illustrate the complete
interaction of the reforms and how they affected the change in total state imprisonment
rates. While this analysis does not allow us to conclude that all states or even one
particular state conforms to the pattern suggested in the table, it does allow us to conclude
that, on the aggregate or on average, the reform is (or is not) significantly associated with
larger changes in imprisonment within states (Finkel 1995). The predicted change scores
represent the average change in imprisonment rates for the average state adopting some
combination of the reforms. A combination in which at least one of the reforms was
significant was flagged. In some of the cases the reform (e.g., voluntary sentencing
guidelines) or some combinations of the reforms (e.g., presumptive sentencing guidelines
in combination with truth in sentencing and determinate sentencing) reduced the changes
in imprisonment, but these cases were rarer. For the majority of the cases, the reforms
increased changes in imprisonment, both on the front-end and on the back-end. Three
strikes laws, on the other hand, did not significantly increase imprisonment rate changes
on their own, but did when taken in combination with other reforn1s. Overall this
analysis suggested sentencing reforms are associated with changes in state imprisonment
rates when controlling for important co-variates. They are associated with at least some
of the rise in imprisonment (often referred to as the "imprisonment binge") presented in
Graph 1.1 (Page 2).
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The event-history analysis presented in Chapter 5 has the advantage of
predicting the relative influence state-level characteristics have on the rate of reform
adoption. Unlike the other regression models presented in Chapter 2-4, where the models
can be used to show the effect reforms have on imprisonment, the event-history models
illustrated the effect the state environments; socially, politically, and demographically
had on the likelihood a state adopted a reform (e.g.) increased the rate of adoption)
(Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002; Carroll 1982; Wu 2008; Xie 1994). This analysis assumed
all states were "at risk" of adopting a sentencing reform at some time (Blossfeld and
Rohwer 2002). Of course it is possible that not all states will adopt a sentencing refonn
and while the models assumes a state, at some time, will, this analysis was primarily
concerned with the effect of the various controls on adoption rates. After all, the main
purpose of the analysis in Chapter 5 is not to predict when a state will adopt a reform, but
under what conditions a state is more likely to adopt one, possibly pointing to state-level
characteristics that knowingly or unknowingly influenced state policy decisions. These
state-level characteristics operate at the structural level and identifying them may help in
understanding the role social stratification, demographic shifts, and/or political affiliation
has on social policy choices.
In the end, the analysis, as a whole, points to broad connections that support the
general theoretical arguments of Beckett (1997), Scheingold (1991), and Simon (2007)
for total imprisonment and the odds of imprisonment for people of color, but not for the
narrowing of the gender gap. They suggest the law and order movement of the mid
1970's to the present was, in part, driving the shift to the "justice model" of
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imprisonment of which "fixed" sentencing is one part. The reforms served to
change the process, through the bureaucratization of the system as described by Weber
and others, from a system giving significant leeway to judges and in house prison
officials to a system largely placing power into hands of elected political officials:
ultimately creating a system that is susceptible to political and social pressures. The final
result is a general increase in punitive incarceration in which "fixed" sentencing
represents a way to codifY the punitiveness. These increases are likely regardless of the
stated political purposes or goals of the reforms (e.g., desire to be growth neutral).
Adding to the body of research in the field, this analysis outlines the broad impacts of
reforms, but also suggesting a number of important considerations for future research.
Because many of these reforms were created in the multifaceted "justice model"
framework, they are likely to have many consequences (e.g., rapid prison growth and
changes in the composition of imprisonment). My analyses shed light on these important
impacts, an area of research that has been largely overlooked or mis-specified in the
previous literature. While some research has attempted to investigate reforms using
panel models, these studies present results that should be viewed with considerable
reservations due to limits in both their application of theory and/or their model
specifications.
After controlling for violent crime rates, drug crime rates, property crimes rates,
percent black, percent Hispanic, percent urban, population density, poverty rates,
unemployment rates, log curves for state senate and state house, state governor, state
revenues, new commitments to prison, and parole violators returned to prison; some of
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the "fixed" sentencing reforms remain positively associated with changes in
imprisonment rates and directly related to a portion of the over 500% increase in the
imprisonment rate over the length of this study and to increases in the racial/ethic
disparities. Legislators should consider this when designing sentencing procedures. The
costs of locking criminals up is increasingly expensive and "prison beds" are currently at
critical levels in a number of states (Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Shane-DuBow 1998).
Rapid increases in prison populations can be devastating to a system that is often
slow to respond (Griset 1995; Kruttschnitt 2005). The overall costs to individual states
can be expensive. For example, Oregon, a state that has implemented sentencing
guidelines, spent $23,389 per inmate in 2003. When the logarithmic growth curve
variable is calculated out for seven years, the effect is about a I-prisoner increase per
1000 state residents for that year, indicating that guidelines have a relatively large effect
(considering the overall imprisonment rates are about 4 inmates per 1000). The Oregon
guidelines could cost the state 81.84 million dollars a year.91 The costs are likely to be
even higher considering that these estimates do not include capital investments such as
construction costs of new prisons and increased transportation. Additionally, increases in
imprisonment places resource pressures on public defenders and courts. While
considerable variation from state to state exists, the average cost per inmate across all
states in 2003 was $22,650 suggesting costs are likely to be high in all states (Boerner
2001). The problem is exacerbated by other recent sentencing policies including truth in
sentencing and three strikes laws that further increase prison populations.
91 Calculations based on 2003 dollars
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The finding that sentencing reforms are associated with a rise, not a
decline, in the racial/ethnic disparities of imprisonment is a finding that should heighten
the concerns to both policy makers and social science researchers. I can find no study to
date that has assessed the impacts of reforms on the odds of imprisonment of blacks or
Hispanics to whites on the state-level across all 50 states. Many policy and some social
science researchers assumed that sentencing reforms would have a positive impact on
(reducing) the large racial disparity in the American imprisonment system. Some
researchers have held steadfast in their defense of this claim despite no evidence to
support such a conclusion. They assume that the reforms, because of their increased
emphasis on apparent race neutral characteristics (crime committed and prior record),
cannot be the reason for a continued rise in the racial disparities.92 Some social science
researchers and/or policy makers cling to the notion that sentencing reforms were
designed not to increase racial disparities and thus must not be responsible for the rise
(Kramer and Ulmer 1996; Von Hirsch 1985). My analysis calls into question the
assumption that sentencing reforms have not increased the racial disparity and
researchers should now endeavor to disentangle exactly what particular parts of
sentencing reforms are responsible for this rise (Kleck 1998). Another area needing more
research involves the characteristics of states that are associated with the adoption of
various sentencing reforms. Chapter 5 highlights some of the broad state level structural
characteristics that may be of influence, but future research should venture deep into
roots of reforms to find the origins of the effects.
92 This statement is not designed to insinuate that no policy maker has questioned sentencing reforms.
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APPENDIX A
DETAILED DISCUSSION OF
SENTENCING REFORMS FOR CHAPTERS II-IV
Sentencing guidelines consist of a matrix of possible sentences with a very narrow
range within a sentencing category that is defined by an offender's criminal history (prior
offenses) and offense severity. These two main determinates make up the technical
apparatus informing the judge's "automation of paragraphs" suggested by Weber (1978).
It is important to note that while sentencing guidelines were established in each state
under the same general principles, guidelines' design and implementation vary
considerably from state to state (Frase 2005; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006). One
c1assification93 of guidelines incorporates two loose legal categories. The first, labeled
presumptive sentencing guidelines, are strict in their application. Only allowing very
limited deviations, Judges generally must follow the matrix (Engen and Steen 2000;
Frase 2005; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006; Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn 2009).
The second format, voluntary sentencing guidelines, treats guidelines as a formal
recommendation, but does not legally mandate they be followed. The difference here is
93 The general census is not unifonnly agreed upon and considerable disagreement of the proper way to
categorize them still exists. The two "types" discussed here represent a division largely discussed and
advocated by Frase (1995) and Stemen (2006) and is the most likely division to be infonnative in this
analysis.
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their legal mechanisms. States with presumptive sentencing guidelines have
"legally binding" sentencing matrixes enforceable by appellate review, allowing both the
prosecution and defense to appeal sentences not following the guidelines. Conversely, in
states with the voluntary guidelines, there is no appellate review. While judges may be
required to give a written justification to deviate from them, they are not legally obligated
to follow them and are largely free to render any decision they want. Research does
indicate judges follow the recommendations of voluntary guidelines 85% of the time,
suggesting they do have impact (Miethe and Moore 1988). The bifurcated classification
of sentencing guidelines into presumptive or voluntary is unrelated to how the guidelines
were created (by legislative statute, initiative process, or sentencing commission) or
whether an active commission monitors them.
It is important to note that while it is relatively simple to classify guidelines by
their binding legal status, considerable variation exists in design and application, both
across and within the two types (Frase 1995; Frase 2005; Reitz 1995).94 As Frase (2005)
and Tonry (1995) argue it may be more appropriate to consider guidelines as falling on a
continuum from structured to loose. Additionally, researchers rightfully acknowledged
the "fixedness" of sentencing guidelines vary considerably from state-to-state. Some
94 Furthermore, the factors considered during initial adoption varied greatly: for example, stated attempts to
be growth neutral, designed to be proscriptive vs. prescriptive, and explicit consideration of one or more of
the following issues: race, ethnicity, and gender. These state-to-state variations in "design factors" will not
be directly assessed in this study, but do represent an area of analysis worthy of investigation. They are not
directly assessed in this study for three reasons. First, the analysis in concerned with aggregate data and
any further slicing of the independent variables further reduces the predictive power of the analysis.
Second, theoretically it is likely that while states have discussed publicly their desires, outcomes will likely
vary considerable from their stated goals. Third, individual discussion of isolated states sociopolitical
landscape during adoption is hampered by a lack of available aggregated data.
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voluntary systems like Missouri have very limited ranges giving little leeway to
judges who choose to follow them, while a state like Pennsylvania, which is categorized
as presumptive, has rather large ranges allowing judges some level of discretion.
Because explaining the general effects is our chief concern and not the variation within
guidelines, we have chosen to leave further discussion of guidelines diversity to another
analysis.
Also, this study will assess statutory presumptive sentencing, another attempt to
shift the correctional system from a rehabilitation model to a crime control model.
Statutory presumptive sentencing, like sentencing guidelines, represents an attempt to
create uniformity within similarly situated crimes, but acts less like a sentencing rubric.
It specifies an appropriate or "normal" sentence for each offense as a baseline for a judge.
It can be considered along with other relevant factors (aggravating or mitigating
circumstances), but its intent is to "fit the punishment to the crime" rather than "fit the
punishment to the offender'" (Brewer, Beckett, and Holt 1981; Frase 1995; Savelsberg
1992).95
Additionally, this study will incorporate an assessment of determinate sentencing
(abolishment o/parole) and truth in sentencing laws. They represent the first attempt to
limit the "indeterminateness" of sentencing. The reforms, like the other "fixed"
sentencing reforms, shifts the role of the correctional system from a rehabilitation model
to a crime control model. In contrast to the three previously mentioned reforms, the
95 As with other sentencing reforms, considerable variation between states adopting statutory presumptive
sentencing exists. For this analysis, the important point is that this sentencing procedure again represents a
shift from the indeterminate model to a model focused on equalizing the variation in sentencing across
similar crimes by "fixing" the sentence to the crime.
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focus lies in the "back-end" mechanism of release as opposed to the "front-end"
of sentencing. In general, determinate sentencing is used to refer to a system without
discretionary parole boards. While ultimately determinate sentencing operates
independently from the type of sentencing procedure used (indeterminate, guidelines, or
statutory presumptive), the reform fits into the "fixed" sentencing category because the
amount of time served is more assured (Griset 1995; Kempf-Leonard and Sample 2001;
Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006). Truth in sentencing on the other hand does not
necessarily dictate the elimination of parole boards, but does require offenders serve a
statutorily defined minimum amount of time. Only states meeting the 1994 federal
omnibus crime bill minimum 85% time-served of original sentence are considered in this
analysis. Finally, we considered three strikes laws. Due to their focus on habitual
offenders, they are considered an additional reform beyond the previous five more
structured reforms affecting sentencing or release. They too fall under the umbrella of
"fixed" reforms because of their design to limit discretion through an apparent push away
from the rehabilitation model.
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APPENDIXB
DETAILED DISCUSSION OF METHODS FROM CHAPTER II
This appendix is designed to give a more detail illustration of the statistical
procedures used. The analysis utilizes panel data or what some in the social sciences call
time-series cross-section96 (TSCS) data. In essence, panel data is simply data that include
both cross-sections and time or better stated, it includes some number of cases observed
repeatedly over time. The data in this study include relatively large equal-spaced time
periods (t = 41 years) and a relatively large number of cases (i = 50 states).97 It should be
noted that the large i in this analysis is only considered large because t is relatively large.
To illustrate, the number of observations (n), the metric by which the model draws its
statistical power is determined by t x i, thus having a large number of time points makes
it possible to have fewer cases. In this case the analysis has the potential for 2,050
96 The analysis inc"orporates both cross-sections (states) as the unit of analysis and measures over time and
in the social science literature the analysis techniques are often called time-series cross-sectional analysis or
panel analysis, with the later language more likely found in the econometric literature.
97 Some researchers like to distinguish between the two "types" of data, but qualitatively these two "types"
are not really different data, but possess different quantities of units or time. In this analysis, I do not see
the necessity to distinguish the two, but you may find prior research that goes into great lengths discussing
the difference. In general panel data is sometimes referred to data with a large number of cases (i), but a
small number of time points (t) and cross-sectional time-series data refers to data with small i and large 1.
Though careful attention should be paid to the exact number of cases or time points stated as the definitions
are loose and many researchers, including myself see the distinction as moot. This is not to say that a
researcher should not be concemed with the number of cases in relation to the number of times points, but
on the contrary, they are highly important to the specific statistical procedure used (Wooldridge 1995;
Wooldridge 2000).
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observations (n) determined by multiplying 41 (t) years by 50 (i) states and is
generally considered a large n for Prais-Winsten regression.
Considering the number of cases in relation to the number of time points helps to
select the proper modeling technique utilized. For example, with a large number of cases
but a small number of time points, Feasible Generalized Least Squares, Arellano-Bond,
or Blundell-Bond models are appropriate, while Prais-Winsten or Hausman-Taylor
models may be more appropriate for large t. The modeling techniques just discussed and
the analysis found in this paper should not be confused with other analysis that may be
used on panel or panel like data including hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) or
structural equation modeling (SEM). It is especially important to not confuse HML with
panel models as the language for fixed vs. random effects are used in both techniques but
represent different substantive effects and interpretations. This last point has caused
considerable confusion among scholars (Wooldredge, Griffin, and Pratt 2001).
Specifically in this analysis, I use Prais-Winsten regression with panel corrected
standard errors (PCSE), an approach recommended by Beck and Katz (1995). While it is
a variant of Ordinary Least Squares regression, which has several known problems when
analyzing panel data (Beck and Katz 1995; England, Kilboume, Farkas, and Dou 1988),
it incorporates a number of corrections that make the analysis justified (Beck and Katz
1995; England, Kilboume, Farkas, and Dou 1988). Beck and Katz (1995) found that
most panel analysis suffers from issues of serially correlated errors that may understate
the standard errors of regression coefficients by as much as 50 to 300 percent. PCSE
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corrects the underestimation and can lead to consistent and efficient point
estimates when models are properly specified (Beck and Katz 1995; Ha1aby 2004).
While PCSE corrects for serially correlated errors, it does not address all issues
that are likely to arise. Due largely to the issue of omitted variable bias, the first issue
often needing consideration is the choice between random and fixed-effects. To
illustrate, Prais-Winsten modeling (or other commensurate modeling of panel data)
without the use of fixed-effects is what researchers have come to call pooled panel
analysis or the random effects model. In a random effects model the panel-by-year
specific observations are "pooled" and the errors are assumed to be exogenous (the
panels are not related to each other) and are not serially correlated (points in time are not
related to each other), thus yielding;
y = 130 + f3l X lil .. ·f3n Xnil +Vi + <;1 +Cil
• Where Vi is the unobserved time-invariant variation, <;1 is the unobserved case-
invariant variation and Cit is the idiosyncratic error term.
• cil is assumed to be uncorrelated with Xlil"Xnil and with Vi and <;1'
• And where Vi and <;1 are not correlated with XliI "Xnil .
Both the Hausman and the Mundlak test can be used to determine whether the
random effects model meets the assumption that Vi and <;1 are uncorrelated with Xlii "Xnil .
If the data fails the tests it is likely to suffer from what researchers have come to call
omitted variable bias (unobserved, variables not included in the analysis, time-invariant
variables that are correlated with the Xit's) and it would not be wise to use a random
effects model. The analysis in this paper failed the both the Hausman and Mundlak tests
suggesting the presence of omitted variable bias. In essence, this suggests that the model
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must include more independent variables that explain the correlation between the
panels (time-invariant variable) or remove the omitted variation, otherwise the point
estimates will be inconsistent (biased) and inefficient, seriously calling into question the
analysis (Wooldridge 2005). Fortunately, with Prais-Winsten regression with PCSE (and
with other forms of panel analysis), the time-invariant omitted variable bias can be
corrected for by utilizing a panel specific fixed effect model (Halaby 2004). In the
simplest approach, including i-I dummy variables for each state (except the reference
state) achieves this. In this analysis, 50-1 (e,g.) ii .. ii-I) dummy variables were included,
yielding;
Y = {30 + {3IX1il "·{3,,X"il + il .. i"_1 + Vi + ~I + Eil
• Where £'t is not correlated with Xlit ,,,X"it '
• Eil is assumed to be uncorrelated with Xlil"X"il
• Where ii .. ii_1 represent the dummy variables for each panel.
• Because i; .. ii_1 and {30 are perfectly correlated with Vi' Vi drops from the analysis
and we are left with: Y ={30 + {3IXlit ...{3"X"it + il ·..i"_1 + £'t + Eit
This model controls the unobserved state level effects (panel specific omitted
variable bias) that are stable over time by holding the unexplained time-invariant
variation constant. In effect, the panel specific fixed-effects model exploits within group
variation by holding constant unexplained between state variation. As long as there is no
serial correlation (£'t is not correlated with XliI "X"il ), estimates achieve an unbiased state
even when the random effects assumptions are violated. Because the random effects
assumptions cannot be met in this analysis the unit fixed-effects model must be
incorporated (Halaby 2004).
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The fixed effects model offers some other significant advantages over the
random effects model. For example, an important advantage in this analysis is that fixed-
effects for states will control for any regional differences that may be present. Research
has shown that the South has higher rates of imprisonment and the analysis will control
for this difference and remove its effect from the results (England 1998). While this can
substantially improve the reliability of the results, it also removes any cross-sectional
effects that might be the focus of a study concerned with differences between states rather
than changes within states (England, Kilbourne, Farkas, and Dou 1988; Halaby 2004;
Wooldridge 1995). In this analysis, however, the primary concern lies not with panel-to-
panel variation, but in the patterns of aggregate change over time, thus making the fixed
effects model theoretically advantageous in addition to being statistically necessary.
In this analysis the panel specific fixed-effects approach sacrifices little. In
practice the panel specific fixed-effects model creates a simultaneous time-series analysis
where the coefficients represent the average, across panels, within panel change over-
time of the average within panel level changes of the independent variables. In fact, early
practitioners called it simultaneous time-series modeling for this exact reason (Finkel
1995). It has the advantage of increasing the statistical power through the "pooling" of
the observations, just like in the random effects model, but it corrects for the critical flaw
of unobserved omitted variable bias. A disadvantage of such a technique is the increased
number of estimates created by the dummy variables for panels and the subsequent loss
of degrees of freedom, but the relative advantage of correcting for omitted variable bias
outweighs any argument for the advantage of the random effects model. Furthermore, in
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an analysis with large t the "cost" of statistical power due to more covariates is
likely to be at a minimum (Wooldridge 2005).
A change in the interpretation of the coefficients does occur when fixed effects
for units is implemented, as they now no longer represent the average effect of the
independent variables (time-variant and time-invariant) on the dependent variable (time-
variant and time-invariant) found in pooled random effects model (Hsiao 2003). While
this may be important to many, especially those concerned with differences between
panels, the desire for between unit effects is not sufficient to justify a random effects
model. While some researchers have pointed to the large variability between (state-to-
state) the states adopting reforms (state level differences as well as differences between
the reforms - e.g., not all sentencing guidelines are the same98), in the unit-specific fixed-
effects model, where the interpretation lies in the average effect over-time, such variation
only makes the model less efficient (larger standard errors) affecting the ability to reach
significant results.
Fixed effects for units may be statistically required and incorporated in the
analysis, but it does not address any issues that are time-variant, that is, issues that are
unit-invariant (does not change over the units) but change over time. Like the issues of
omitted unit-specific variable bias, this time-specific issue revolves around omitted
variables. If suspected (the Mundlak and the Hausman test can be used test for time-
specific omitted variation), the choice of fixed-effects for time is not as cut and dry as the
98 This should not be interpreted to mean that it is not important to correctly specify the data. Miss-
specified data will result is biased results in any analysis.
203
choice of unit-specific fixed effects because there are a laundry list of proven
procedures that may remedy the time-specific concerns (Halaby 2004).
Fixed-effects for time is on the top of the list of appropriate tools to assess models
suffering from unexplained omitted variables that are constant across units at a given
time period. Like fixed effects for units, fixed effects for time completely corrects for
any time-variant omitted variation. But their inclusion is not without cost. First it
changes the interpretation of the coefficients from change over-time. Because the theory
suggests the effects of reforms will be observed in the changes in imprisonment over-
time within a state, it is desirable to leave the year-to-year variation intact. To illustrate
further, when fixed-effects for both units and time are included, the substantive
interpretation of the coefficients become a measure of the panels' deviation from time by
unit specific mean that is stable over time, completely removing any unexplained time
varying and panel varying unobserved variation. This of course could be a measure of
theoretical interest, but is substantively different then the "change-over-time" measure of
the panel-only fixed-effects model. Second, and possibly more important, fixed effects
for time, especially when coupled with fixed effects for units, are likely to "suck up"
most of the variation in the analysis. When most of the variation is removed from the
analysis the models can become highly inefficient and statistically significant results can
be hard to come by.
Therefore, because most time variant issues can be assess with a large number of
other proven procedures (e.g., AR controls, first differencing, or the within
transformation) that are less likely to make the analysis difficult by "sucking up" all of
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the variance. That is, the analysis becomes difficult because when fixed effects
for years are included, the time dummies are perfectly correlated with the error caused by
the omitted time-variant variables. This "perfect correlation" is what gives the fixed
effects approach its statistical utility, but it is also the reason it can be difficult
(statistically speaking) to get significant results as the analysis becomes less efficient.
Instead of fixed-effects for time, this analysis used a series of procedures common and
proven effective to time series analysis that control for time-specific confounds. If these
controls are capable of controlling for enough of the time-specific omitted variation that
may be present in the analysis then it is appropriate to run the analysis without time-
specific fixed effects (Finkel 1995; Hsiao 2003).99
The procedures can also be used to de-trend the data, address issues of the random
walk, and to address time-specific shocks (Beck and Katz 1995; Halaby 2004). First, it is
important to remember that once fixed-effects for units is implemented the analysis no
longer represents a pooling of the state (panel) by year (time) specific observations and
now becomes a series of simultaneous time-series analyses that measure the aggregate
(averaged across panels) change over-time within panels (Frees 2004; Hsiao 2003). As
noted, between 1972 and 2007, imprisonment increased by some 550%. This trend is
problematic and should be corrected for. In general a researcher can choose to first-
difference or perform the within mean transformation on the dependent variable.
Because the within transformation is prone to serial correlation and is further from the
substantive interpretation of "change-over-time" this analysis was interested in, first
99 Of course you can use a Hausman or Mundlak test to assess the presence of time-specific omitted
variables.
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differencing was utilized. The approach has its advantage as it now represents
year-to-year change in imprisonment for each i (Finkel 1995; Halaby 2004). The model
now becomes what some call the unconditional change score model:
L1Y = /30 + /31Xlit •••/3"X"it + i1.. i"_1 + ~t + Cit
• Where ~t is assumed uncorrelated with Xlit '''Xnit .
• Cit is assumed to be uncorrelated with Xlit .. XII it .
• Where L1Y =Y,t - Y,t-l and i l .. .ii_l creates individual intercepts for each L1Y
• Note: the /3 may be either /3 or L1/3
In time-series analysis a shock or spike in the series can have a profound effect on
the analysis and undermine the model's ability to measure change-over-time effectively.
To remedy the apparent "shocks" observed in the first-differenced imprisonment
variable, another common time-series transformation, a three-year moving average was
instituted (Frees 2004). As you can see in Graph B.l below the first differenced change
scores suffer from some spikes, while the three-year moving average "smoothes" the
spikes. It should be noted that moving averages are most appropriate when the analysis
includes large t. Time specific fixed-effects, when coupled with unit specific fixed-
effects, also largely controls for shocks to the series. As noted, a concern that needs to be
addressed, but in this analysis the three-year moving average is more appropriate (see
Graph B.l).
206
Graph B.t. The Change in Imprisonment Rates and the Three-Year Moving Average
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Even when the panel specific fixed-effects model with PCSE and a three-year
moving average of a first-differenced dependent variable was included, time related
issues are stilllikely present (a Mundlak test of the unit fixed-effects v. the unit and time
fixed-effects model confirms this assertion). A phenomenon known as regression to the
mean is often found in this type of analysis and it suggests that the unconditional change
score model, ~y ={30 + {31X1it ···{3n X nit + ij .. i n_I + ~t + Cit (where~t is left unchanged or
unconditioned) leads to biased results because the effect size of the explanatory variables
on the change score dependent variable is related to the preceding value of the dependent
variable (Frees 2004). For example, an imprisonment rate going from 10 to 20 would
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have a change score of 10, while a change form 100 to 110 would also be a
change of 10. The former would actually be a doubling of imprisonment and arguably a
larger "effect" while the later would be just a 10% increase. To correct for the this, a
lagged term of imprisonment rate, f3nYiH' was included in the analysis, yielding;
~Y = 130 + 131XI it ···f3nXnit + f3n+]~t-l + i1 •• i n- 1 + ~t + Cit
• Cit is assumed to be uncorrelated with Xlit ...xnit .
• Where, when Y takes the form of ~Y , f3n+l~r-1 is correlated with the portion of
~t that takes on a first-order serial correlation structure, then~t becomes ~~t
• Therefore we are left with: ~Y = 130 + f31Xlir ···f3nXnir + f3n+]~r-] + i] .. i n- 1 + ~~r + cir
• Note: The lagged dependent variable term is not ~~t-] but is instead1';r_l'
This model is often referred to as a static-score or conditional change score model
and frames the analysis in the following fashion: "do the independent X variables [both X
or L1X] influence changes in Y (e.g., ~Y) for fixed levels of f3n~t-I' that is, taking into
account the negative effect of initial values of Yon subsequent change (Finkel 1995: 9)?"
Additionally, because time-series analysis assumes that social systems are progressing
towards stability, where the change in the dependent variable (Y or ~Y) becomes
constant and stable until it is altered by some exogenous disturbance, a negative
relationship between the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation
and the dependent change-score variable ( ~Y ) on the left hand side is likely to be
observed. If the negative coefficient is found, it can be said that a causal relationship
between 1';r-] and Y is present. That is, there is evidence of serial correlation.
Furthermore, a general-proxy of the size of the serial correlation can be observed because
as 1';r-1 approaches zero the model is also approaching equilibrium (an absence of serial
208
correlation). Large values of 13/1 for 1',t-l indicate large correlation, similar to
large values of rho (p) for an AR(l) term (Finkel 1995; Frees 2004).
Finally, a good measure to the overall need (or lack of need) of the need to
difference the dependent variable is the unit root test. The model is said to possess a unit
root when the error is non-stationary in the time-series. That is, the moments of the
stochastic process depend on t. In other words, Y is correlated with the error in some
proceeding value of 1', in time or 1', "remembers" the error of YiH perfectly (at least the
time before, but it can take on a more complicated structure than Yit - 1 ) (O'Brien 2001). A
unit root occurs when a random shock at one period is perfectly transmitted to the next
period ("perfect memory") and is particularly likely to occur when the dependent variable
is based on a "stock" rather than a "flow." In this analysis imprisonment rates in a given
year are largely based on the composition of the stock of prisoners the year before with a
small flow component based on those who leave prison and those who enter prison
(Levin, Lin, and Chu 2002).
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is likely the most appropriate unit root
test for this analysis because of the complicated error structure. IOO It tests the null
hypothesis that a time series is serially correlated assuming that the data dynamics have
an ARMA structure (Levin, Lin, and Chu 2002; Ng and Perron 2001). In this analysis
the unchanged dependent variable model fails the ADF test while with the conditioned
change-score model the null is rejected suggesting the conditional moving average
differenced model was successful in correcting the autoregressive error structure at a lag
100 See Ng and Perron 2001 for a more detailed discussion of why the ADF test is the most appropriate
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of 1 (for additional discussion of the importance of choosing the correct lag see
Ng and Perron (2001).
It is believed that the conditional change model used in this analysis,
L1Y == [30 + [31X1it .. ·[3nX nit + [3n+l"Y;t-l + ij •• in_j + L1~t +Eit , supplies considerable advantages,
yielding consistent and efficient point estimates. The coefficient's interpretations are
both theoretically desirable and statistically robust and produce results that can be
interpreted as the average effect of the aggregate within panel change over time as a
result of the implementation of reforms. Furthermore, in addition to passing the Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) unit-root test, this model passes both the Hausman and Munlak tests,
suggesting not unit-specific and time-specific omitted variable bias is present.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED DISCUSSION OF
SENTENCING REFORMS FOR CHAPTER V
Sentencing guidelines consist of a table of possible sentences with a very narrow
range within a sentencing category that is defined by an offender's criminal history (prior
offenses) mnning across the top of the table and the severity of the current offense
mnning down the side of the table. These are the two main determinates that are cross-
referenced to determine the box in which the judge will find the sentencing range. The
table makes up the technical apparatus informing the judge's "automation of paragraphs"
suggested by Weber (1978). It is important to note that while sentencing guidelines were
established in each state under the same general principles, guidelines' design and
implementation vary considerably from state to state (Frase 2005; Stemen, Rengifo, and
Wilson 2006; U.S. 1996).
Tonry (1995) argue, it may be more appropriate to consider guidelines as falling
on a continuum from stmctured to loose. Additionally, researchers rightfully
acknowledged the "fixedness" of sentencing guidelines vary considerably from state-to-
state. Some voluntary systems like Missouri have very limited ranges giving little leeway
to judges who choose to follow them, while a state like Pennsylvania, which is
categorized as presumptive, has rather large ranges allowing judges some level of
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discretion. I have chosen to leave further discussion of guidelines diversity to
another analysis.
Also, this study will assess statutory presumptive sentencing, another attempt to
shift the correctional system from a rehabilitation model to a crime control model.
Statutory presumptive sentencing, like sentencing guidelines, represents an attempt to
create uniformity within similarly situated crimes, but acts less like a sentencing rubric.
It specifies an appropriate or "normal" sentence for each offense. It can be considered
along with other relevant factors (aggravating or mitigating circumstances), but its intent
is to "fit the punishment to the crime" rather than "fit the punishment to the offender'"
(Brewer, Beckett, and Holt 1981; Frase 1995; Savelsberg 1992).101
Additionally, this study will incorporate an assessment of determinate sentencing
(abolishment of parole) and truth in sentencing laws. They represent the first attempt to
limit the variation in imprisonment. The reforms, like the other "fixed" sentencing
reforms, shifts the role of the correctional system from a rehabilitation model to a crime
control model. In contrast to the two previously mentioned reforms, the focus lies in the
"back-end" mechanism of prisoner release as opposed to the "front-end" of sentencing.
In general, determinate sentencing is used to refer to a system without discretionary
parole boards. While ultimately determinate sentencing operates independently from the
type of sentencing procedure used (indeterminate, guidelines, or statutory presumptive),
the reform fits into the "fixed" sentencing category because the amount of time served is
101 As with other sentencing refonns, considerable variation between states adopting statutory presumptive
sentencing exists. For this analysis, the important point is that this sentencing procedure again represents a
shift from the indetenninate model to a model focused on equalizing the variation in sentencing across
similar crimes by "fixing" the sentence to the crime.
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more assured (Griset 1995; Kempf-Leonard and Sample 2001; Stemen, Rengifo,
and Wilson 2006). Truth in sentencing on the other hand does not necessarily dictate the
elimination of parole boards, but does require that offenders serve a statutorily defined
minimum amount of time limiting the power of parole boards or other release
mechanisms. Only states meeting the 1994 federal omnibus crime bill102 minimum 85%
time-served of original sentence are considered in this analysis.
102 The 1994 Federal Omnibus Crime Bill refers to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994 which allocated 30 billion dollars to law enforcement and included a truth in sentencing provision.
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APPENDIXD
DETAILED TABLES FOR CHAPTER V
Appendix D offers detailed tables of the analysis presented in Table 5.6. The
tables here are designed to give an overview of the relative effects, how much the
variable increased or decreased the adoption rates (Xie 1994). The effects are presented
at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. Each of the four models presented in Tables D.2-
D.5 are identical to the models in Table 5.6 and they are numbered sequentially as they
appeared in Table 5.6. Table D.1 is a replication of Table 5.1 outlining the descriptive
statistics of the controls variables from the event-history analysis and supplies the
percentiles used to calculate their relative effects.
Table D.l. Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables
Mean St Dev. 25th Per 50th Per 75th Per
Crime & Justice Controls
Imprisonment Rate 223.622 162.612 92 173 328
Violent Crime Arrest Rate 156.8338 115.292 77.507 129.029 207.716
Drug Crime Arrest Rate 272.446 209.335 109.622 238.034 388.369
Demographic Controls
South*
Percent Black 10.288 9.304 3.130 7.801 15.042
Percent Hispanic 5.685 7.868 1.067 2.457 6.679
Percent Unemployment 5.059 2.417 3.300 5.000 6.400
Percent Under Poverty 12.895 4.330 9.700 12.00 15.328
State Population Density 139.427 183.367 30.833 74.781 149.990
Percent Urban 66.922 8.837 55.772 69.318 81.233
Political Controls
Republican State House -.853 2.434 -2.971 -1.882 1.792
Republican State Senate -.760 2.499 -3.037 -1.609 1.998
Republican Govemor*
State Revenues 359079.7 239502.1 219517.1 321616.3 420762.6
* Indicates a dummy variable
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Table D.2. Sentencing Guidelines
Modell 25 Percentile 50 Percentile 75 Percentile
Crime & Justice Controls
Imprisonment Rate 0.00477 1.012 1.039 1.075
(0.018)
Violent Crime AlTest Rate 0.00305 1.968 3.044 5.552
(0.002)
Drug Crime AlTest Rate 0.00388*** 1.439 2.430 4.501
(0.002)
Demographic Controls
South 0.567 1.763 1.763 1.763
(1.047)
Percent Black -0.0267 0.920 0.812 0.669
(0.061)
Percent Hispanic -0.351 *** 0.688 0.422 0.096
(0.131)
Percent Unemployment 0.523*** 5.618 13.667 28.423
(0.119)
Percent Under Poverty Line -0.230** 0.107 0.063 0.029
(0.113)
State Population Density -0.00166 0.948 0.881 0.773
(0.002)
Percent Urban 0.00983 1.730 1.977 2.222
(0.011)
Political Controls
Republican State House 0.439*** 0.271 0.438 2.196
(0.190)
Republican State Senate 0.427*** 3.657 1.988 0.426
(0.192)
Republican Governor -0.692 0.501 0.501 0.501
(0.551)
State Revenues -0.133 0.703 0.627 0.558
(0.151)
Prior Reform 1.548* 4.702
(0.836)
Time Controls Rate Change
Years 1986-1993 2.399*** 11.012
(0.848)
Years 1994-2008 1.463 4.319
(1.227)
Base Rate
Constant -8.522*** 0.000
(1.498)
Log Likelihood 29.770
Observations 1715
Standard elTors in parentheses, *** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
Note: Modell of Table 5.6.
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Table D.3. Statutory Presumptive Sentencing
Model 2 25 Percentile 50 Percentile 75 Percentile
Crime & Justice Controls
Imprisonment Rate -0.00207 0.995 0.984 0.969
(0.1 08)
Violent Crime Arrest Rate 0.00666* 4.386 11.369 42.229
(0.004)
Drug Crime Arrest Rate 0.000978 1.096 1.251 1.461
(0.003)
Demographic Controls
South -10.94 0.000 0.000 0.000
(33.270)
Percent Black -0.337 0.348 0.072 0.006
(0.217)
Percent Hispanic 0.224** 1.270 1.734 4.464
(0.095)
Percent Unemployment 0.873*** 17.830 78.649 266.987
(0.239)
Percent Under Poverty Line -0.320 0.045 0.021 0.007
(0.255)
State Population Density 0.00891** 1.332 1.980 3.987
(0.004)
Percent Urban -0.00751 0.658 0.594 0.543
(0.026)
Political Controls
Republican State House 0.982*** 0.054 0.158 5.810
(0.324)
Republican State Senate -0.0122 1.038 1.020 0.976
(0.335)
Republican Governor -3.287* 0.037 0.037 0.037
(1.977)
State Revenues 1.444 45.973 157.783 558.201
(0.820)
Prior Reform -11.82 0.000 0.000 0.000
(48.670)
Time Controls Rate Change
Years 1986-1993 -21.56 0.000
149.880
Years 1994-2008 -27.34 0.000
47.990
Base Rate
Constant -15.52*** 0.000
(3.799)
Log Likelihood 21.492
Observations 1769
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<O.OI, ** p<0.05, * p<O.1
Note: Model 2 of Table 5.6.
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Table D.4. Determinate Sentencing
Model 3 25 Percentile 50 Percentile 75 Percentile
Crime & Justice Controls
Imprisonment Rate 0.0161 1.042 1.137 1.275
(0.021)
Violent Crime Arrest Rate -0.00328 0.483 0.302 0.158
(0.002)
Drug Crime Arrest Rate 0.00457* 1.535 2.846 5.882
(0.002)
Demographic Controls
South -0.512 0.599 0.599 0.599
(1.389)
Percent Black 0.0602 1.207 1.599 2.473
(0.072)
Percent Hispanic -0.208* 0.801 0.600 0.249
(0.114)
Percent Unemployment 0.480*** 4.874 11.023 21.585
(0.148)
Percent Under Poverty Line -0.0579 0.570 0.499 0.412
(0.134)
State Population Density -0.00563* 0.834 0.649 0.417
(0.003)
Percent Urban 0.0191 * 2.902 3.758 4.719
(0.011)
Political Controls
Republican State House 0.540** 0.201 0.362 2.631
(0.236)
Republican State Senate 0.659*** 7.397 2.888 0.268
(0.224)
Republican Governor 0.651 1.917 1.917 1.917
(0.719)
State Revenues -0.095 0.778 0.717 0.660
(0.254)
Prior Reform 4.967 *** 143.595 143.595 143.595
(1.162)
Time Controls Rate Change
Years 1986-1993 -0.850 0.427
(1.264)
Years 1994-2008 -0.922 0.398
(1.419)
Base Rate
Constant -11.130 0.000
(1.960)
Log Likelihood 15.337
Observations 1767
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
Note: Model 3 of Table 5.6.
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Table D.S. Truth in Sentencing
Model 4 25 Percentile 50 Percentile 75 Percentile
Crime & Justice Controls
Imprisonment Rate 0.0098 1.025 1.082 1.159
(0.016)
Violent Crime Arrest Rate -0.000518 0.891 0.828 0.747
(0.001)
Drug Crime Arrest Rate 0.00398*** 1.452 2.486 4.679
(0.001)
Demographic Controls
South -2.837* 0.059 0.059 0.059
(1.149)
Percent Black 0.0741 1.261 1.783 3.048
(0.050)
Percent Hispanic -0.185*** 0.821 0.635 0.291
(0.062)
Percent Unemployment 0.181 1.817 2.472 3.185
(0.213)
Percent Under Poverty Line 0.0885 2.360 2.892 3.883
(0.083)
State Population Density -0.00228 0.929 0.840 0.702
(0.001)
Percent Urban 0.012 1.953 2.297 2.651
(0.013)
Political Controls
Republican State House 0.293** 0.419 0.576 1.690
(0.143)
Republican State Senate 0.109 1.392 1.192 0.804
(0.156)
Republican Governor 0.787 2.197 2.197 2.197
(0.510)
State Revenues -0.555*** 0.230 0.143 0.088
(0.217)
Prior Reform 1.897*** 6.666 6.666 6.666
(0.578)
Time Controls Rate Change
Years 1986-1993 0.505*** 1.657
0.147
Years 1994-2008 3.935*** 51.162
(0.139)
Base Rate
Constant -12.46 0.000
(1.752)
Log Likelihood 76.135
Observations 1754
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<O.O 1, ** p<0.05, * p<O.1
Note: Model 4 of Table 5.6.
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Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables (DV)
Change in Imprisonment Rate*
Black to White Impris. Rate**
Hispanic to White Impr. Rate**
Female to White Impris.***
Crime Variables
Violent Crime Rate
Drug Crime Rate
Female to Male Violent Crime
Female to Male Drug Crime
Female to Male Property Crime
Demographic Variables
Percent Black
Percent Hispanic
Percent Unemployment
Percent Under the Poverty Line
Population Density
Percent Urban
South"
Political Variables
Republican House
Republican Senate
Republican Governor"
State Revenues
Prior Reform"
Imprisonment Variables
8.344
6.992
1.856
0.057
156.834
272.446
0.139
0.191
0.308
10.288
5.685
5.056
12.895
139.427
66.922
-0.853
-0.760
359079.700
13.332
4.159
2.222
0.030
115.292
209.335
0.057
0.074
0.115
9.304
7.868
2.417
4.330
183.367
18.837
2.434
2.499
239502.100
-116.138
0.035
0.001
0.054
58.996
13.221
0.055
0.078
0.056
0.020
0.247
0.000
2.900
0.385
0.000
0.000
-4.074
-3.912
0.000
127068.000
0.000
131.602
28.177
13.771
0.248
725.512
1337.498
0.455
0.957
1.382
97.274
65.433
18.000
31.500
997.349
182.590
1.000
3.689
3.734
1.000
3700724.000
1.000
New Commitment 86.318 150.139 7.0529 3237.291
Parole Violators Returned 25.282 33.865 0 267.844
"Indicates Dummy Variable, * DV Chapter 1, ** DV Chapter 2, *** DV Chapter 3
Note: Table E.1. gives the mean, standard deviation (Std. Dev.) and the range (Min and Max) for all
variables used in this analysis with the exception of the sentencing reform variables.
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